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Abstract—Coconut is a novel selective disclosure credential
scheme supporting distributed threshold issuance, public and
private attributes, re-randomization, and multiple unlinkable se-
lective attribute revelations. Coconut integrates with blockchains
to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and availability even when
a subset of credential issuing authorities are malicious or offline.
We implement and evaluate a generic Coconut smart contract
library for Chainspace and Ethereum; and present three ap-
plications related to anonymous payments, electronic petitions,
and distribution of proxies for censorship resistance. Coconut
uses short and computationally efficient credentials, and our
evaluation shows that most Coconut cryptographic primitives
take just a few milliseconds on average, with verification taking
the longest time (10 milliseconds).
I. INTRODUCTION
Selective disclosure credentials [17], [20] allow the is-
suance of a credential to a user, and the subsequent unlinkable
revelation (or ‘showing’) of some of the attributes it encodes to
a verifier for the purposes of authentication, authorization or
to implement electronic cash. However, established schemes
have shortcomings. Some entrust a single issuer with the
credential signature key, allowing a malicious issuer to forge
any credential or electronic coin. Other schemes do not provide
the necessary re-randomization or blind issuing properties
necessary to implement selective disclosure credentials. No
existing scheme provides all of threshold distributed issuance,
private attributes, re-randomization, and unlinkable multi-show
selective disclosure.
The lack of full-featured selective disclosure credentials
impacts platforms that support ‘smart contracts’, such as
Ethereum [51], Hyperledger [16] and Chainspace [3]. They
all share the limitation that verifiable smart contracts may only
perform operations recorded on a public blockchain. Moreover,
the security models of these systems generally assume that
integrity should hold in the presence of a threshold number
of dishonest or faulty nodes (Byzantine fault tolerance); it
is desirable for similar assumptions to hold for multiple
credential issuers (threshold issuance).
Issuing credentials through smart contracts would be very
desirable: a smart contract could conditionally issue user
credentials depending on the state of the blockchain, or attest
some claim about a user operating through the contract—such
as their identity, attributes, or even the balance of their wallet.
This is not possible, with current selective credential schemes
that would either entrust a single party as an issuer, or would
not provide appropriate re-randomization, blind issuance and
selective disclosure capabilities (as in the case of threshold
signatures [5]). For example, the Hyperledger system supports
CL credentials [17] through a trusted third party issuer, il-
lustrating their usefulness, but also their fragility against the
issuer becoming malicious.
Coconut addresses this challenge, and allows a subset of
decentralized mutually distrustful authorities to jointly issue
credentials, on public or private attributes. Those credentials
cannot be forged by users, or any small subset of potentially
corrupt authorities. Credentials can be re-randomized before
selected attributes being shown to a verifier, protecting privacy
even in the case all authorities and verifiers collude. The
Coconut scheme is based on a threshold issuance signature
scheme, that allows partial claims to be aggregated into a
single credential. Mapped to the context of permissioned and
semi-permissioned blockchains, Coconut allows collections of
authorities in charge of maintaining a blockchain, or a side
chain [5] based on a federated peg, to jointly issue selective
disclosure credentials.
Coconut uses short and computationally efficient creden-
tials, and efficient revelation of selected attributes and verifi-
cation protocols. Each partial credential and the consolidated
credential is composed of exactly two group elements. The size
of the credential remains constant regardless of the number
of attributes or authorities/issuers. Furthermore, after a one-
time setup phase where the users collect and aggregate a
threshold number of verification keys from the authorities,
the attribute showing and verification are O(1) in terms of
both cryptographic computations and communication of cryp-
tographic material—irrespective of the number of authorities.
Our evaluation of the Coconut primitives shows very promising
results. Verification takes about 10ms, while signing a private
attribute is about 3 times faster. The latency is about 600
ms when the client aggregates partial credentials from 10
authorities distributed across the world.
Contribution. This paper makes three key contributions:
• We describe the signature schemes underlying Coconut,
including how key generation, distributed issuance, aggre-
gation and verification of signatures operate (Sections II
and III). The scheme is an extension and hybrid of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
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presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
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3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the sche e on hidd n me sage ). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alber o: compare re ults (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initializ d t
zero). In the case of a petition the options are nly YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut whe deeply related to blo kchains), since w
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilin ar pairing works over a Barr to-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Op nSSL as the rithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSi n 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Pe formances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System valuation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): lient
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind si natures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citize of C. Th authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this s gnature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaig . Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, ner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniqu ly identifies the petition, and
the scores paramet r holds the citizen’s vot s (initialized to
zero). In t e case of a petition the o tions ar only YES
and NO; a d the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built f om a sign d private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how th CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since w
actually built all of this to have redentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tl b [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clea message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
present d in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
m ssage on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The h ghe t transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden me sage. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s a sociated with the message is pproximat ly
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n auth rity): lient
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compa results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overvi w of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citize of C. T e authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind a d long- rm sig atur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and -voting campa gn. Succ s ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifi s the p titi , and the
scores par m ter holds the citizen’s votes (initi liz d to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t optio s are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities i suing the
cred ntia s. I order to sign the petitio , the users compute
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluatio
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSig 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perf rmances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h pr cedur d scrib d in section ection II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 m asured on an Octa- ore
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. Th s table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times fa ter for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in pract ce m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Upd te the above
3https://github.com/asonni o/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these tok t steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of M let im-
plies that the adversary needs o c rrup at least t
auth rities for this att ck to happen. This pr p rty
also prev nts a si gle authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving -petition and e-
vot
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs th Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters , t are set accordingly, and re f
po t to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expe ting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
catio k y of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order t sig a petition, the users compute a value n as
foll ws:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th etitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s th vote of t e us rs to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citiz to vote
twice during the same campaign (preven do ble spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
pr p rties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a s ngle au-
thority from cre ting arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previo s example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs th Cr ate f nction of the CoC Nut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. T e authorities se q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and l ng-term sig atur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature a ts as the citizen credentia s t ign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and t fields owner and verifier respectiv ly hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign t e petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
k
1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowled e proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (pr vent double spending), while t e proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Georg , Describe how the CoCoNut autho ities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as n open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the ean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the sch me working o clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operatio µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSi n 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
B in Sign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBli dSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Agg gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O( ) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the commu icat on compl xity and the
size of e ch exchange involv d in the sign ture cheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authori ies (n), and ||m|| represent the size of the
message on which the u er wi h to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest tr nsaction siz appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it take to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alber o: disc ss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authoriti s in
charge of C runs the Create function of t e CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the use to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, a d are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citiz n credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the pe ition contra t as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifi , options, score ) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case f a petition the opti ns a e only YES
and NO; and he fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
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Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, an build a zero-knowl dge proof showi g that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built fr m a signed private k y k.
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that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (ab ut
15 times faster for the sch me workin on clea messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
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Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± .003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden m s age:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
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aggregation of key and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexi y and t e
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presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a si nature. Not
that in practice m is the hash of the actual messag , nd is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the pr of  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
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Similarly to the previous example, a s t of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points t a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities s t q = 1, a d are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
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gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized t
zero). I the c se of a petiti n the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the pe ition and of
auth riti s i suing the crede tials. I order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value as f llows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during th same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   e sures
tha   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actu lly built all of this to have credenti ls in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for th scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authoriti s: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y sig ature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication omplexity and transactio size.
a d 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as t e number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
messag on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the h sh of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears wh n the ser
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alb rto: @Ba o, test ystem on AWS (n aut ority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed nd size) with alternativ s
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petitio architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The para eters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom fun tion equiring the use to prove in some ways that
he is a citiz n of C. The aut oritie t q = 1, an are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm igna ure on the citizen’s iv te
key k; this s gnature acts s the citiz c den ials to sign
any e-petition nd e-vot g campa gn. Succes ively, any hird
party create a instance of the petition contra t as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely i entifies t e p tition, and the
scores paramet r holds the citiz n’s votes (initializ d to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k r spect vely h ld the public key of the
third party creating the p tition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and bu ld a zero-knowledg proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measur s: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyg 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSi n 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Ra d ize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rformances evaluation.
Numbe of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signat on clear mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
S g ature on hidden message:
  ask ignature O(n) 516
À get ignature O(n) 132
Ã verify sig atur O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Inte Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying sig atures (about
15 times f ster for the scheme wo king on cl ar messag s,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of ke s a d ignatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fi . 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in pract ce m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview f the Mal t petition architecture
Bano: Re o his fig re as p r Ba o’s notes, nd then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these toke to ste l all the money
in the buffer. The threshold prop rty of Malet im-
plies that the adversary eeds to rrup at least t
auth ritie for this att ck to happen. This pr perty
also prev nts a si gl auth rity from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petiti n and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a cust m function req iring the users to prove
in some ways that they are citizens of C. The auth ri-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are exp cting to issue
a blind and long-ter signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen crede tials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields ow an vk resp c vely hold the verifi-
cation k y of th third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authoriti s issuing the credentials.
In orde to sign a p titio , the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part f a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vot of the us rs to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Proper ies brought by Malet. M let provides a set of
pr perties that enable th abov application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citize ’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the sers to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
throug the issuance phase only once, and can the
re-use their cre ent als multiple time while st ying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 C nso ship- sistant dist ibution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to th previou example, a of au horit es in
charge of C runs th Cre te func on of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set c ordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in s m ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, sc res) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, sc r ) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options ar only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and ve ifier respectiv ly h ld
the public key of the third par y creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their v te to the options, app nd   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-k owledg proof showi g that   is
build from the same value x of their cr dentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen t vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain n des
Alberto: @George, Describ how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme h s been implem nt d i python
using the two cryp libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, usi g
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. W have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and st ndard devia ion (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop omputer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme workin on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rand mize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlin Sign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perform nces evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Trans ction complexity size [B]
Sig ature on clear mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) || ||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signat re on hidden me sa e:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity nd transaction size.
and 3 ime f s er for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficie t.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
present d in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
tha in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 byte (for SHA-2). The ize of a signatur is
132 bytes. The high st transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Ban , t st s stem on AWS ( authority): client
l tency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from a horities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is co l stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.co /asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen c edentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, y t i d party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, cor s) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniq ely id ntifie the petition, and
the scores parameter holds t e citizen’ votes (initi ized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the cre entials. In order to sign th petiti n,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, appe d   to a sp nt
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof sho ing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during th s me
campaign (prevent double sp nding), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, De cribe ho the C CoNut autho iti s
can also be Chainspace node (to make clear the pot ntial
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockcha ns), since w
actually built all of this to have cr dentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Nae rig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have eleas the code
as an ope - ource project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard d viation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bli dSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBli dSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number f authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra saction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on idden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communic tion c mplexi y and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the sc eme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregatio of keys and signatures are xt emely efficient.
Table II shows the communication compl xity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The compl xity is expressed as the number
of signing author ties (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
m ssage on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
ther fore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated ith the message is approximately
318 bytes; th proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: pdate the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): cli nt
laten y vs t – ask n signa ures (and n blind signatures) an
che k the time it takes to hear back from t authoriti s.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have ac ually be n
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s ivate
key k; this signature acts as the citizen cr dentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifi r, options, cor s) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter olds th citizen’s votes (in tialized to
zero). In the ase f a petition the opti n are o ly YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and f
authorities issuing the credentials. In order t si n the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vot to the options, app d   to a sp nt
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof s o ing that   is
build from the same value x f their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citiz n to vote wice during the same
campaign (prevent doub pend g), hile the proof   sur s
that   has been built from a signed private k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, De cribe ho the C CoNut author ties
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockcha ns), since w
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented n python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz I tel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
K yge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pre areBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rformance evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transactio complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signatur O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication c mplexity and tr nsaction size.
a 3 ti e fast r for th scheme on hid en mes ag s). Also,
ggregation of key and signature are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ang involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is express d as the nu ber
of signi g authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which t user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that n practice m s the hash of the actual message, and is
therefo set to 32 byt s (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the us r
ask signature o a hidden message. This comes from t fact
th the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n bli d signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see w y it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Fig. 5: Overview of the C CoN t petitio architectur .
Similarly to the previous example, a set of auth rities in
charge of C runs the Cr a e function of he CoCo ut librar .
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref o nts to a
custom function requiring th user t prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The auth rities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signatu e on th citizen’s priva
key k; this signature act as the citizen cr dentials to sign
any e-petition and -voting campa gn. Su ces iv ly, any third
party create a instance of the petitio co t ct as s ow in 5.
The UUID paramet r quely identifies th p tition, and the
scores parameter holds th citizen’s votes (initialized o z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options ar ly YES and NO; a d
the fields owner and k r spectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuin th
credentia s. In order to sign he petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, ap nd   to a sp
list L, and build a zero-kn wledge proof showing that   i
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has bee implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] nd bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works ver a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measu s: 10,000
Operation µ [m ]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyg n 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Ag regateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr pareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
S owBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
ggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Pe formances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature o clear messag :
  a k signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verif signat re O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature o hidden message:
  sk signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an op n-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the xecution of h procedure described in section sec ion II.
Each entr is the result of 10,000 measur d on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz I tel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster tha verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for th scheme o hid en messages . Also,
aggr gation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message n w ich the user wi h to obtai a signature. Note
that in ractice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transacti n size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden messa e. This omes from the fact
that the proof  s ass ciated with e m sage is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Bano’s not s, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold p op rty of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single uthority from taking t user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving -petiti n and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all th entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this s heme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citiz ns of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term sig ature on the itiz n’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition a d e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then ho will bl ndness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifie t e petition, and th score param ter
Bano: is t is private (can everyone see current sc res)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and th fields own r and vk respectively hold the verifi-
c tion key f th hird party creatin th petition and the
ver ficati key of the auth rities issuing the credentials.
In rder to sign a petition, the sers compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that is build fr the same valu k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petiti sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, nd checks hat the vote is fresh by verifying
that n i not part of a spe t l st L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
u to t li t L. Ad ng n to L prevents a citizen o vote
twice during the same campaign (pr vent double spend-
ing). Also, h proof p ens res that n has been built from
a signed private k y k; this means that th users correctly
xecuted the call ack to prove th t they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prev nts the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and u e it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resi tant syste based on
Malet. Proxies are of en used to circumvent censorship
when th target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from t ree limitatio . First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number f countries block Tor by blacklisti g Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Waters signature scheme [50], the BGLS signatur [11],
and th signature sc e f Poi t heval and Sander [41].
This is the first fully distributed threshold issuanc re-
randomizable, multi-show credential scheme of which we
are aware.
• We use Coco ut to implement a generic smart contract
library for Chainspace [3] and one for Ethereum [51],
p rforming public and private at ribute issuing, aggrega-
tion, randomization and selective disclosure (Section IV).
We evaluate their perform nce, and c st wi hin thos
platforms (Section VI).
• We design t ree applicatio using th Coconut c tract
library: a coin tumbler providing payment anonymity;
a privacy preserving electronic petitions; and a proxy
distribution system for a censorship resistance system
(Section V). We impleme t and e aluate the first two
application on the Chai space platform, a d provide a
security and performance evaluatio (Secti VI).
II. OVERVIEW OF COCONUT
Coconut is a selective disclosure cr dential system, sup-
porting t reshold cred ntial issuance of public and private
attributes, re-randomization of credentials to support multiple
unlinkable revelations, and the ab lity t selectively discl se a
subset of attribut s. It is embedded into a smart contract library,
that can be called from other contracts to issue credentials.
The Coconut architecture is illustrated in Figure 1. Any
Coconut user may send a Coconut request command to a set
of Coconut signing authorities; this command specifies a set
of public or encrypted private attributes to be certified into
the credential (Ê). Then, each authority answers with an issue
command delivering a partial credential (Ë). Any user can
collect a threshold number of shares, aggregate them to form
a single consolidated credential, and re-randomize it (Ì). The
use of the credential for authentication is however restricted
to a user who knows the private attributes embedded in the
credential—such as a private key. The user who owns the
credentials can then execute the show protocol to selectively
disclose attributes or statements about them (Í). The showing
protocol is publicly verifiable, and may be publicly recorded.
Coconut has the following design goals:
• Threshold authorities: Only a subset of the authorities is
required to issue partial credentials in order to allow the
users to generate a consolidated credential [10]. The com-
munication complexity of the request and issue protocol is
thus O(t), where t is the size of the subset of authorities.
Furthermore, it is impossible to generate a consolidat d
credenti l from few r th n t partial cr dentials.
• Blind issuance & Unlinkability: The authorities issue
the cr d ntial without earning any additional informat on
bout the p ivate attributes embedded in the credential.
Furthermore, it is imp ssible o link multiple showings of
the credentials with each other, or the issuing transcript,
even if all th aut orities collude (see Section III-B).
• Non-interactivity: The authorities may operate indepen-
dently of e ch other, following a simple key distributi n
and setup phas to agree on public security and crypto-
graphic parameters—they do not need to synchr nize or
further coordinat heir ctivities.
• Liveness: C conut guarantees liveness as long as a
threshold number of authorities remains honest and weak
synchrony assumptions holds for the key distribution [32].
• Efficiency: The credentials and all zero-knowledge proofs
involved in the protocols are short and computationally
efficient. After aggregation and re-randomization, the
attribute showing and verification only involve a single
consolidated credential, and r theref re O(1) in terms
of both cryptographic computations and communication
of cryptographic material—no matter the number of au-
thorities.
• Short credentials: Each part al cr tial—a well as
the c nsolidat d credential—is compos d of exactly two
group elements, no matter the number of authorities or
the number of attributes embedded in the credentials.
As a result, a large number of authorities may be used to
issue credential , wit out ignificantly affecting efficiency.
III. THE COCONUT CONSTRUCTION
We introduce the cryptograhic primitives supporting the
Coconut architecture, step by st p from the design of
Pointcheval and Sanders [41] and Boneh et al. [12], [11] to
the full Coconu scheme.
• Step 1: We first recall (Section III-C) the scheme of
Pointcheval et al. [41] for single-attribute credentials. We
present its limitations preventing it from meeting our
design goals presented in Section II, and we show how to
incorporate principles from Boneh et al. [12] to overcome
them.
• Step 2: We introduce (Section III-D) the Coconut thresh-
old credentials scheme, which has all the properties of
Pointcheval and Sanders [41] and Boneh et al. [12], and
allows us to achieve all our design goals.
• Step 3: Finally, we extend (Section III-E) our schemes
to support credentials embedding q distinct attributes
(m1, . . . ,mq) simultaneously.
A. Notations and Assumptions
We present the notation used in the rest of the paper, as
well as the security assumptions on which our primitives rely.
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a) Zero-knowledge proofs: Our credential scheme uses
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to assert knowledge
and relations over discrete logarithm values. We represent
these non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs with the notation
introduced by Camenisch et al. [18]:
NIZK{(x, y, . . . ) : statements about x, y, . . . }
which denotes proving in zero-knowledge that the secret values
(x, y, . . . ) (all other values are public) satisfy the statements
after the colon.
b) Security settings: Coconut requires groups
(G1,G2,GT ) of prime order p with a bilinear map
e : G1 × G2 → GT and satisfying the following properties:
(i) Bilinearity means that for all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and
(x, y) ∈ F2p, e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab; (ii) Non-degeneracy
means that for all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, e(g1, g2) 6= 1;
(iii) Efficiency implies the map e is efficiently computable;
(iv) furthermore, G1 6= G2, and there is no efficient
homomorphism between G1 and G2. The type-3 pairings
are efficient [25]. They support the XDH assumption which
implies the difficulty of the Computational co-Diffie-Hellman
(co-CDH) problem in G1 and G2, and the difficulty of the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G1 [12].
Coconut also relies on a cryptographically secure hash
function H , hashing an element G1 into an other element
of G1, namely H : G1 → G1. We implement this function
by serializing the (x, y) coordinates of the input point and
applying a full-domain hash function to hash this string into
an element of G1 (as Boneh et al. [12]).
B. Scheme Definitions and Security Properties
We present the protocols that comprise a threshold creden-
tials scheme:
v Setup(1λ) → (params): defines the system parameters
params with respect to the security parameter λ. These
parameters are publicly available.
v KeyGen(params) → (sk, vk): run by the authorities to
generate their secret key sk and verification key vk from
the public params.
v AggKey(vk1, . . . , vkt) → (vk): run by whoever wants to
verify a credential to aggregate any subset of t verification
keys vki into a single consolidated verification key vk.
AggKey needs to be run only once.
v IssueCred(m,φ) → (σ): Interactive protocol between a
user and each authority, by which the user obtains a cre-
dential σ embedding the private attribute m satisfying the
statement φ.
v AggCred(σ1, . . . , σt) → (σ): run by the user to aggre-
gate any subset of t partial credentials σi into a single
consolidated credential.
v ProveCred(vk,m, φ′) → (Θ, φ′): run by the user to
compute a proof Θ of possession of a credential certifying
that the private attribute m satisfies the statement φ′ (under
the corresponding verification key vk).
v VerifyCred(vk,Θ, φ′) → (true/false): run by whoever
wants to verify a credential embeding a private attribute
satisfying the statement φ′, using the verification key vk
and cryptographic material Θ generated by ProveCred.
A threshold credential scheme must satisfy the following
security properties:
Unforgeability: It must be unfeasible for an adversarial user
to convince an honest verifier that they are in possession
of a credential if they are in fact not (i.e., if they have not
received valid partial credentials from at least t authorities).
Blindness: It must be unfeasible for an adversarial authority
to learn any information about the attribute m during the
execution of the IssueCred protocol, except for the fact
that m satisfies φ.
Unlinkability / Zero-knowledge: It must be unfeasible for
an adversarial verifier (potentially working with an adversar-
ial authority) to learn anything about the attribute m, except
that it satisfies φ′, or to link the execution of ProveCred
with either another execution of ProveCred or with the
execution of IssueCred (for a given attribute m).
C. Foundations of Coconut
Before giving the full Coconut construction, we first
recall the credentials scheme proposed by Pointcheval and
Sanders [41]; their construction has the same properties as
CL-signatures [17] but is more efficient. The scheme works in
a bilinear group (G1,G2,GT ) of type 3, with a bilinear map
e : G1 ×G2 → GT as described in Section III-A.
v P.Setup(1λ) → (params): Choose a bilinear group
(G1,G2,GT ) with order p, where p is a λ-bit prime number.
Let g1 be a generator of G1, and g2 a generator of G2. The
system parameters are params = (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2).
v P.KeyGen(params) → (sk, vk): Choose a random se-
cret key sk = (x, y) ∈ F2p. Parse params =
(G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2), and publish the verification key
vk = (g2, α, β) = (g2, g
x
2 , g
y
2 ).
v P.Sign(params, sk,m) → (σ): Parse sk = (x, y). Pick
a random r ∈ Fp and set h = gr1 . Output σ = (h, s) =
(h, hx+y·m).
The signature σ = (h, s) is randomizable by choosing
a random r′ ∈ Fp and computing σ′ = (hr′ , sr′). The
above scheme can be modified to obtain credentials on a
private attribute: to run IssueCred the user first picks a
random t ∈ Fp, computes the commitment cp = gt1Y where
Y = gy1 , and sends it to a single authority along with a
zero-knowledge proof of the opening of the commitment. The
authority verifies the proof, picks a random u ∈ Fp, and
returns σ′ = (h′, s′) = (gu, (Xcp)u) where X = gx1 . The
user unblinds the signature by computing σ = (h′, s′(h′)−t),
and this value acts as the credential.
This scheme provides blindness, unlinkability, efficiency
and short credentials; but it does not support threshold issuance
and therefore does not achieve our design goals. This limitation
comes from the P.Sign algorithm—the issuing authority com-
putes the credentials using a private and self-generated random
number r which prevents the scheme from being efficiently
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distributed to a multi-authority setting1. To overcome that
limitation, we take advantage of a concept introduced by BLS
signatures [12]; exploiting a hash function H : Fp → G1
to compute the group element h = H(m). The next section
describes how Coconut incorporates these concepts to achieve
all our design goals.
D. The Coconut Threshold Credential Scheme
We introduce the Coconut threshold credential scheme,
allowing users to obtain a partial credential σi on a private
or public attribute m. In a system with n authorities, a t-out-
of-n threshold credentials scheme offers great flexibility as
the users need to collect only n/2 < t ≤ n of these partial
credentials in order to recompute the consolidated credential
(both t and n are scheme parameters).
a) Cryptographic primitives: For the sake of simplicity,
we describe below a key generation algorithm TTPKeyGen
as executed by a trusted third party; this protocol can however
be executed in a distributed way as illustrated by Gennaro et
al. [26] under synchrony assumption, and as illustrated by
Kate et al. [32] under weak synchrony assumption. Adding
and removing authorities implies a re-run of the key generation
algorithm—this limitation is inherited from the underlying
Shamir’s secret sharing protocol [46] and can be mitigated
using techniques introduced by Herzberg et al. [28].
v Setup(1λ) → (params): Choose a bilinear group
(G1,G2,GT ) with order p, where p is a λ-bit
prime number. Let g1, h1 be generators of G1, and
g2 a generator of G2. The system parameters are
params = (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, h1).
v TTPKeyGen(params, t, n) → (sk, vk): Pick2 two poly-
nomials v, w of degree t−1 with coefficients in Fp, and set
(x, y) = (v(0), w(0)). Issue to each authority i ∈ [1, . . . , n]
a secret key ski = (xi, yi) = (v(i), w(i)), and publish their
verification key vki = (g2, αi, βi) = (g2, gxi2 , g
yi
2 ).
v IssueCred(m,φ) → (σ): Credentials issuance is com-
posed of three algorithms:
v PrepareBlindSign(m,φ) → (d,Λ, φ): The users gen-
erate an El-Gamal key-pair (d, γ = gd1); pick a random
o ∈ Fp, compute the commitment cm and the group
element h ∈ G1 as follows:
cm = g
m
1 h
o
1 and h = H(cm)
Pick a random k ∈ Fp and compute an El-Gamal
encryption of m as below:
c = Enc(hm) = (gk1 , γ
khm)
Output (d,Λ = (γ, cm, c, pis), φ), where φ is an
application-specific predicate satisfied by m, and pis is
defined by:
pis = NIZK{(d,m, o, k) : γ = gd1 ∧ cm = gm1 ho1
∧ c = (gk1 , γkhm) ∧ φ(m) = 1}
1The original paper of Pointcheval and Sanders [41] proposes a sequen-
tial aggregate signature protocol that is unsuitable for threshold credentials
issuance (see Section VII).
2This algorithm can be turned into the KeyGen and AggKey algorithms
described in Section III-B using techniques illustrated by Gennaro et al. [26]
or Kate et al. [32].
v BlindSign(ski,Λ, φ)→ (σ˜i): The authority i parses Λ =
(γ, cm, c, pis), ski = (x, y), and c = (a, b). Recompute
h = H(cm). Verify the proof pis using γ, cm and φ;
if the proof is valid, build c˜ = (ay, hxby) and output
σ˜i = (h, c˜); otherwise output ⊥ and stop the protocol.
v Unblind(σ˜i, d)→ (σi): The users parse σ˜i = (h, c˜) and
c˜ = (a˜, b˜); compute σi = (h, b˜(a˜)−d). Output σi.
v AggCred(σ1, . . . , σt) → (σ): Parse each σi as (h, si) for
i ∈ [1, . . . , t]. Output (h,∏ti=1 slii ), where l is the Lagrange
coefficient:
li =
 t∏
i=1,j 6=i
(0− j)
 t∏
i=1,sj 6=i
(i− j)
−1 mod p
v ProveCred(vk,m, σ, φ′) → (Θ, φ′): Parse σ = (h, s)
and vk = (g2, α, β). Pick at random r′, r ∈ F2p; set
σ′ = (h′, s′) = (hr
′
, sr
′
); build κ = αβmgr2 and ν = (h
′)r.
Output (Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv), φ′), where φ′ is an application-
specific predicate satisfied by m, and piv is:
piv = NIZK{(m, r) : κ = αβmgr2 ∧ ν = (h′)r ∧ φ′(m) = 1}
v VerifyCred(vk,Θ, φ′) → (true/false): Parse
Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv) and σ′ = (h′, s′); verify piv using
vk and φ′. Output true if the proof verifies, h′ 6= 1 and
e(h′, κ) = e(s′ν, g2); otherwise output false.
b) Correctness and explanation: The Setup algorithm
generates the public parameters. Credentials are elements of
G1, while verification keys are elements of G2. Figure 2
illustrates the protocol exchanges.
To keep an attribute m ∈ Fp hidden from the author-
ities, the users run PrepareBlindSign to produce Λ =
(γ, cm, c, pis). They create an El-Gamal keypair (d, γ = gd1),
pick a random o ∈ Fp, and compute a commitment cm =
gm1 h
o
1. Then, the users compute h = H(cm) and the encryption
of hm as below:
c = Enc(hm) = (a, b) = (gk1 , γ
khm),
where k ∈ Fp. Finally, the users send (Λ, φ) to the signer,
where pis is a zero-knowledge proof ensuring that m satis-
fies the application-specific predicate φ, and correctness of
γ, cm, c (Ê). Note that all the zero-knowledge proofs required
by Coconut are based on standard sigma protocols to show
knowledge of representation of discrete logarithms; they are
based on the DH assumption [18] and do not require any
trusted setup.
To blindly sign the attribute, each authority i verifies the
proof pis, and uses the homomorphic properties of El-Gamal
to generate an encryption c˜ of hxi+yi·m as below:
c˜ = (ay, hxibyi) = (gkyi1 , γ
kyihxi+yi·m)
Note that every authority must operate on the same element
h. Intuitively, generating h from h = H(cm) is equivalent to
computing h = gr˜1 where r˜ ∈ Fp is unknown by the users
(as in Pointcheval and Sanders [41]). However, since h is
deterministic, every authority can uniquely derive it in isolation
and forgeries are prevented since different m0 and m1 cannot
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previ us xample, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accor ingly, and ref p ints to a
custom function req ring the user to prove in some ays
he is a cit zen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an ins ance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In ord r to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a igned private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potent al
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature s heme has be n implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] an bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] urve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have leased the code
as an open- ource project on Git ub.3.
Table I shows the ean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each p ocedure described i section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transact on complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication compl xity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II sho s t e communication complexity nd the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
present d in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| repr sents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual mess ge, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are s t accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the us r o prove i som ways tha
he is a citiz n of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-t rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signatur acts as t citizen cred ntial to sign any
e-petition and e-voti g campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
op ions, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that is
build from the s me va ue x of their cr entials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent ouble sp ding), while t pr of   ns res
that   has been built from sig e private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to av credentials n smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
Th signature schem has been implemented n python
using t two cryp libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have r l ased the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the schem working on clear mess ges,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSig 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communicatio complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatu es are extremely efficient.
T bl II shows the commun cati n complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature sch me, s
presented in fig 1. T e complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authoriti s (n), an || || represents the size f the
message on which the u er wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This come from th fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to ee why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref poi ts to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, ver fier, options, scor s) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniqu ly identifies the petition, and
the scor s parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the t ird party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users comput a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUAT ON
A. Primitives valuation
The signature scheme has b en impl mented i python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of me sures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify signature O(1) || ||+ 132
Signa ure on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 im faster for th scheme on hidd n m ssages). Also,
ggregation of k y and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and || || represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signatu e. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual mes age, and is
therefo e set to 32 by es (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The high st transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System eval ation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and s ze) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to
custom function requiring th user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are ex ing
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID par m ter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of he
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In ord r to sign the petiti , the u er compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
= PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign ( revent double spending), wh le the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describ how th CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to m ke clear the potential
of CoCoNut when de ply r lated to blockchains), sinc we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.00
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.7 4 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSig 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signa ure on hidden message:
  a k signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as t arithmetic ackend. We have released the code
a pen-s urce project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II hows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. Th s comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token t steal all the money
in the buffer. The thr sho d property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at lea t t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the us r
money and disappear w thout issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy- reservi g e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fiel s owner and vk resp ctively hold th verifi-
cation k y f the third party creating the petition nd the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In or er to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
= PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad the vote of the us rs to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed he callb ck to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that en ble the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a se of auth rities in
ch rge of C runs th Cre te function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters , t are s t acc rdingly, and ref poi ts t
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a ci izen of C. The authoriti s set q = 1, and a e xpec ing
to is ue a b ind nd lo g- erm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signatu ac s as the citizen credentials t sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
creat a instance of e petiti contract as sh wn in ??.
(UUID, own , verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, sc res) (3)
=
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the o tions are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the pe tion and of
authorities issuing the cred nt als. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as foll ws.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zer -knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to bl ckchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when d eply relat d to blockchain ), since we
actually built al of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-N ehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-sourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the m an (µ) and standar deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is t e result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell de ktop computer, 3.6G z I tel X on. This table shows
that signing is uch faster th verifying signatures (about
15 times faster fo the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of me sures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
  [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rand iz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSig 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authoritie : n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction compl xity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À et signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 ime faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of ea h excha ge involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is xpres ed a th number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m s the hash of the actual messag nd is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest trans ction size app ars when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from th fact
th t th proof  s associ ted with the messag is approximately
318 bytes; the pr of  v is only 157 byt s.
Alberto: Update he above
B. System evaluation
Alb rto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signat res (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to ar back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternativ s
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, wner, verifi r, options, sco es) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
th sc res parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case f a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-k owledge roof showing that   s
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   o L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
tha   has b en bu lt from a signe private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe ho the C CoNut uthorities
ca also be Chains ace des (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to ave credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primiti s evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works ver a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arith etic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ource project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-c re
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 t mes faster for the scheme working on clear message ,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get sig ature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ag regation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II hows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange invo ved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signi g authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in pra tice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (f r SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. Sy tem evaluation
Alber o: @Bano, test syst m o AWS (n authority): client
lat ncy v – ask n sign tures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear b ck from t thorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed a ze) with alternatives
o see why t is c l stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and l g-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citiz n credentials to sign any
e-petit o and e-voting campa gn. Successively, any third party
creat an instanc of the petitio contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, opti ns, cores) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the sc res parameter holds the citize ’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a valu  as follow .
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their v te to the options, appe d   to a spent
list L, nd build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build fro the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID   =   k}
ddi g   to L r v nt a citiz to v te twice uring the same
campaign (prevent double sp nding), w ile the proof   sures
that   has been built from a s gn d private key k.
C. Mapping authorities t blockchain nodes
Alberto: @G or e, Describe ho the C CoNut uthorities
ca also be Chains ace odes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all f this to have credentials in sm rt contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalu tion
The signature sche e has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] nd bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Op nSSL as the arit metic backend. We have rel ased the code
as an open-sourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
he xecution of ach rocedure described i se ion section II.
Each ntry is the result of 10,000 measured o an Octa-core
Dell d sktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear messa e:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation f key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each xc ang involv d in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. Th co pl ity i express d as the number
of signing authoriti s (n), and || || represent the size of the
message on which the us r wish to obta n a signature. Note
that in pra tice m i he hash of th actu l m ssage, and is
th refore set 32 bytes (for SHA-2). Th size of a signature is
132 byt s. The highest transac ion size app ars wh n the user
ask a si ature on a hidd n message. This co s from the fact
t a the proof  s associated with th me sag is approximately
318 b tes; the proof  v i onl 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update t e b ve
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test syst on AWS (n authori y): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check th time it takes to hear ack fro t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition arc itecture.
Similarly t the pr vious example, a set of authorities in
ch rge of C runs the Crea function of he CoCoNut library.
The p rameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requ ring the user to pr ve in some ways that
he is a ci izen of C. The authoriti s et q = 1, and a e x t ng
to issu a blind and lo g- rm signatur on the citiz n’s private
key k; hi sign ture acts the citizen cred ntials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instan e of the petition co tract as ow in 5.
The UUID arameter un quely i entifi the p tition, nd the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (i itialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owne and k r s c vely hold the public key of the
third arty crea ing the petition and of author ties issuin the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the user compute a
value  as fo ws.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they a d their v te to the options, append   to a spent
list L, a d build a zero-knowledge pr of showing that is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spe ding), while the proof   ensures
that   has be built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Albe to: @George, Describe how he CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prep reBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Blind ign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signatur O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask sign ture O(n) 516
À et signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
Ope SSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execut on of h procedure described in section section II.
Each e try is the result of 1 , 00 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is uch faster th verifying signatures (about
15 tim s f ster fo the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hi de messages). Also,
aggregation of k ys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the c mmunicati n complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m s the hash of the actual messag , nd is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from th fact
that the proof  s associ ted wit the messag is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 byt s.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Ov rvi w of the Malet petition rchitectur
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps i write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at l ast t
authorities for this attack to happen. his pr perty
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Priva y-pres rving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from t is scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to is u ome lo g term credentials o their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verific tion key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
=
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
d s the vote of he users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed priv te key k; this means that the users correctly
executed th callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properti brough by Malet. Malet provide a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to ign petition
on their ha e. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link c tizens’
vote across campaigns. Join ng unli kability with
bl ndness allows a system here citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: di tributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority f om creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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A.1 Security of the Malet Signature
Scheme
First, the co-CDH problem can be rephrased in this con-
text as follows: it is computationally unfeasible for an
algorithm C knowing only (g2,ga2) 2 G22 and h 2 G1
(where a 2 Fp) to output ha 2G1.
Then, Pointcheval et al. [30] proposed an assumption
based on the LRSWAssumption [28] and on the co-CDH
problem that can be rephrased in our context as follows.
Considering vk = (g2,gx2,g
y
2) 2 G32 where x,y 2 F2p, an
oracleO(m) on inputm2Fp chooses a random h2G1\1
and outputs the pair s = (h,e) = (h,hx+my); given vk and
unlimited access toO , it is computationally unfeasible to
output s for a new m0 2 Fp that has not been queried to
O .
Finally, we create a modified oracle O 0 that acts ex-
actly as O but doesn’t generate h at random; it computes
h = H(gm1 ) instead. Under the Random Oracle Assump-
tion, the EUF-CMA security of our scheme follows from
the above since the modified oracleO 0 is perfectly equiv-
alent to a signing oracle.
A.2 Security of the Malet Anonymous Cre-
dentials Scheme
The following paragraphs argue about the unforgeabil-
ity, unlinkability and blindness of the Malet anonymous
credentials scheme.
Unforgeability. The unforgeability of the Malet
anonymous credentials scheme relies on the unforgeabil-
ity of the underlying signature scheme (see Theorem 1).
It can be shown that if there is a forger A capable of
forging a credential, then an algorithm C can query A
to break the underlying signature scheme. Intuitively,
C would execute PrepareBlindSign and get a forgery
from A on a hidden attribute m; then uses her private
El-Gamal key to call Unblind on the credential and
output a valid forgery on the signature scheme.
Unlinkability. The unlinkability property means that
the verifier cannot link multiple executions of the
ShowSign$ BlindVerify protocol between each other
or with the execution of PrepareBlindSign$ Bli d-
Sign (for a given attribute m). This property is enabled
by the possibility to re-randomize the signature. Intu-
itively, given two randomized signatures, s0 and s1 on
the attributes m0 and m1, respectively; there is no adver-
sary capable to distinguish which one is a signature on
m0 and which one is a signature on m1, since both signa-
ture are randomly distributed overG21. More specifically,
considering signature s on the attributem, one can pick a
random t 2 Fp and randomized this signature as follows:
s 0 = Randomiz (s) = (ht ,e t)
Therefore, we can argue that since t is randomly dis-
tributed in Fp, s 0 is randomly distributed in G21.
Blindness. Blindness ensures that the signer will not
learn any additional information about the messages m
during the execution of BlindSign. This property is
guaranteed by the security prop rties of the El-Gamal
encryptio system since the input of BlindSign is an
El-Gamal encryption of m. Also, the ShowBlindSign
algorithm does not reveal any information about m nei-
ther by the zero-kn wledge pro erty of the proof pv.
i
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A SKETCH OF SECURITY PROOFS
This appendix sketches the security proofs of the cryptographic
construction described in Section 3.
Unforgeability. First, the co-CDH problem can be rephrased in
this context as follows: it is computationally unfeasible for an al-
gorithm C knowing only ( 2, a2 ) 2 G22 and h 2 G1 (where a 2 Fp )
to output ha 2 G1. Then, Pointcheval et al. [31] proposed an as-
sumption based on the LRSW Assumption [27] and on the co-CDH
problem that can be rephrased in our context as follows. Consid-
ering  k = ( 2, x2 , 
 
2 ) 2 G32 where x ,  2 F2p , an oracle O(m) on
input m 2 Fp chooses a random h 2 G1\1 and outputs the pair
  = (h,  ) = (h,hx+  ·m ); given  k and unlimited access to O, it is
computationally unfeasible to output   for a newm0 2 Fp that has
not been queried to O.
Finally, we create a modified oracle O0 that acts exactly as O but
doesn’t generate h at random; it computes h = H ( s1) instead as
described in Section 3.4. Under the Random Oracle Assumption, the
EUF-CMA security of our scheme follows from the above since the
modified oracle O0 is perfectly equivalent to a signing oracle.
Blindness. Blindness ensures that the signer will not learn any
additional information about the attributem during the execution of
BlindSign. This property is guaranteed by the security properties
of the El-Gamal encryption system since the input of BlindSign
is an El-Gamal encryption of m. Also, the ShowBlindSign al-
gorithm does not reveal any information about m neither by the
zero-knowledge property of the proof    .
Unlinkability. The unlinkability property means that the verifier
cannot link multiple executions of the ShowSign and BlindVerify
protocol between each other, or with the execution of Pr par -
BlindSign and BlindSign (for a given attributem). This p o r y is
enabled by the possibility to re-randomize the credent al. Intui v y,
given two randomized credentials,  0 and  1 on the attr butesm0 and
m1, respectively; there is no adversary capable to distinguish which
one embedsm0 and which one embedsm1, since both credentials
are randomly distributed over G21. More specifically, considering
credential   on the attributem, one can pick a r ndom r 0 2 Fp an
randomize this credential as follows:
  0 = Randomize(  ) = (hr 0 , sr 0)
Therefore, we can argue that since r 0 is random y distribute in Fp ,
  0 is randomly distributed in G21.
B ETHEREUM TUMBLER
We extend the example of the tumbler application described in Sec-
tion 5.1 to the Ethereum version of the Coconut library, with a few
modifications to reduce the gas costs incurred and to ad pt t e sys-
tem for Ethereum. Instead of having   (the numb r of coins) as an
attribute, which would increase the number of ell tic rve ul-
tipications required to verify the credentials, we al for a fix d
number of instances of Coconut to be setup for differe t den mina-
tions for  . The Tumbler has a Deposit method, where users can
deposit Ether into the contract, and then send an issuan e requ st
to authorities on one private attribute: addr | |s, where ddr is th
destination address of the merchant, and s is a randomly generated
sequence number (1). It is necessary for addr to be a part of the
attribute because once the attribute is revealed, the credential can b
spent by anyone with knowledge of the attribute (including any peers
monitoring the blockchain for transactions), therefore the credential
must be bounded to a specific recipient address before it is revealed.
This issuance request is signed by the Ethereum ddr ss tha d -
posited the Ether into the smart contract, as proof that e r quest
is asso iated with a valid deposit, and sent to the authori i s (2). As
addr and s will be both revealed at the same time when withdrawing
the token, we concatenate these in one attribute to save elliptic curve
operations.
After the authorities issued the cre entials to the s rs (3), they
aggregate them and re-randomize them as usual. The resulting token
can then be passed to the Withdraw function, whe the withd wer
reveals addr and s (4). As usual, the contract maintains a m p of s
values associated with tokens that have already be n withd awn to
prevent double-spending. After checking that the token’s cre entials
verifies and the it has not already been spent, the contract sends   to
the Ether um destination address addr (5).
( , , c, s )
( ˜i )
( , , , v )
t
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A SKETCH OF SECURITY PROOFS
This appendix sketches the security proofs of the cryptographic
construction described in Section 3.
Unforgeability. First, the co-CDH problem can be rephrased in
this context as follows: it is computationally unfeasible for an al-
gorithm C knowing only ( 2, a2 ) 2 G22 and h 2 G1 (where a 2 Fp )
to output ha 2 G1. Then, Pointcheval et al. [31] proposed an as-
sumption based on the LRSW Assumption [27] and on the co-CDH
problem that can be rephrased in our context as follows. Consid-
ering  k = ( 2, x2 , 
 
2 ) 2 G32 where x ,  2 F2p , an oracle O(m) on
input m 2 Fp chooses a random h 2 G1\1 and outputs the air
  = (h,  ) = (h,hx+  ·m ); given  k and unlimited acces to O, it is
computationally unfeasible to output   for a newm0 2 Fp tha has
not been queried to O.
Finally, we create a modified oracle O0 that acts exactly as O but
doesn’t generate h at random; it computes h = H ( s1) instead as
described in Section 3.4. Under the Random Oracle Assumption, the
EUF-CMA security of our scheme follows from the above since the
modifi oracle O0 is perfectly equivalent to a signing oracle.
Blindness. Blindness ensures that the signer will not learn any
additional information about the attributem during the execution of
BlindSign. This property is guaranteed by the security properties
of the El-Gamal encryption system since the input of BlindSign
is an El-Gamal encryption of m. Also, the ShowBli dSign al-
gorithm does not reveal any information about m neither by the
zero-knowledge property of the proof    .
Unlinkability. The unlinkability property means that the verifier
cannot link multiple executions of the ShowSign and BlindVerify
protocol between each other, or with t xecutio of Prep r -
BlindSign and BlindSign (for given attribut m). This prope ty s
enabled by the possibility to re-randomize the cred nti l. Intuitively,
given two randomized credentials,  0 nd  1 n the attributesm0 and
m1, respectively; there is no adversary cap ble to distinguish which
one embedsm0 and which one embedsm1, since both cr dentials
are randomly distributed over G21. More s ecifically, considering a
credential   on the attributem, one can ick a ra dom r 0 2 Fp a d
randomize this credential as follows:
  0 = Rando iz (  ) = (hr 0 , sr 0)
Therefore, we can argue that since r 0 is randomly distributed in Fp ,
  0 is randomly distributed in G21.
B ETHEREUM TUMBLER
We extend the example of the t mbler application descr b d in Sec-
tion 5.1 to the Eth reum ve ion of the Coc nut library, with fe
modifications to reduce the gas costs incur d and o adapt the sys-
tem for Ethereum. Instead of having   (the number of coin ) as an
attribute, which would incre se the number of elliptic curve mul-
tipications required to verify the credentials, we allow for a fixed
number of instances of Coconut to be setup for different denomina-
tions for  . The Tumbler has a Deposit method, where users can
deposit Ether into the contract, and then send n issua ce request
to authorities on one private attrib te: addr | |s, where addr is the
destination address of the m rchant, and is a randomly generate
sequence number (1). It is ne essary for addr to be a part of the
attribute because once the attribute s revealed, the credential can be
spent by anyone with knowledge f the a tribute (including any p rs
monitoring the blockchain for transactions), therefor th credential
must be bounded to a specifi recipi nt address before it is revealed.
This issuance request is signed by th Ethereum address that e-
posited the Ether into smart contract, as pr of that the request
is associated with a valid deposit, a d sent to the author ti s (2). As
addr and s will be both r vealed at the same time hen withdrawing
the token, we concatenate thes in o e att ibu s ve ellipt c curv
operations.
After the authorities issued he credentials to the users (3), they
aggregate them a d re-randomize them as usual. The resulting ken
can then be passed to the Withdraw function, where the withdrawer
reveals addr and s (4). As usual, the con ract maintains a map of
values associated with tokens tha have already been withdrawn to
prevent double-spending. After checking that the token’s credentials
verifies and the it has not already been spent, the c ntract sen s   to
the Ethereum destination address addr (5).
( , , c, s )
( ˜i )
( , , , v )
t
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Ether into the smart contract, as proof that the request is
associated with a valid deposit, and sent to the authorities (2).
As addr and s will be both revealed at the same time when
withdrawing the token, we concatenate these in one attribute
to save elliptic c rve operations.
After e authorities issued the credentials to the users (3),
they aggregate them and re-randomize them as usual. The
resulting token can then be passed to the Withdraw function,
wh re the withdrawer reveals addr and s (4). As usual, the
contract aintai s a map of s v lue associa ed with token
at have alr ady been withdra n to prevent doubl -spen ing.
After checking that the token’s credential verifies nd the
it has not already been spent, the contract sends v to the
Ethereum destination address addr (5).
(⇤, )
( ,⇥, 0)
15
it has not already been spent, the contract sends v to the
Ethereum destination address ddr (5).
(⇥, 0)
15
Fig. 2: Coconut threshold credentials protocol exch ges.
lead to the same value of h.3 As d scribed in Section III-C,
the blind signature scheme of Pointcheval and Sanders builds
the credentials dir ctly from a commitment of the attribute
and a bli di g factor secretly chosen by th authority; this is
unsuitable for issuance f threshold crede tials. We circumvent
that problem by intr ducing the El-Gamal ciphertext c in our
scheme and exploiting its homomorphism, as described above.
Upon reception of c˜, the users decrypt it using their El-
Gamal privat key d t recover th partial credentials σi =
(h, hxi+yi·m); is is performed by the U blind algorithm (Ë).
Then, the users can call the AggCred algorithm to aggregate
any subset of t partial credentials. This algorithm uses the
Lagrange basis polynomial l which allows to reconstruct the
original v(0) a d w(0) through polynomial interpolation;
v(0) =
t∑
i=1
v(i)li a d w(0) =
t∑
i=1
w(i)li
However, this computation happens in the exp nent—neither
the authorities nor the users should know the values v(0) and
w(0). One ca easily verify the correctness of AggCred of t
partial credentials σi = (hi, si) as below.
s =
t∏
i=1
(si)
li =
t∏
i=1
(
hxi+yi·m
)li
=
t∏
i=1
( xi)
li
t∏
i=1
(hyi·m)li =
t∏
=1
h(xili)
t∏
i=1
h(yili)·m
= hv(0)+w(0)·m = hx+y·m
Before verification, the verifier collects and aggregates the
verifications keys of the authorities—this process happens only
once and ahead of time. The algorithms ProveCred and
VerifyCred implement verification. First, the users randomize
the credentials by picking a random r′ ∈ Fp and computing
σ′ = (h′, s′) = (hr
′
, sr
′
); then, they compute κ and ν from
the attribute m, a blinding factor r ∈ Fp and the aggregated
verification key:
κ = αβmgr2 and ν = (h
′)r
Finally, they send Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv) and φ′ to the verifier
where piv is a zero-knowledge proof asserting the correctness
3If an adversary A can obtain two credentials σ0 and σ1 on respectively
m0 = 0 and m1 = 1 with the same value h as follows: σ0 =
hx and σ1 = hx+y ; then A could forge a new credential σ2 on m2 = 2:
σ2 = (σ0)−1σ1σ1 = hx+2y .
f κ and ν; and that private a tribute m emb dded
into σ satisfies the application-specific predicate φ′ (Ì). The
proof piv also ensu es that the users actually know m and
that κ has been built u i g the c rrect verification k ys
and blinding factors. The p iring verification is simi ar o
P intcheval and Sa ders [41] and Boneh et al. [12]; expressing
h′ = gr˜1 | r˜ ∈ Fp, the left-hand side of the pairing verification
can be expanded as:
e(h′, κ) = (h′, g(x+my+r)2 ) = e(g1, g2)
(x+my+r)r˜
and the right-hand side:
e(s′ν, g2) = e(h′(x+my+r), g2) = e(g1, g2)(x+my+r)r˜
From where the correctness of VerifyCred follows.
c) Security: The proof system we require is bas d on
standard igma protocols to show knowledge of representation
of discrete logarithms, and can be rendended non-interactive
using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [24] in the random oracle
model. As our signature scheme is derived from the ones due
to Pointcheval and Sanders [41] and BLS [12], we inherit their
assumptions as well; namely, LRSW [36] and XDH [12].
Theorem 1. Assuming LRSW, XDH, and the existence of
random oracles, Coconut is a secure threshold credentials
scheme, meaning it satisfies unforgeability, blindness, and
unlinkability.
A sketch of this proof, based on the security of the underlying
components of Coconut, can be found in Appendix A.
E. Multi-Attribute Credentials
We expand our scheme to embed multiple attributes into
a single credential without increasi g it s ze; th generaliza-
tion follows dir ctly from the Waters signature scheme [50]
and Pointcheval and Sand rs [41]. The authorities k y pairs
becomes:
sk = (x, y1, . . . , yq) and vk = (g2, g
x
2 , g
y1
2 , . . . , g
yq
2 )
where q is the number of attributes. The multi-attribute creden-
tial is derived from the commi ment cm and the group element
h as below:
cm = g
o
1
q∏
j=1
h
mj
j and h = H(cm)
and the credential generalizes as follows:
σ = (h, hx+
∑q
j=1mjyj )
Note that the credential’s size does not increase with the
number of attributes or authorities—it is always composed
of two group elements. The security proof of the multi-
attribute scheme relies on a reduction against the single-
attribute scheme and is analog to Pointcheval and Sanders [41].
Moreover, it is also possible to combine public and private
attributes to keep only a subset of the attributes hidden from
the authorities, while revealing some others; the BlindSign
algorithm only verifies the proof pis on the private attributes
(similar to Chase et al. [20]). The full primitives of the multi-
attribute cryptographic scheme are presented in Appendix B.
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
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Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
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Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
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PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
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Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
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B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
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The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
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he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
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(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
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  =
 
gk1
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(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
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Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
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of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
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The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
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 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
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presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
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Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The par met rs n, t are set accordingly, and ref po nts t a
custom function requiring the user to prove in s me ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and -voting campaign. Successively, any third party
cre te an instance of the petition cont act as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the C CoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentia s in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The ignature scheme has been implemented in python
using he two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinea pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the ari hmetic backe d. We have released the c de
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Ra domize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden m s ages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity nd the
siz o each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. T complexi y is expressed a the number
of signin uthorities (n), a d ||m|| represents th size of the
messag on which the user wish to obtain sign ture. Note
that in practic m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(U I , own r, verifier, option , scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely id tifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
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TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
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size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
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build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @G orge, Describe how the CoC Nut authorities
can also be C ainspace no (to make clear the p tential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockch ins), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives valuation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregat ign 0.004 ± . 00
Ag regat Keys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefor set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a ignature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS ( authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition archit cture.
Similarly to the prev ous example, set of authorities in
charge of C runs th Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The p rameters n, t are set accordi gly, and ref poi ts to a
custom functio requiring the user to pr ve in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. Th auth riti s et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to i sue blind and long- rm signature on the cit n’s priv t
key k; this signature acts as the citize credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting a pa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of he petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID pa a er un quely i nt fies the p tition, and the
score parameter h lds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e opti s are only YES and NO; and
the fields owne and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In ord r t sign th petitio , the us rs compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the o ions, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describ how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindV rify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: , Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signatur on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h proc dure described in section ection II.
Each entry is the re ult of 10,000 me sur d on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster th n verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggreg tion of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity nd the
siz o each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. T complexi y is expressed a the number
of sig in authorities (n), a d ||m|| represents th size of the
messag on which the user wish to obtain sign ture. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/c conut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buf er. Th threshold p ope ty of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities f r this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preser ing e-p tition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we c nsider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term crede tials to their
citize s in order to allow any third party to or anize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
poi ts to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition an e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
v lve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as show in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cati n key of the third p rty creating the petition and the
verification key of th authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the v te of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same cam aign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the c llback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Bli dness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party t link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
bli d ess allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circu vent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of cou tries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly o the previous example, a set of authorities in
ch rge of C ru s the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parame e s n, t are set accordingly, a d ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
e i a citizen of C. The authorities s t q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; th s signature acts as the citizen credenti ls t sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
cr ate a instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) ( )
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, sco s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
Th UUID parameter uniquely identifies t e petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’ votes (initializ d to
zero). I the case of a petition the ptions are only YES
and NO; and the fields own r and verifi r respectively old
the public key of the third pa ty creating the petition and of
authorities ssuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, hey add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
= PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Addi   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authori ies to blo k hain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut hen deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinea pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as th arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as n open-source project on GitHub.3.
T ble I how the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the executi of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than ve ifying signatures (about
15 times f st r for the scheme working n lear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
Sh wBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signatur on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signatur on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 t me ast r for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of ch exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
pres nted in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
f gning authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
th t in practice m is the hash of the ctual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signature ) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citiz n of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature o the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an insta ce of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, ow er, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID param ter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the p blic key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Addi g   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensur s
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. M pping authorities to blockch in nodes
Albe to: @Ge rge, D scribe how t e C CoNut aut orities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply re ated to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in s art contracts.
V. EV LUA ION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented i python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] nd bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open- ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in sect on secti n II.
Each entry is the re ult of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
D ll desk op omputer, 3.6GHz Int l Xeon. Th s table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signat res (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify sign ture O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom func ion requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an nstance of the petition c ntract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the p ti ion, and
th scores param ter holds the citizen’s votes (initializ d to
zero). In the case of a pet tion the options ar only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and v rifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creati g the petiti n and of
uth rities issuing the cred ntials. In order to ign the petition,
th users co pute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Th n, th y add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowl dge proof s owing that   is
build from th same value x of th ir credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =   k1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), whil th ro f   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapp ng authorities to blockchain n d
Alber o: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chain pace nod s (to make cl ar the pot tial
of CoCoNut when deeply relate to blockchains), ince we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has bee implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) d standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop comput r, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. T is table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À g t signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
13 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Ba o, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to se why it is cool stuff; not many sch me have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Simil rly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C u s th Cre func i n of he CoCoNut library.
The arameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
cu tom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citize of C. The aut orities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind a d lo g- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; his signature acts as the ci izen c edentials to sign
any e-petition and -v ting campa gn. Su ces ively, any third
p rty create a instance of t e petition co tract as s ow in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scor param ter olds the citizen’s v tes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a p ti i n t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields wn r and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Th n, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge p oof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of thei cred ntial :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (p vent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to bl ckc a n nodes
Albert : @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can als be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] a d bplib [2]. The
bilinear pair works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic back nd. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I hows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the x cution f h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Del desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
hat signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for th scheme o hidden messag s). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Tabl II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
pres ted in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the siz of the
message n which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signa ure on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3h tps://githu .com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet pet tion rchitecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to it elf, nd use these token to steal all the money
in he buffer. T e threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adv rsary needs to corrup at lea t t
authorities for this a tack to happen. This property
also prevents a singl authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 P i acy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properti s are expected from this scheme?
In t is example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to llow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main an nymous, a d unl nkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a im-
ple smart c ntract called petition.
Similarly to the prev ou example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function f he Mal
library. The arameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they a e a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind a d long-term signature on the citize ’s private
k y k; this signature act as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-pe ition and e-vot g Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other informat on e.g. passport ff-
band, ut the how will blindness be aintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates a i stanc f the p -
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID pa ameter
u iquely identifies the petition, and th scores arameter
Ba : i this p ivate (can everyone see cur ent scores)?
how are v tes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? ho ds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petitio the options are only YES a d NO;
and th fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation k y of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign p tition, the users compute a value n as
foll s:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they c nstruct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is bu ld fr he same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credential , and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a e t list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s he vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proo p ensures that n has been built from
a igned private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Proper ies brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
pro erties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Bl ndness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: preve ts a party to link citizens’
vote across campaig s. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-us their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
mo s a ce tral authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implem nt a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
whe the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer f m three limitations. First, proxies tend to
beco e th target of censorship themselves. For exam-
le a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that ar publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxie that it controls and pollute the sys-
t m. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Sim larly to the previ us example, a set of authoritie in
charg of C run the Cre te function of the CoCoNut library.
The p rameters , t ar s t accordingly, and r f p ints to a
custom functio requiring the user to prove in some ays that
he is a citizen of C. The auth riti s set q = 1, and are xpecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this si nature acts as the citizen credentials to sign a y
-petition and e-voting campaig . Successively, any third party
create n insta c of the petition contract as shown i ??.
(UUID, owner, ver fier, ptions, scores) (1)
(UUID, owne , vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely ide tifies the petition, and
the score para eter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the opti ns are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to th options, app nd   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Albert : @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can a so be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of thi to have credentials in s art contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives eva uation
The signature scheme has bee impleme t d in python
using he two crypo libra ies petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
biline r pairing w rks over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Tab I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviati n (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
hat signing is much fa ter than verifying signatu es (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
Aggr gateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature o lear mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify ignature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify si nat r O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 tim fast r f he scheme on hidd n m ssages). Als ,
greg tion of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
T bl II shows t e co munication compl xity and the
size of ach xchange involved in the signatur scheme, as
p esented in fig. 1. The complexity s expr ssed as the numb r
of signing authorities (n), and || || represents the ize of
message on which the user wish o obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m i the h sh f the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 by s (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have act ally been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, own , verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the etition, and
the cores param ter holds the citize ’s vot s (initialized t
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifi r respectiv ly hold
the public key of the third party creating t e petitio and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign th petition,
the us s compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, ey add their vote to the options, a p nd   to a spent
list L, and build zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from th same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Add g   to L prevent citiz n to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent d uble spendi g), while th proof   ensures
that   ha b en built from a igned private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Geo ge, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nod s (to make clear the otenti l
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to h ve credentials in smart cont a ts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitiv s evaluation
The signature schem ha be n implemented in python
using th two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. Th
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehri [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as a ope -sourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard devi tion (
 
 2) of
the execution of each pr cedure escribed in section sect n II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-co
Dell desk op computer, 3.6GHz In el Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than v rifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSi n 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggre ateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify ignature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the co munication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
pres nted in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approxi ately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypt relat d w rks
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordin ly, and re points to a
custom function requir ng the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen f C. Th autho ities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s privat
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition a d e-voting ca pai . Successively, any third party
create an insta ce of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, ow er, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
T e UUID parameter u iq ely identifi s the p tit o , and
the scor s parameter holds the citizen’s votes ( niti lized to
zero). In the case of a petition the re only YES
and NO; and he fields owne a d v rifi r espectively hold
the pu lic key f he third party creating the petition and of
authoriti s issuing the cred ntials. In rder to sign the petition,
the users compute a valu  as f llows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, t e add thei vote to the op ions, a pend   to a spent
list L, and ild zero-knowl dge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr ve t a citizen to vote wice during th ame
camp ign ( event double spending), while the proof   sur s
that   has been built rom a sig ed privat key k.
C. Mappi authorities to blockchain n des
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut uthori ies
can also be Chainsp n d s (t make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), si ce we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives eval ation
The signature scheme has been impl mented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard devia ion (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is th result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table s ows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign .445 ± .001
Aggregat ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggre ateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction co plexity size [B]
Signature on clear mes age:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signatu e O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore se to 32 bytes (for HA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s a sociated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Upd te the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n auth rity): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the ime i takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Albert : discuss cr pto related works
Alberto: compa results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many sc eme h ve actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut p tition r hitecture.
Si larly to the p evi us xampl , a s t of uthoritie in
charg of C runs the Crea e functi n of e CoCoNu library.
The param t s , t ar set ac ordingly, nd ref points to a
custom f nct on requiring the us r to pr ve in some ways that
is a c tizen of C. The autho ities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to is u a blind and long- rm signature on he c izen’s private
key k; this ig ature act s the citize credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succ ively, any third
party c eate an inst nce of the etition contr ct as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifi s the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citize ’s votes (in tialized to z ro).
In the case of a p ti io t ptions re o ly YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issui g th
credentia s. I order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, appe d   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of th ir c den ial :
  = PK{(k) :   =   k1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent doubl sp nding), while the pro f   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate y k.
C. Mapping aut orities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libr ries p tlib [1] and bp ib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pre areBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Nu ber of auth rities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tr saction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear ssage:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
Ope SSL as the arithmetic b ckend. W hav released th code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
T ble I hows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
th execution of pr cedur d scrib d in section ction II.
Each entry is the result of 0,000 m asured on an Octa- ore
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is m ch faster tha verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the sch me on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of ch exchange involved in the signatur scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. Th complexity s expr ssed as the numb r
of sig ing authorities (n), and || || represents the ize of
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash f the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3http ://github.com/asonnino/co nut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re this figu e s per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer the steps i write-up.
to itself, and use t ese token to steal all t e money
in the b ffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adv rsary ne ds to corrup at least t
authoritie for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
m y nd disappear without issuing a y token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 P ivacy-pre rving e-petiti n a d e-
vot g
Bano: learly name all t e entities involved in this use
c se. What pr perties re expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the sce ario where a
city C wish to issue s me long term credentials to their
citizens i order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library co tract an a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Cr te functi n of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points t a cust m function req iring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The auth ri-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-ter signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen crede tials to sign
any e-petition a d e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other i formation e.g. passport off-
band, but t en how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as sh wn in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Ban : is this private (can every e see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cat n key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification k y of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
foll s:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
a s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t lis L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice d ring the same cam aign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
xecuted the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that en ble th above application when com-
b nes.
• Blind ess: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party t link citizens’
vote across camp igns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allow a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Cen orship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circu vent cens rship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target f censorship themselves. For exam-
le a number of cou tries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to th previous exampl , a set of authoritie in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of the CoCoNut li rary.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities s t q = 1, and re expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s pr vate
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
k
1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creati g the petiti n and of
authorities iss ing the credentials. In order to sign th petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and b ild a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, D scribe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on n Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying sign tures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measure : 10,000
O eratio µ [ms]
 
 2 [m ]
Keyge 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggr gateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rando ize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSi n 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tr nsaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask sign ture O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and tra sac ion size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and t e
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
f signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a sig atur . Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature o a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, est system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and blind sig atur s) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previ us example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create functi n of t CoC Nut library.
The parameters n, t are se ccordingly, a d r f poi ts to a
custom function requiring t user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authori ies set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signa ure on the citizen’s private
key k; this signat re ac s as the citizen r to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifi s the p tition, nd
the scores para eter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vot t the options append   to a sp nt
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pr of showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice duri g the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signe private k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNu when deepl related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL s the r thmetic back nd. We have r leased the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
O ration µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances valuation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra sactio complexity siz [B]
Signatur on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction siz .
and 3 time fast r for the scheme on hidden message ). lso,
aggregation of keys nd signatures are extremely fficient.
Table II shows the communica ion compl xity and the
size of each exchange involv d i the ig atur scheme, s
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expr sed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of th
message on which the user wish to obtain a sig ature. Note
that in practice m is the hash the actual message, and i
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The siz of a signature is
132 byt s. The hig est transaction size a pe rs when the us
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the pro f  s associated with the me sage is approximatel
318 bytes; t proof  v i only 157 byt s.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – sk ignatures ( nd n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed a d size) with alter tives
to see why t is cool tuff; not many scheme have ct ally been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ays that
he is a citizen of C. T authoriti s set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signatu e on the citiz n’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUI
(4)
The UUID p rameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s vote (initialized to
zero). In the as of a petition the opti ns are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the c ede tials. In order to sign the p tition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, t ey add thei vo e to the opti ns, app nd   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed privat key k.
C. Mapping auth rities to blo kchain n d s
Alberto: @George, Describe ho the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potenti l
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives ev luation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each pr cedure describ d in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rformanc s evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra ction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O( ) 516
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã v i y sig ature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time f ster fo th sch me hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key nd signatures r extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communicati n com l xi y and he
size of each exchang i volve in the sig atu sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the siz of the
message on which the user wish t obtain a sign ture. Note
that in practice m is the hash of th actual m ssage, and is
therefore set to 32 by s (for SHA-2). The size of a sig atur i
132 byte . The high st ran action size appears when the user
ask a signature on a idden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with he mess ge is approximately
318 bytes; the pr of  v is o l 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the bove
B. System evaluatio
Alberto: @Bano, test sy tem on AWS (n uthority): client
latency vs t – k signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss cry t r lat d works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoN t petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of h CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requir ng the ser to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. he uthorities et q = 1, nd are ex t g
to issue a blind and long- r signature on the citizen’ private
key k; this signature acts as th citizen cre nti ls to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of th p tition co tract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petiti n and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citiz n to vote twice du ing the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed ri ate key k.
C. Mapping author ties o blo kchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the C C Nut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
K yg n 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Ra domize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlin Sig 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindS gn 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggregat ThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
ABLE I: Pe formances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signatur O(n) 132
Ã verify sign ture O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden me sage:
  sk signatur O( ) 516
À get signature ( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transactio size.
OpenSSL a the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an op n-s u ce project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mea (µ) nd st ndard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This abl shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the schem on hidden messages . Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the com unication complexity and the
size of each exch nge involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in pr cti e m is he ash of the ac ual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update th above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Ov rview of the Malet petition arc itectur
Bano: Re o s figure as per B ’s t s, and t en
refer to the steps in wri e-up.
to itself, and s th s token to ste l the m ney
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at leas t
authorities for this attack to hap n. This pr perty
also preve ts a single autho ity from t king th u er
money and disappear without issuing any t ken.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-p eserv ng e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entiti s involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this schem ?
In this example, we consider the scenario wher a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to o ga iz a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voti g camp ign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, a d should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contra t and a si -
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Mal t
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requ ring th user o prov
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The uthori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintai ed?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an insta ce of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores pa ameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initi lized to z ro). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and th fie ds owner and vk re pe tiv ly hold t e verifi-
ca ion key of the third party cr ating th petit on a d the
v ification key of the authorities issuing the crede tials.
I order t sign a petition, th users c mpute a value n as
foll ws:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Th n, they construct a zero-knowledg proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
k
1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks th proof p t
credentials, a d ch cks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is ot part of a spe t list L; if all the ch cks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
wice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p en ur s th t n has bee buil from
a signed priv te key k; t s means hat th users correctly
executed the callback to pro e that they are citizens of C.
Pr p ties brought by Malet. Malet provides s t of
pr perties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citize ’s secret key and use it t sign petition
on their b hav . Also, it allow the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevent a party o link itizens’
v te across ca paigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through t e issuance ph se o ly once, and can then
re-use their credentials m ltiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issu n re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Cens rship-r sistant di tribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant syste based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP add ess has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censor hip themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blackli ting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can di tribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set acc rdingly, a d r f oints to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in s e ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on e citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract a shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the cas of a petition th optio are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the crede tials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-k owledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while t e pro f   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoC Nut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to ke cl ar the po ntial
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contr cts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives ev luatio
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measur d on an Octa-co e
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (ab ut
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
N mber of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify .714 ± 0.005
Prepar Bli dSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bli dSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: , Signature size: 132 [B]
Transac i c plex ty size [B]
Signat re on clear message:
  ask signatur O(n) ||m||
À get sign ture (n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden mes ages). Al o,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communicati n complexity and the
size f e ch exchange involved in th signature s heme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask s gnature o a h dden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Ban , t st syst m on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (a d n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alb rto: co pare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create func i n of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the us r to prov in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expectin
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Success vely, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as sho in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, sco es) (1)
( , own r, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID paramet r uniquely identifies t e petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (ini ial zed to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields own r and verifie respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the p tition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a z ro-knowledge proof showi that   is
build from th same value x of their cred ntials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during he same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the pr of   e sures
that   has been built fr m a signed private k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockch i nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the C CoNut auth riti s
can also be Chainspace nodes (to mak cle the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockch ins), since we
actually built all of t is to h ve credenti ls in smart co tracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in ython
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (  2) of
the execution of each procedure d scribed in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured o an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. T is table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
A gregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0. 02
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evalu tion.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear m s age:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  a k signature O(n) 516
À g t sign ture O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transactio size.
and 3 time fas r for the scheme on hid en messag ). Also,
aggregation of k ys and ignatures are extr ly effici t.
Tabl II shows the com unic ion c mplexity an the
size of each exchang involved in the signatur cheme, s
presen ed in fig. 1. The ompl xity is express d s the numb r
of signing autho iti s (n), and ||m|| repre nts the size of the
message on which the user wish to obt n a ignatu . Not
that in practice m is the hash f the ac ual message, and is
therefore set to 32 by es (for SHA-2). Th size of a signa ur is
132 bytes. The highest transaction ze app ars when t e u r
ask a signature on a hidden messag . T is c mes from the fac
that th proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is o ly 157 byt s.
Alberto: Upda e the above
B. System evaluation
Albert : @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
heck the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related wor s
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is co l stuff; not many schem have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of auth rities in
charge of C runs the Create f nction of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the us r to prov in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s privat
key k; this signature acts as the ci izen crede tials o sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contrac a ho in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
( , own r, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID paramet r uniquely id tifies the etitio , and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (i iti lized to
zero). In the case of a petition the ptions are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner nd verifier respec ively old
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the cred ntials. In order to sign t e petition,
the users compute a v lue  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pro f s owing that   is
build from the same value x of th ir cre entials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   su es
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of t is to h ve credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluatio
The signature scheme as b n impleme ted in pyth
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithm tic ba kend. We have released th code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table sh ws
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gateT Sign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances valuation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction com lexity size [B]
S g at re on clear me sage:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã verify si nature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Commu ic tion compl xity and transaction ize.
and 3 t me faster for th scheme on hid en messag ). Also,
ggregation of key and sign tures re xtre l ffici t.
Tabl II shows the com unicati n c mplexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signatur sc me,
pres nted in fig. 1. T co plex ty is expressed as t e umber
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| repr ent the size of the
message on which the user wis to obta n a signatur . N te
that n practice m is the hash of the ctual message, and i
ther fore set to 32 by es (for SHA-2). Th size of a signature s
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from t e fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatur s) and
check the time it take to hear back from authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and s ze) with alternatives
to s e why it is cool tuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCo ut petition architectur .
Similarly to the previous ex mpl , a set of au horities i
charge of C runs t e Crea function of the C CoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set acc rdingly, and ef points t a
custom function requirin the user o pr ve in some w ys that
he is a citizen of C. The authoriti s et q = 1, and are ex g
to issue a blind and long- rm g ature on the c z n’s priva e
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentia s to sign
any e-petition and -v ting a pa g . Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID paramet r un quely i ent fies the p tition, nd t e
scores parameter holds th citize ’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options re only YES and NO; and
the fields owner nd k respectively hold th public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authoriti s issuing the
credentia s. In order to ign t p titio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, appe d   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Cha nspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives ev luatio
The signatur scheme has been impl mented in pyth n
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operati n µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sig 0.445 ± 0.001
Agg egat Sign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindS g 2.633 ± 0.003
B Sign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSig 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggregat ThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perf rm ces evaluation.
Numb r of uthorities: , Signatur si : 132 [B]
Trans ctio co plexity size [B]
Sign tu e on clear message:
  ask ignatu e O(n) ||m||
À get signa re O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hi den message:
  ask ig ature O(n) 516
À get signat re O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunicat on complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic b ck . We have released he code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the executio of h proced described in section secti n II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for t e scheme worki g on clear ssages,
and 3 time faster for the sch me n hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Tabl II sh ws th c mmunication co plexit and the
size of each exch nge i volved in the signature sc eme, as
present d in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing aut oriti s ( ), and ||m|| represen s the s ze of the
message on which the u er wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore et to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hi den messag . This comes from the fact
at the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 byt s; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update t e above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of he Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure s per Ba o’ notes, and en
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all t e money
in the b ffer. T e threshold prop rty of Malet im-
plies that the dver ary n eds t cor up at l ast t
authorities f r this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and dis pp ar without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving -petition a d -
vot g
Bano: Clearly name al the ntities involved i t is use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issu some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to llow any third party to organize a
privacy-preservi g e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are llowed to participate, and should re-
main anony ous, a d unlinkable acr ss campaigns. This
system is based on the Mal t library co tract and a sim-
ple smart ontract called pe ition.
Simi arly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs he Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, nd are expecting to is ue
a blind and long-term signature on the citiz n’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to ign
any e-petition and e-v ting Bano: state if th s may in-
volve ch cking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates a i stance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID pa ameter
uniquely identifies the petiti , and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can ev ryone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and th lds owner and vk respectively hold the v rifi-
cati k of th third party creating the peti ion and the
v r ficatio k y f the authoriti issui g the cred ntials.
In order to sign a petition, th use s compute a value n as
foll ws:
=
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
The , they construct a zero-k owl dge proof showing
that n is uild fr the ame value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th pe itio s rt c ntract c cks the proof p and he
cr dentials, and checks th t the vot is fresh by verifying
that is not p r f a spe t list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of th users to th list of scor s and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during he sam campaign (prev n double spend-
ing). Also, th proof p e sures that n has been built fr m
a signed private k y k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prov that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provide a s t of
properties that nable the above application w en com-
bines.
• Blindness: pr vents the au hor ties from ar ing
the citizen’s secr t key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it llows th users to vo e
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: reven a p rty to link citiz ns’
vote c oss campaig s. Joining unlinkability wit
blindne s allows a sys em wh re citize s hav t go
through the issuanc phase only once, nd can then
e us heir credentials mu tiple time while s aying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a cen ral author ty and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship- esistant distribution of
proxies
We implem nt a censorship-resi tant system based on
Malet. Proxies are ft n used o circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but pr x-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of c nsorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block To by black isting Tor
entry nodes that re publicly know . Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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S milarly to the prev ous exampl , a set of authorities in
char e of C runs th Cr at function of th CoCoNut library.
T e parameters , t are set accordin ly, a d r f points o
us m fu cti n requiring t e user to prove in some ways that
e is a citizen of C. The a thorities s t q = 1, a d ar ex cting
is u a bl nd and lo g- rm ignature on c tizen’s pri te
k y k; this i n tu e acts as citizen credentials to sign any
-petition d -voting ca p ig . Successively, any third party
creat an stanc of the etitio c ntr ct s s wn i ??
(UUID, owner, verifier, op io s, cores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk
UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petiti n, a
th sc re par meter holds t citizen’ votes (i iti lized to
zero). In the case of a pet tion t e options re only YES
and NO; and th fi lds owner and verifier re p ct v ly hold
the public key of the thir par y creat ng the p tition and of
u orities i sui the red nti ls. I rder to sign the p tit on,
the users c mpu e a value  as follo .
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a ze o-knowledge proof showing that   is
bu ld from the ame v l x of their cred ntials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
c mpaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authori es to blockchain n des
Alberto: @George, Describe ow the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply relate to blockchains), since we
actually built all of t is to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives eval ati
The signature s h me ha been implemen ed in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pair ng works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Op nSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source proje t on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the me n (µ) and s andard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure escribe in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured o an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Int l Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures ( bout
15 times fas er for the scheme working clear messages,
Nu ber of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performan es evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Sig ature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear messag :
  ask signature (n) ||m||
À g t signatu e O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature n hidden message:
  ask ignatur O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify si nature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communica ion complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the sche e on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
p sented i fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities ( ), and || || represents th size of t e
m ssage on which the user ish to obtain a signature. Note
t at in practice is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The siz of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden mes age. Th s c mes from t e fact
that t e proof  s associated with the m ssage is approximately
318 bytes; the pro f  v is only 157 byt s.
Alberto: Up ate the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Ban , t st syste on AWS ( authority): client
l tency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signa ures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t auth rities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many sch me have actually been
3https://githu .com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
UUID par meter uniqu ly identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In th case of a p tition the options are only YES
a d NO; and the fields owner and verifier respect vely hold
th public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities i suing the credentials. In order to sign the petiti n,
the users ute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent citizen to vote twice during the same
mpaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has b en built from a signed private key k.
C. M ppi g authorities to blockch i nodes
Alb rto: @Georg , Describe how the CoCoNut th riti s
can also be Chainspac nodes (to make clear the potential
of C CoNut when deeply r lated t blockchains), since w
a tually built all of this to ha e cred tials n smart con rac s.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives valuation
The s g ature scheme has been implemented in python
usi g the two cryp libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. Th
bilinear pairing works over a Barre o-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL s the arithmetic backend. We have released the cod
as an ope - ource project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standa d deviati (
 
 2) of
th executi n of each procedure describ d in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop c mputer, 3.6GHz I tel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the sch me working clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggr g tion of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
m ssage on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s as ociated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. Syst m evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes t hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discu s cry to related works
Alberto: com are results (sp ed and size) with alternatives
to se why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some wa s that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, v rifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID paramet r uniquely identifies the petit on, and
the score parameter holds th citize ’s votes (in tializ d to
zero). I th case of a petition he ptions are only YES
nd NO; a d th fields own r and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
au horities issuing the crede tials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
T n, th y add t ir vote to t e ptions, append   to a spent
lis L, a d build a z ro-knowledge proof showing that   is
build fro the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L p vent a citizen to vote twice during he same
a pa gn (prevent double spe ing), while the proof   sures
tha   has b n b il from a signed privat key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, D scribe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually b il all of this to av cr dentials in smart c ntracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The ignature scheme has been implemented in python
usi e two crypo libraries p tl b [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilin ar pair g works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithm tic backend. We have rel ased the code
as n op -source project on GitHub.3.
Table I s ows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execut on each procedure described in section section II.
E ch e try i the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell d kt p computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This ta le shows
that signing is uch faster than verifying signatures (about
15 ti s fast r for the sch me working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authoriti s: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signatur O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexi y is expressed s the number
of signing authorities (n), a d ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the ctual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the pr of  s assoc ated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: U dat the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test s stem on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to ar back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://githu .com/as nnino/coconut
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Fi . 5: Ove view of the CoCoNut petition chitecture.
Si ilarly t th pr vious example, a s t of authorities in
charg of C r ns the Crea function of he CoCoNut library.
The param t s , t a e t accordingly, and ref points to a
c stom fu ction requiring th us r to prove in some ways that
he is a cit z n o C. The authori ies et q = 1, and are ex e ting
issue a bli d and long- rm signature n he citize ’s privat
key k; this s gna u ac s as the citiz n cr dentials t sign
any -petition and e-vo ing c mpa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a in tance of the petition contract s s own in 5.
Th UUID par me e un quely iden fies the p tition, and h
sc res parameter holds th citiz n’s votes ( iti lized to z ro).
I h ca e o a pe i i n options are only YES and O; and
t e field owner d k r spe ively hold the public k y of t
t ird party r ating h p tition and of uthoriti s issuing the
cred ntia s. I rd r to sign the titi , the us rs compute a
v lu  a foll ws.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Th n, th y add th ir vote to the options, append   to a spent
li t L, an uild zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build fro th a e v lue x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
A ding   to L prevent a citiz to vote twice during the same
campaign reve t do ble nding), while the proof   ensur s
that   as be built from a igned pri ate key k.
C. Mapping uth rities t block hai nodes
Alberto: @G orge, D scrib how the C CoNut authoritie
c n also be Cha nspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockch i s), since we
actually built all of this to have credenti ls in smart contr cts.
(sco es,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur schem has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barret -Naehrig [17] curve, u ing
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra saction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an op n-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each e try is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
D ll desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 imes faster for the schem working on clear messages,
and 3 t me fast for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved n the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities ( ), and || || represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
t at in practice is the hash of the actual m ssage, and is
th refore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The siz of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
sk signature on a hidden essage. Th s c mes from the fact
that t e proof  s a sociated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 byt s.
Alberto: Upda the above
3https://github.com/aso nino/coconut
F gur 5: Ov rview of th Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figur as er Ba o’s notes, nd then
refer t he s eps in write-up.
to itself, nd se hes token to steal all the m ne
in the bu fer. The hr shold p operty f Malet im-
pli that t adv rs ry e d o corrup at least t
aut oriti s for thi attack to app n. T is property
also prevent a single authority from taking the use
m ey and disappe r with ut issuing any t ken.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Priv cy-pr se vi g e-petition nd e-
vot g
Ban : Cle rly n me all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this sch me?
In this ex mple, w onsider th sc ari wh re a
city C w sh o issu some long t rm credentials to their
citizens in order to allow an third party to organize a
pr vacy- reserving e-peti i n or e-voting a paign; all
citizens of C ar allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable acr ss cam aigns. This
system is based on the Malet libr ry contract and a si -
le smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
i charge of C ru s the Create function of the Ma et
library. The parameters n, t re set accordingly, a d re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
i s me ways t at they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Ba o: what is q, an are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; t is signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other informati e.g. pa sport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
ces ively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
titio contract as shown n fig. 5. The UUID parameter
niquely identifi s the petiti n, and the scores parameter
Bano: is thi private (can veryone see curre scores)?
ow are votes with non-binary (y /no) options repre-
sented? h lds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). I
the case of petition the options are only YES and NO;
and t e fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the ird party creating the petition and the
v r fication k y of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In rd r to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
foll ws:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that s build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
cred ntials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
a s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice uring the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the p of p ensures that n has been built from
signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
ex cuted th callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Pro ert es brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities fro learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allow th users to vote
nymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote acro s campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
bli dness allows a system where citizens have to go
t rough the issuance phas nly once, and can then
re-use their credentials m ltiple time while staying
a onymous.
• Thre hold: distr buting the credentials issuance re-
m ve a c ntral authority a d prevent a single au-
thority from cr ating arbitr ry redentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
e suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of c untries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
c distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Fig. 3: The Coc nut smart contract library.
Note that if the credentials only include non-random at-
tributes, the verifier could guess its value by brute-forcing
the verification algorithm4. This ssue s prevented by always
embedding a private random attribute int the credentials, a
can also act as the authorization key for the redential.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
W impleme t a Py hon library for Co o ut as described
in Sectio III and publish the c e on GitHub as an open-
so r e project 5. We also implement a sm rt contract library
in Chain pace [3] to enable other pplication-specific smart
contracts (see Section V) to conveniently use our cryptographic
primitives. We present the design and implementation of the
Coconut smart contract library in Section IV-A. In addition, we
implement and evaluate som of the fu ctionality f the Co-
conut smart ontract library in Ethereum [51] (Section IV-B).
Finally, we sh w how to integrate Coco ut into existing se i-
permissioned blockchains (S ction IV-C).
A. The Coconut Smart Contract Library
We implement he Coconut mart contrac in Chainspac 6
(w ich can be used by ther applic tion-sp cific smart con-
tracts) as a library to issue and verify randomizable threshold
credentials through cross-contract calls. The contract has four
functions, (Create, Request, Issue, Verify), as illustrated
in Figure 3. First, a set of authorities call the Create
function to initialize a Coconut instance defining the contract
info; i.e., their verification key, the number of authorities and
the threshold parameter (Ê). The initiator smart contract can
specify a callback contract that needs to be executed by the
user in order to request credentials; e.g., this callback can be
used for authentication. The instance is public and can be read
by the user (Ë); any user can request a credential through the
Request function by executing the specified callback contract,
4Let assume for example that some credentials include a single attribute m
representing the age of the user; the verifier can run the verification algorithm
e(h, κ(α · βm)−1) = e(ν, g2) for every m ∈ [1, 100] and guess the value
of m.
5https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
6https://github.com/asonnino/coconut-chainspace
nd providi t e public a d private attributes to include in
the cred ntial (Ì). The public attr but are simply a list of
cl ar ext strings, while the private attributes are encrypted as
described in Section III-D. Eac signin authority mo itors
the blockchain at all times, looking for cred tial requests.
f the requ st appears on the blockchain (i. ., a transaction
executed), it means that the cal back has een correctly
xec t d (Í); each authority issues a partial cr de tial on the
specifi d at ributes by calling the Issue procedure (Î). In our
implementation, all partial credentials are in the blockchain;
however, hes can also be provi ed to the use off-chain. Users
collect a thr s old number of partial credentials, and aggregate
them to form a full credential (Ï). Then, the users locally
randomize the credential. The last function of the Coconut
library contract is Verify that allows the blockchain—and
anyone lse—to check the validity of a giv n cred ntial (Ð).
A limitation of this architecture is that it is not efficient
for the authorities to continuously monitor the blockchain.
Section IV-C explains how to overcome this limitation by em-
bedding the authorities into the nodes running the blockchain.
B. Ethereum Smart Contract Librar
To make Coconut more widely available, we also imple-
ment it in Ethereum—a popular permissionless smart contract
blockchain [51]. We release the Coconut Ethereum smart
contract as an open source library7. The library is written in
S lid ty, a high-level JavaScript-like language that compiles
dow to Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) assembly code.
Ethereum recently hardcoded a pre-c piled smart contract
in the EVM for pe form ng pairing checks and elliptic curve
o erations on the alt bn128 curve [15], [43], for efficient
verification of zkSNARKs. The execution of an Ethereum
smart contract has an associated ‘gas cost’, a fee that is paid
to min rs for executing a t ansactio . Gas c st is calculated
bas d on the op rations executed by h contract; i.e., the mor
operations, the higher the gas cost. The pre-compiled contracts
have lower gas co t than equivalent native Ethereum smart
contracts.
We use the pre-compil d contract for p rfor ng a pairing
check, in or er to impl ment Coconut verification within a
sm rt contract. The Ethereum code only implements ellip-
tic curve addition and scalar multiplication on G1, whereas
Coconut requires operations on G2 to verify credentials.
Therefore, we implement elliptic curve addition and scalar
multiplication on G2 as an Ethereum smart contract library
written in Solidity that we also release open source8. This
is a pr ctical solutio for many Coconut applications, as
verifying cred ntials with one r vealed attribute only requires
one addition and one scalar multiplication. It would not be
practical however to verify credentials with attributes that will
not be revealed—this requires three G2 multiplications using
our elliptic curve implementation, which would exceed the
current Ethereum block gas limit (8M as of February 2018).
We can however use the Ethereum contract to design a
federated peg for side chains, or a coin tumbler as an Ethereum
smart contract, based on credentials that reveal one attribute.
We go on to describe and implement this tumbler using
7https://github.com/musalbas/coconut-ethereum
8https://github.com/musalbas/solidity-BN256G2
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the Coconut Chainspace library in Section V-A, however the
design for the Ethereum version differs slightly to avoid the
use of attributes that will not be revealed, which we describe
in Appendix C.
The library shares the same functions as the Chainspace
library described in Section IV-A, except for Request and
Issue which are computed off the blockchain to save gas
costs. As Request and Issue functions simply act as a
communication channel between users and authorities, users
can directly communicate with authorities off the blockchain
to request tokens. This saves significant gas costs that would
be incurred by storing these functions on the blockchain.
The Verify function simply verifies tokens against Coconut
instances created by the Create function.
C. Deeper Blockchain Integration
The designs described in Section IV-A and Section IV-B
rely on authorities on-the-side for issuing credentials. In this
section, we present designs that incorporate Coconut authori-
ties within the infrastructure of a number of semi-permissioned
blockchains. This enables the issuance of credentials as a side
effect of the normal system operations, taking no additional
dependency on extra authorities. It remains an open problem
how to embed Coconut into permissionless systems, based on
proof of work or stake. These systems have a highly dynamic
set of nodes maintaining the state of their blockchains, which
cannot readily be mapped into Coconut issuing authorities.
Integration of Coconut into Hyperledger Fabric [16]—a
permissioned blockchain platform—is straightforward. Fabric
contracts run on private sets of computation nodes—and use
the Fabric protocols for cross-contract calls. In this setting,
Coconut issuing authorities can coincide with the Fabric smart
contract authorities. Upon a contract setup, they perform the
setup and key distribution, and then issue partial credentials
when authorized by the contract. For issuing Coconut cre-
dentials, the only secrets maintained are the private issuing
keys; all other operations of the contract can be logged and
publicly verified. Coconut has obvious advantages over using
traditional CL credentials relying on a single authority—as
currently present in the Hyperledger roadmap9. The threshold
trust assumption—namely that integrity and availability is
guaranteed under the corruption of a subset of authorities is
preserved, and prevents forgeries by a single corrupted node.
We can also naturally embed Coconut into sharded scalable
blockchains, as exemplified by Chainspace [3] (which supports
general smart contracts), and Omniledger [33] (which supports
digital tokens). In these systems, transactions are distributed
and executed on ‘shards’ of authorities, whose membership
and public keys are known. Coconut authorities can naturally
coincide with the nodes within a shard—a special transaction
type in Omniledger, or a special object in Chainspace, can
signal to them that issuing a credential is authorized. The
authorities, then issue the partial signature necessary to recon-
struct the Coconut credential, and attach it to the transaction
they are processing anyway. Users can aggregate, re-randomize
and show the credential.
9http://nick-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/idemix.html
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
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Alberto: discuss crypto related works
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
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Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In t is example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authoriti s in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiri g the user t rove in some way that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, v rifier, options, score ) (1)
(UUID, wner, k, (2)
options, sco es) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID param ter uniqu ly ide tifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the ptions are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public k y of the third party creati g the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent citiz n to v te t ice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapp authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to h ve cr dentials in smart co tracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo librari petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
biline r pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arit metic backend. We have released the cod
as an open-so rce pr ject on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is m ch faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster f r the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggreg teSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rformances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra saction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O( ) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme o hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. Th highest t ansaction size appears wh n the user
ask signature on a hidde message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associa ed with the message is ap roximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is o ly 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alb to: @Ban , test sy tem on WS (n authority): client
latency vs – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the t me it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter u iqu ly ide tifies the p tit on, and
the scores parameter holds the ci iz n’s votes (initialized to
zero). In he case of a petition the options ar only YES
and NO; and the fields wner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they dd their vote t the o tions, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent ouble spending), while the proof   ensur s
that   as been built from a signed privat key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The sign ture sch me has been implemented in python
using e two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2] The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 13
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity a d the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update th bove
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS ( authority): cli nt
latency v t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check th tim it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme hav actually b en
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifie , options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifi r respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the ptions, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Ge rge, Describe h w the CoCoNut authoriti s
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when eeply related o blockchains), since we
actual y built ll of this to have credenti ls in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviati n (
 
 2) of
the execution f each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on cl ar me sages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster fo th scheme on hidde messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C ru s the Cre function f h CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways th t
he is a citizen of C. The uthorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s privat
key k; this signature acts as the citizen cred ntials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instanc of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and th
scores parameter holds the citiz n’s vot s (initializ d to z ro).
In the case of a p ti ion t e options a e o ly YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectiv ly hold the public key of the
third party creating the petiti n nd of authorities issuin the
credentia s. In rder to sign h petitio , the us rs compute a
value  as follow .
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add heir vot to th ptions, append   to a spe t
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their cred ntial :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (pr vent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has be n built f o a signed pri at k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to h ve cr dentials in smart co tracts.
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V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
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Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
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Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
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TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
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OpenSSL as the rithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
th execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 easured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange i vol ed in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associa ed with the message is ap roximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is o ly 157 bytes.
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Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architectur
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adv rsary needs to orr p at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a singl authority from taking the user
money and disapp r with ut issuing ny tok n.
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4.3 Privacy-preserving e-pe ition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all th entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to i sue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party t organize a
priv cy-pres rving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and hould re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across camp igns. This
system is ba ed on th Malet library cont act and a sim-
ple smart co tract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of uthorities
in harge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set c rdingly, and re f
point to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind nd l ng-term signatu on the itizen’s private
key k; this signatu e acts as the citiz n credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking ome other informatio e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, y third party creates an instan e of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores para eter
Ban : is this private (can very ne see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sent d? holds the citizen’s vot s (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they co struct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt con r ct checks th proof p and the
credenti l , and checks that th ote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the u ers to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n ha been uilt f om
a sign private k y k; thi means that the users correctly
executed th callback t prove that they are citiz ns of C.
Properties broug t by M let. Malet provi es a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behav . Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkabil y: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a nu b r of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls a d p llute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can prete d to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of aut orities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecti g
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s privat
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyg 2.392 ± 0.006
Sig 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
Sh wBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggre at ThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: , Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signatu e O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Tabl II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
t t in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
t refor set to 32 by es (f r SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highes tr n action size appear when the user
ask a signatur on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (s eed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden me sage:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and tra saction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messag ). Also,
aggregation of keys and ignatures are xtremely effi ient.
Table II shows th communication compl xity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexit is expresse as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| repr sents the size of th
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. T e highest transaction siz appea s when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. T is com s from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: U date the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @B no, est system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authoriti s.
VI. COMPAR SON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alber o: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and siz ) with alternativ s
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Numbe of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
Aggr gateK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transac ion compl xity siz [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th sche e on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange inv lved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), a ||m|| repr sents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Not
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore s t to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). h s ze of a sig ature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a sign ture on a hidden message. This com s from the fact
that the proof   associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update the above
B. System evalu tion
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it take to hear b ck from t authoriti s.
VI. C MPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare result (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; n t many scheme hav actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition archite tu e.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut libr ry.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number f measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKey 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Blin Sign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
Bli dVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances valuation.
Num r of authorit s: n, Signature ize: 132 [ ]
Transactio complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify signatur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signat re O(n) 132
Ã ve ify si nature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmu ication complexity and trans ction size.
OpenSSL as t e arithmetic backend. We have releas d the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in sec ion section II.
E ch entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing i uch faster than v rifying i nature (ab ut
15 mes faster for the sch me working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggre ation of keys and signatu s re extrem ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m i the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The hi hest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is pproximately
318 by s; th proof  v is nly 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet pet ti n architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to ste l all t e money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corr p at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any tok n.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petiti d e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this sc me?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to rganize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s p ivate
key k; this signature acts as the citizen c edentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: stat f this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. p ssport ff-
band, but then how will blindness b maintai ed?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fi lds owner and vk r sp ctively hold the verifi-
cat o k y of th hird party creating the petition and he
verification key f the authorities issuing the credentials.
In ord r to sign a pet t n, the u ers co put a valu as
foll ws:
=
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
The , they construct a z ro-knowledge proof showing
that n is b ild fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
cr dentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent lis L; if all he checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the s m campaign (prev t double spen -
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built fro
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to rove tha they are ci izen of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: preven s the authoriti s from lea ning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vot across campai ns Joi ing nlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single a -
tho ity from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement censors ip-resistant system b sed on
Malet. Proxies ar often u ed to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs he C ate functio of the CoCoNut library.
The par eters n, t are set accordi gly, and r f points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vot to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Ge rge, Describ how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), si c we
actually buil all of this to have credentials in smart co tracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has be n implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
T ble I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 ti es faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of m asures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr pareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggregat ThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Nu ber of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction ize.
and 3 time faster fo the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing autho ities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
mess ge on which the user wish to obtai a signature. No e
that in practice is th hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
vote
7
smart 
contract
Ledger
petition 
creator
citizen
7
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters , t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition c tract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users com ute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a itizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built fr m a signed p ivate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Ge rge, Describe how th CoCoNut au h rities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply rel ted to blockchains), s nce we
actually built all of this to ave credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSig 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã verify sign ture O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communicati n compl xity and transacti n size.
and 3 tim faster for the s heme hidden messag s). Also,
aggregation of keys and signa ures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows th communication complexity a d the
size of each exchange inv lved in the signatur scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is express d as the numb r
of signing aut or ties (n), and ||m|| repres nts the size of the
message on which e user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice is the h sh of t e actu l message, is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size f a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transacti n size app ars when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from th fact
that the proof  s associated with the essage is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n auth rity): cli nt
latency vs – ask n signatur s (and n blind signatures) a
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create a instance of the petition contract a show in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifi r, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petiti n the options are only YES
and NO; and the fi lds owner and verifier resp ctively hold
the public key of the third par y creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
T en, they add their vote to the options, append   to spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x f their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
camp ign (prevent double spending), whil the pro f   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authori ies to blockchain nod s
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
Aggre ateK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performanc s evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O( ) || ||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã veri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication c mplexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidd n m sages). Also,
ggregation of key and signature are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows th com unication c mplexity and the
siz of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents t e siz of the
message on which the us r wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (fo SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. he highest transaction siz appe rs wh t e user
ask a signature on a hidde message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is o ly 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): clien
latency vs t – sk n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto rel ed works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Cr a e funct on of he CoC Nut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref poin s to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in som ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citizen cred ntials to sign
any e-petition a d e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a in tanc of th peti ion contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifi s the p tition, and the
scores paramet r holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as foll ws.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   ha been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authori ies
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluat on
The signatur sch me has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing orks over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggr gateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomiz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlin Sign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindV rify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rf rmances ev luation.
Number f a thoriti s: , Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction omplexity size [B]
Signature on clear messa e:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À g t sign ture O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden m ssag :
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arit tic backend. W have released the code
as n open-source pr ject on GitH b.3.
Table I shows the mea (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the executio of h procedure described in s ction section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear essages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of keys and signatur s are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in th sign ture scheme, a
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user ish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signatur is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidd n message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Updat the abov
3https://github.com/asonnino/coco ut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re this figure a per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to its lf, nd use these token to steal ll the mo y
in the buffer. The threshold property of M let im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the us r
money and disapp ar without ssuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: w at is q, a d are expe ting to issu
a blind and long-term signatur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and -voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some ther information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
an the fields owner a vk r spectively hold th verifi-
catio key of the third party creatin the p t ti n and the
v rification key of the authoriti s issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, t users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowl dge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
h petitio sm rt contract ch cks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that he vote is fresh by verifying
t t n is not part f a sp nt lis L; if all the check pass, it
ad s the vote of the u r to th list of scores and adds
nu to list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed privat key k; this means that th u ers corr ctl
executed the callback to prov th t they re itizens of C.
Prop rti s brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties th t enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vo e
anonymously.
• Unlinkabil ty: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote cross camp igns. Joining unlinkability with
bli dness allows system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phas only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
nonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Cens rship-resis ant distr bution of
proxies
We i plement a ce s rship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
sm rt 
contract
L dger
petition 
creator
citiz n
7
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoN t library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways th t
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, sc res) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter ho ds the citizen’ votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping a t orities to blockc ain nodes
Alberto: @G orge, Desc ibe how the CoCoNut author ties
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in pyt on
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithm tic back nd. W have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard d viation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each proce ure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatur s (ab ut
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Ope ation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggregat Sign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prepar BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perfo mances evaluation.
Number of authorities: , Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra s cti n complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À g t sig ature O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexi y and transaction size.
and 3 ime faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys n signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the comm ication complexit and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
pr sented in fig. 1. The complexity is xpressed as the number
of signing authorities ( ), and ||m|| repres nts the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signatur . Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the t me it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (spe d and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expectin
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, ow r, verif er, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, o n r, vk, (2)
ptions, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the cas of a p tit on the op ions are only YES
and NO; and th fields own r and verifier respectively hold
the pub ic key of the third party creating the petition and of
autho i ies issuin the credentials. In o d r to sign the p tition,
the users comput a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
The , they add their vote o the op ons, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledg proof showing that   is
build from th sam value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Albert : @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Cha nspace nodes (to make clear th potential
of CoCoNut when eply related to blo kchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contr cts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalu tion
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. W have releas d the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (  2) of
the execution of each proc dure described in s ction section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 m asured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme wo king on clear messages,
Nu ber of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Ag regateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perfo ma ce evaluati .
Numbe f authorities: , Signature size: 132 [B]
Trans ction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity a d tr nsactio size.
and 3 time fast r for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficie t.
T ble II shows the communicat n complexity and he
size of each exchange involved in the signature schem , as
presented i fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of si ning authorit es (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash f the actual message, and is
th refore s t to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears w en the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associat d with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update th bov
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) a d
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authori ies in
charge of C runs th Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set acco dingly, and ref points t a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is citiz n of C. The authoriti s set q = 1, and are expectin
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successiv ly, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
z ro). In the cas of a pet t n the op ions are only YES
and NO; and th fields owner and verifier respe tively hold
t pub ic key of the third party creating the petition and of
uthorities issuin the credent al . In order to ign the petition,
the users compute a value  as foll ws.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to he options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-k owledge proof showing that   is
build from the ame valu x of their cred ntials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (preve t double s ending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blo kchain nodes
Albert : @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace n es (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when eply related o blo kchains), since we
actually built all of this to hav credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has b en implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as th arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
D ll desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 im s faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measur s: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± 001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr p reBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateT Sign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evalu tion.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À g t signat re O(n) 132
Ã verify sign ture O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y sig ature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication compl xity a tra saction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures r extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange i v lved in th signature sc me, as
presented i fig. 1. Th c plexity is ex ress d as the number
of signing authoriti (n), and ||m|| repr sents he siz of t e
essage n which the user wish t obtain a signature. Note
that in practice is the has of the actual message, a d is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approxi ately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update the above
B. Sys em eva uation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related work
Alberto: compare results (speed nd size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; no many scheme h e actually b en
3h tps://github.com/aso nino/ oconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overvi w f the CoCoNu p tition architecture.
Similarly to the previous xample, a set of aut rities i
charge of C runs the Crea e functi n of he CoCoNut lib ry.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove i some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and ar ex e ting
t issu a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; thi signatur acts as the ci izen credenti ls to sign
a y e-petit o and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
arty reate a insta ce f the petiti n contract as s wn in 5.
The UUID para eter un quely id nt fies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds he citiz n’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the cas of a peti ion t e options re only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively ld the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make cl ar the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to ave credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, u ing
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggre ateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
Aggregat Keys 0.017 ± 0.000
R ndomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prep reBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlin Sign 1.388 ± 0.001
Bli dV rify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluati n.
Number of author ti s: n, Sig atur size: 132 [B]
Tra saction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear messag :
  ask sig ature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signatur on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transactio size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released th code
as an op n-sourc proj ct on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and tandard d via ion (
 
 2) of
th execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-c r
Dell desktop comput r, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
tha signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times fas er f r he scheme working on clear messag s,
and 3 ti e faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely fficient.
T ble II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signatur scheme, as
prese ted in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as th n mber
of sig ing authoritie (n), and ||m|| repre ents the size of the
message on which th user wish t obtain a signature. Note
that in prac ice m is the hash of the actual mess ge, and is
refore s t to 32 byte (for SHA-2). T size of a signature is
132 bytes. The gh st trans ction size appear when the user
ask a signature n hidden mes age. This comes fr m the fact
that the proof  s associated with the messag is approximately
318 bytes; th proof  v is only 157 byt s.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition arc itecture
Bano: Re o t is figur as per Ba o’s n t s, and then
refer to the steps in w i e-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold prop r y Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities f r this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking t e user
money and disapp ar without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
v t g
Bano: Clearly na e all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this sch me?
In this exampl , we consider the scen rio where a
city C wish to issue some long ter credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
ain anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on th citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citize redential to sig
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state f this may in-
volve checking some other inform ti n e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party create an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, a d the scores parameter
Bano: is this pr vate (can everyone s e current scores)?
how are votes with non-bin y (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and th fields owner and vk r p ctively hold the verifi-
a ion key of the third party creating the petition and t e
v rification key of the au o ities issui g the credentials.
I order to s g a pet ion, the users ompute a value n a
f llo s:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they co struct a zero-knowledge proof showing
hat i build fr the same valu k f their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th titio m rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, a d checks that the vot is fresh by verifying
that is n t part of a spent li t L; if all the checks pas , it
ad s he v e of t sers to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prev nts a c tize o vote
twice during the same c mpaign (prevent doubl spend-
ing). Also, the proof p nsures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove h t he ar citizens of C.
Propertie b ought by M let. Malet provides a set of
p operties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across camp igns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time whil staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We impl ment a censor hip-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are oft n used to ci cumv nt censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of ensorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries bl ck Tor by blackli ting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the pr vious example, a s of autho iti s in
charge of C runs the Create fu ction of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set ac rdingly, and ref points to
custom function r quiring the user to rove i some ways that
he is a citiz n C. T authorities et q = 1, nd are xpecting
to issue a blind and long-term signa ure on the citize ’s private
key k; this s gna ure acts as the citizen cr d ntials t sign any
e-pet ti n and e-voting campaign. Succe sively, any t ird party
create an instan of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner v ifier, op i ns, cor s) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
opt ons, score ) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquel identifies t e petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s v t s (ini ialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the ptions are only YES
and NO; and t fi lds ow er and verifi r respectively hold
the public key of the third par y creating he petit on nd of
authorities ssuing the credentials. In der o sign the petition,
the us rs compute a a ue  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to th options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-kn wledge proof h wing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L preve t a citizen to vote tw ce du ing the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while he proof   ensures
that   has been built from a si ned private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also b Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to bl ckchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been imple ented in python
usi g the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bp ib [2]. The
bil ear pairing w rks over a Barr to-Naehrig [17] curv , using
Op nSSL as the rithmetic backend. We have r lea ed the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I hows the mean (µ) and standard deviati n (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Int l Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggregat ThSig 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Nu ber of authoritie : n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction compl xity s ze [B]
Signature on cl ar message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get sig ature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Sign ure on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the cheme on hidden me s ges). A so,
aggregati n of ke s nd signatures are extremely fficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expr ssed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size f a s gnatu e is
132 bytes. The hig est transaction size appea s whe the us r
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from he fact
that th proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatur s (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alb rto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare result (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters , t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways th t
he is a citizen of C. The autho ities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s p ivate
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Successively, ny third par y
create an instance of the petition contract as s own in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifi r, opti ns, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID p ram ter u iquely ident fies th petit o , and
the scores paramete holds the citiz n’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the cas a p tition th op ions are only YES
and NO; and the fields owne nd v rifier respectively hol
the public key of th thir party cr ating th p tition and of
authorities issuing the cred n ials. In order to s n th petition,
the users compute a value   s follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
The , they add their vote to the options, app nd   to a pen
list L, and build a zero-knowledge p oof showing th t   is
build from the same value x of their cred nti ls:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Addi g   to L pre ent a citize t vote twic during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while th proof   ensures
that   has b en built from a signed priva e key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe the CoCoNut authorities
can als be Chain pace nodes (to mak clear the potential
f CoC Nut when d eply related to blockchains), s c w
actually built all of his to have credentials i smart cont acts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been i plemen ed in python
using the wo crypo libraries petlib [1] bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
a an ope - ourc project n GitHub.3.
Table I hows the mean (µ) and st ndard eviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of eac procedure described in secti n section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-cor
Dell desktop comput r, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
K ygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSig 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSig 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Sign ture size: 132 [B]
Tra saction compl xity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signatur O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Tabl II shows the communication omplexity and th
ize of each exchang involved in the signatur scheme, as
pr sented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed a th nu b r
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of th
message on which the user wis to obtain sig ature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual m ssage, and is
ther fore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The s ze of a signature is
132 by . The highes transaction size appears when the user
ask a sign ture on a hidden essage. This comes from the fact
that the p oof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; th proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
A bert : @Bano, t s system on AWS (n authority): client
late cy vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
chec the time it takes to hear back from t uthoritie .
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (spe d a d size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not ma y scheme have actually been
3ht ps://git ub.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a et of uthorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function req iring the user to prove in som ways t at
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term sig ature on th citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-vo ing campaign. Successiv ly, any th rd party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, ver fie , options, sc es) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, sc res) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petitio , and
the scores parameter holds the citiz n’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the ca e of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields own r and verifier resp ctiv ly hold
the public key of the third par y creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vot to th op s, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowl dg roof showing that   is
build from the same v lue x of their cr dentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen t vote twice d ring the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has be n built fr a si ed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, D scribe the C CoNut auth rities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to mak clear the otential
f CoCoNut when de ply related to blockchains), s nce w
actually built all of his to have credenti ls in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluati n
The signature scheme has be n implemented i python
usi g the two crypo librari petlib [1] a bplib [2]. The
bilinea pairing w rk over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source pr ject o GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
th xecution of eac procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Del desktop comput r, 3.6GHz In el Xeon. This table shows
hat signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for he sc eme working n clear m ssages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
S owBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of aut orities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Sig ature n hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time fast r for th sc em on hidde messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signature are extre ely fficient.
Table II shows the communication c mplexity and the
size of each xc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
f signin authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size f the
message on which the us r wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 byt s; th pr of  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @B no, test system on AWS (n authority): client
late cy vs t – ask n signatures (and blind ignatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternative
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.c m/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoC Nut tition rchit cture.
Similarly to the pr vious exampl , se of author t es in
charge f C runs th Cr e f nction f he CoCoNut library.
The paramet rs n, t are s t ccord ng y, and r f poi t to
ustom function requiring the user o p ove in some wa s that
he is a citizen of C. The au orities t q = 1, and re ex e ting
to issue blind and long- rm ig ature on the citizen’s private
key k; t is sig at cts as the citizen credenti ls to sign
an e-petition and e-voting campa g . Succ s ively, any t ird
party create a instance of t e petiti n ntract s own i 5.
The UUID paramet r un quel id ntifi s the p ition, n e
scores parameter holds he citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the cas of a peti io t e opti ns are only YES a d NO; and
the fields wn r a d k r pectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
cr den ia s. In ord r to sign the petitio , the users co ute a
ue   s follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Th n, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x f their c edential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prev nt a citizen to vot twice during t same
campaign (prevent double spe ing), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. M pping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Ge rge, Describe how the CoCoNut au horities
can also be Chainspace nodes (t m k clear th pot ntial
of CoCoNut when deeply related o blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have cred nti ls in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalu tion
The signatur scheme has bee implemented in python
using the two crypo librar es p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear p iring works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, usi g
Numb of measures: 10,000
Operati n µ [m ]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rando ize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr pareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of th rities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transacti complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À g t signature O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on h dden mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signat re O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication c mplexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as n open-sourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) f
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa- or
Dell deskt p computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster tha verifying signatures (about
15 times faster f r he scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows th communication complexity and the
siz of each exch nge involved in the signa ure scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is express d as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on whic the user wish to obtain a signature. Not
that in ractice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a gnature on hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the p oof  s a sociated with the message is approximately
318 byt s; th proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/ sonni o/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petiti n arc it cture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s ot , and the
refer to the st ps in wri -up.
to itself, and use these t ken t t al all th mo ey
in the buff r. The thre hold pro erty of Malet im-
pli s t a the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happ n. This prop rty
also prevents a single autho ity f om taki g the us r
mo ey and disappear witho t i suing a y t k n.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-pres rving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly n me all the en ities inv lved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this sch me?
In this example, we consider the scenari where a
city C wish to issue some long term creden ials to their
citiz ns in ord r to allow ny third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-peti ion or - oting c aign; all
citizens of C are llowed to par icipate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlink bl across c mpaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library c t act and a sim-
ple smart contract called pe ition.
Similarly to the previous example, a et of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, a d re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that t y are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 B no: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind nd long-term sig atu e on he citizen’s private
key k; this signature ac s as the cit zen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voti g Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some o er inf matio .g. pass ort off-
band, but then how will blin ness be maint ined?. Suc-
cessively, any thir party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. T UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of t e third party creating the petition and the
v rification k y f the authoritie issuing the credentials.
In orde to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a z ro-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same valu k of heir credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt co tract checks the roof p and the
credentials, and ch cks that the vot is fresh by verifying
that n is not art of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a sy tem where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: dis ributing the credentials issuance re-
m ves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority fro cr a in arbitrary credentials to sign
multi time a p tition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a cen orship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxi s are oft used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limit tions. First, oxies end to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the pr v us example, a se of authorities i
charge of runs the Cr ate function o th CoCoNut ibrary.
The param t rs , ar set ccordingly, and r f point to a
custom function requiring th us r to pr ve in some w ys that
he is a citize of C. The authorities set q = 1, a d are expecti g
to issue a blind and long-t rm signature on the ci iz n’s private
key k; this signature cts as the citiz n credentials sig a y
e-petitio and e-voting campaign. Successivel , any third arty
create an instance of the petition co tract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifi , o o s, s r ) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
optio , sc res) (3)
  =
 
k
1
 UUID
(4)
T e UUID rameter uniquely identifies the p tition, a d
the scores parame er holds th citiz n’ vot s (initialized to
zer ). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifi r respectiv ly h ld
the public k y of the third party reating th petition nd of
uthorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the p titi n,
the users c mpute a value  as f llo s.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, th y add their vote to the options, a pend   to a spent
list L, and build a zer -knowledge proof showi g that   is
build from the same value x f their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to v te twice duri the sa e
campaign (prevent double spending), w ile the proof   ensu es
that   has be n built from signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockch in nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe h w the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalua ion
The signature scheme has been implem nt d in python
using th two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing orks over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as th arithm tic backend. We hav released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 m asured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
p ration µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rand mize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
P par BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bli dSig 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
Bli dVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I Perf rma ces evaluat on.
Numb r of uthorities: n, Signatur size: 132 [B]
Tran acti n complexity size [B]
Signature n clear mes age:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify sig ature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden m ssage:
  ask sign tur O(n) 516
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã verify s gnatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communicat o complexity and transaction size.
nd 3 tim faster for the sche on hidden m ssag ). Also,
aggre ation f k ys and signatur s ar extremely efficient.
Tabl II how the o munication complexity nd the
size of each xchang involved in the signature scheme, s
presented in fig. 1. Th compl xity is xpressed as the number
of signing authorities ( ), and ||m|| repr sents the size of the
m ssage on which the us r wish to obtain a signatur . Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
erefore s t to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 b tes. he highes transacti n size appears when the user
ask a ig ature o a hidden message. This co es from the fact
t at th proof  s ass ciated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v i only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update th above
B. System evalua ion
Albert : @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
late cy s t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto rel ted works
Alberto: compare results ( peed and size) with alternatives
to s e why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/aso nino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref poin s to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on th citizen’s priv te
key k; this signature acts as the citizen cred ntials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successiv ly, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
( )
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the p tition, and
the scores parameter holds the citiz n’s votes (initializ d to
zero). In the case of a petition th options ar only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party cr ating the petition and of
authoritie issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users com ute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the optio s, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   t L pr vent a citizen to vote twic during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   e sures
that   has been built from a signed priva e key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authoriti s
can also be Chainspace nodes (to mak clear the po ntial
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
ctually built all of this o have crede tials in s art contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The si nature scheme has been implem nt d n p thon
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. Th
bilinear pairing works ov r a Barreto-Nae rig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the ar thmetic backend. W ha e r leased t c de
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows th mean (µ) n standard deviatio (
 
 2) of
the execution of ac procedure d scribed n sectio secti n II.
Each ent y is the result of 10,000 easured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that sig ing is much faster than verifyi g signatures (about
15 t mes faster for t e scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
A gregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Ra do ize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggre ateThSig 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transact on complexity s ze [B]
Signature on lear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signatu e O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and tra saction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hid en messages). Also,
aggreg tion of keys and sig atu s are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of ach exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
pres nted i fig. 1 The complexity is expressed as the number
f signi g author ties (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual messag , and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (f r SHA-2). The size f a signat re is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from t e fact
that the p oof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof   is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. Syste evaluation
Albe o: @Bano, tes syst m n AWS (n authority): lient
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Al erto: discuss crypto related works
Alb o: c pare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to s e why t is cool stuff; not many schem have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature cts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition d e-voting campaign. Succ ssively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter u iq ely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citiz n’s vot s (initializ d to
zero). In the case of a petition t e options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creatin the petition and of
authoriti s is uing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
th users omput a value   s follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, t ey add their vote to th optio s, ap nd   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showi g that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (pr vent double spendi g), while the pr of   e sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping aut orities to blo kchain nodes
Albert : @George, Describe h w the CoC Nut authorities
can also be Ch inspace no es (to mak clear h potential
of CoCoNut when deeply r lated to blockchains), s nce w
actually built all f this to have credent als i smart c ntracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. P imitiv v luatio
Th signat e scheme has been implemented in python
using th two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL a the arithmetic backe d. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Tabl I hows the mean (µ) an standard deviation (
 
 2) f
the execution of each procedure described n section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 easured on an Octa-cor
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Int l Xe n. T i table shows
t at signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregat ign 0.004 ± . 00
Aggregat K ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSi n 3.356 ± 0.002
Sh wBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindV rify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggre ateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  a k signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À g t ignature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication omplexity nd tra saction size.
nd 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are ext e ly efficient.
Table II shows the communic tion complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as th number
of si ni g aut oritie (n), and ||m|| represents the s ze of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
herefore set to 32 by es (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The high st tr nsact on size appears when the user
ask a signature n a hidden message. This comes from the fact
tha the proof  s assoc ated wi h the me sag is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System ev l ti n
Alberto: @Bano, te t sy tem on AWS (n uthority): lie t
latency vs t – ask signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Albert : compare results (speed and size) with alter atives
to see w y it is cool stuff; not many scheme hav actually been
3https://gith b. om/asonni o/ oconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCo ut petiti n a chitectu e.
Similarly to the previous xample, a set of uth riti s i
char e of C runs the Crea e function of CoCoNut library.
Th parameters n, t are set accordin ly, n ref oin o a
custom function requiring he ser to prove in some ways that
he is a citiz n of C. The autho iti s et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm ignature t e citiz n’ privat
k y k; this sig ature acts s e ci izen edential to sign
any -petition a d e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party cr ate a instan e of the petition on act as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely iden fi s the p titio , nd the
cor s ramet r holds the citizen’s vo es (init alized t z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t opti ns ar ly YES nd NO; and
the fie ds owner and k respectively hold the public ey of the
third party cre ti g t e etition and of authoritie issuing the
credentia s. In ord r to sign the p itio , the rs c mpute a
value  as f l o s.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
The , they add their vote o t o tions, append   to a spen
list L, nd build a zero-k owl dg pro f sho ing th   i
build from the sa e value x of their cre ential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Ad ing   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice duri g t e same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   en ures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockch in nodes
Alberto: @George, De cribe how the CoC Nut auth rities
can also b Chai space nod s (to m ke clear the pote tial
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blo kchains), sin e we
actually built all of thi t have redentials in sm t contracts.
(sc res,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluat on
Th signa ur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two cry o libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pai ing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± . 06
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± . 00
Aggre ateKeys 0.017 ± 0.00
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0. 2
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of uthoriti s: n, Sig ature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signatur O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: C munication complexity and transaction size.
Ope SSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-sou ce project on GitHub.3.
Table I show the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h pr c dure descri ed in sectio se tion II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than v rifying sig atur s (about
15 times faster for the scheme worki g on clear messages,
an 3 ti e faster for the sch me hidden m ag s). Also,
aggr gation of k ys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II sh w the comm nication complexity and the
ize of each exch ge involv d n the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expr ssed as the number
of sig ing uthoriti s (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the has of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidd n message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the m ssage is approximately
318 bytes; he proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/aso n no/ oconut
Figu e 5: Overview of t e Malet pet tio architectur
B no: R o thi fi ure a er B o’s not s, and the
refer to the ep in write-up.
to itself, and use these tok n o s eal all the money
in the buffer. The t r shol pr perty of Malet im-
pli s that the dversar ne s cor upt at l ast t
authorities for this attack t hap . T i pr perty
also prev ts ingle auth ty from taki g th us r
mo ey nd di appe r without issuing any to en.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preservi e-p tition an -
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all th ent ties involve i this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
I this example, we con ider th scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long t rm cr dentials to th ir
citizens in order to allow any third p rty to rga iz a
privacy-p eservi g e-pet tion or e-voting campai n; all
citizens of C are allow d to participat , and should re-
main anonymou , and unlinkabl across campaigns. This
s ste is bas d o he Malet libr ry contract and sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly t the previous ex mple, a set of authorities
in charge of C ru s the Crea e fun tion of the Mal t
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and f
points to a custom fu ction requiring the users to prov
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. T authori-
ties set q= 1 what is q, and re expecti g t is ue
a blind and long-term signature n he citizen’s private
key k; this signature act as e citizen crede tials to sign
any e-petition and e- oting Ban : state if this may i -
volve checkin some other information .g. pas port off-
band, but then how will bl nd ess be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of th p -
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parame er
Bano: is this private (can eve yone see curre t scores)?
how are votes with on-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s vote (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the opti ns are only YES nd NO;
d the fiel s owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of th third par y creating the petition and the
v ficatio k y of the authoritie issuing the cred ntials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compu e a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
T , t ey co t a z r -knowledge proof showing
that i build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = b k}
Th titi s rt contract checks the proof p and he
c dentials, and checks th t the vot is fresh by ve ifyi g
that n is not part of a spe t list L; if all the che ks pass, it
d s th vote of the us rs to the list of scores and ad s
nu o list L. Addi g n to L prevents a citize to vote
twice during the same ampaig (preven d uble sp nd-
i g). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove t at they are citiz ns of C.
P op rtie brought by Malet. Malet pr vides a set of
pr pertie that enabl th abo e applicatio when com-
bines.
• Blin ness: preve ts the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it all ws th u ers to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining u l nkability wi h
blindn ss allows system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase nly once, a d can then
re- se their credentials multiple time whil staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distrib ting the creden als issuance re-
moves a central uthority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple i e a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We impl ment a censorship-resista t system based on
Malet. Proxies ar often used t ci cu vent censorship
when th t rget IP addr ss has been blocked, but prox-
ies suff r from three limitati ns. First, proxies tend to
become the target of c sorshi themselves. For exam-
ple numb r of countries block Tor by blacklisti g T r
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxie that it contr ls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor a pre end t be a user of the
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Similarly to the p v us example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Cre t function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set acc rdingly, nd ref points o a
custo function requiring the user to prove in some ways tha
he is citizen of C. The uth rities s t q = 1, and re expecting
to issue a blind and long- erm ignatur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen cr d nt als to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, ny third party
create an instance of the p tition contract as sh wn in ??.
(UUID, owner, verif er, op i ns, ores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies th petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citiz n’s votes (initializ d to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner nd verifier respecti ly hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In o der to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, t ey add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their cr dentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent citizen to vote wice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while th pro f   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the pot ntial
of CoCoNut wh n deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contra ts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primit ves evaluation
The signature scheme has been impl mented in pyth n
using the two crypo librari s petlib [1] and bplib [2]. T e
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have r leased the od
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
T ble I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviatio (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the schem working on clear m ssages,
N mber of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
A gregateSig 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rand miz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBli dSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSi n 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
ABLE I: Performances ev luat o .
Numb r of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Sig atur on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O( ) 516
À et signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication c mplexity a d transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extre ely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and th
siz of each exchange involved in the signatur cheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is exp essed as the numb r
f signing authoriti s (n), a d ||m|| repre ents the size of t e
message on which the user wish to b ain a signatu e. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual me sag , and is
therefore se o 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when th user
ask a signature on a hidden m ssage. This comes from the fact
tha th proof  s assoc ated with the message is approxi ately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the bove
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – sk n sig atures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Albert : compare results (speed nd size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3 ttps://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous exampl , a set of au horities in
charge of C runs the Create functi of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-t rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an nstance of the petition co tract as show in ??.
(UUID, owner, ver fier, p io s, scores) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
op ions, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores par eter holds the ci iz n’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options e only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key f the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value   s follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, th y add their vote to the opti ns, a p nd   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   i
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1  UID     =   k}
Adding   to L preve t a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spend ng), while the proof   nsures
that   has been b ilt from a signed pr vate key k.
C. Map ing a t orities to bl ckchai nodes
Alberto: @Geo ge, D scribe how the CoCoNut auth rities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of is to h ve c ede tials in sma t contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] a d bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, u in
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We ha e released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows th m a (µ) and standard de iation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure d scribed in sec ion section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop comp ter, 3.6GHz Intel Xeo . This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rand mize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prepar BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBli dSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perf rm ces evaluati .
Number of authorities: n, Sig ature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity siz [B]
Signature on clear me sage:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Commu ication complexity and tra saction siz .
and 3 time faster for the cheme o hidd n messages). Also,
ag regation of key and ignatur s are extre ely efficien .
Table II hows the commu icat on omplexity d th
size of ach exchang involved in the signature scheme, a
pr e ted in fig. 1. The compl xity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities ( ), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on hich the user wish to obtain a signa ure. Note
t at in practic m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore et o 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest tran act o size appears when the use
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from th fact
that the pro f  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. Sys em evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test syst m on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (a d n blind signatures) and
check the time it akes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alb rto: dis uss crypto relat d works
Alberto: compare results (speed a d size) with alterna ives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme hav ctually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Creat fu ction of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set acco dingly, and ref points t a
custom funct on requi ing the user t prove in som ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signatur on the citiz n’s private
key k; this signature act as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voti g campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as sh wn in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
o io s, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, nd
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). I the case of a petition the options are o ly YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they dd their vote to th opt ons, appen   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowl dg proof show ng that   is
build from the same value x of heir credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1  UID     =   k}
dding   to L pr v nt a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   su es
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping auth rities to blockchai odes
Alberto: @G orge, Describe how the CoCoNut authoritie
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of t is to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives eval ation
The signature scheme has been implemented python
usi g the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as t e rithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project n GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure d scrib d in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than ve ifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear m ssages,
Number of measure : 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSig 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSig 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVer fy 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSig 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Pe forma ces evaluation.
Number of authorities: , ignature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Si n ture n cl ar message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get s g ature O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signat re on hidden me sage:
  a k signature O(n) 516
À get signatur O n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Commu i ation compl xity nd t ansaction size.
and 3 time f ster for th sche e on idden mess ges). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication c mplexity and the
size of eac exc ange involved in the signature sc e, as
pre ented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the us r wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in pr ctice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 byte (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transacti n size appears when the user
ask a signatu e on a hidden message. Thi comes from th fact
that t e proof  s ass ciated with the message is approximat ly
318 bytes; the pro f  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. Syst m evaluati n
Albert : @Bano, t st system o AWS (n uth ity): client
l te cy vs t – ask n signatu s (a d n blind sign tures) and
check the time it takes to he r back fr m t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare re ults (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overvie of the CoCoNut petition archit ctur .
Similarly to the pr vious exampl , a set of u horities in
charge f C runs th Cr a e function of he C CoN t l br ry.
The param ters n, t a e t accordingly, and r f p ints t a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some way that
he is citiz f C. Th uthorities et q = 1, and ar ex e ting
to issue a blind and lon - rm signature on t citizen’s p ivate
key k; this signatu e ac s as t e citizen credentials to sign
any e-petiti n and -vot g campa gn. Succ s ively, a y th rd
party create a instance of th petition cont a t s wn n 5.
The UUID parameter un qu ly id ntifies the p ti io , and the
scores p ram ter holds th citizen’s v t s (initial zed t z o).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are onl YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k esp ctively ho d th public k y f the
third party c eating the p tition and of authorities issui g the
cre e tia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute
v lue  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   t a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pro f howing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain odes
Albert : @George, Describe how th CoCoNut authorities
can a so be Chainspace node (to make cl ar the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply r lat d to lockch ins), since we
actually built all of this to h ve cr dentials in sm rt contra ts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
T e signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] c rve, using
Nu ber of measures: 1 ,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ ]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggreg t Si 0.004 ± 0.000
Aggr gateK s 0.017 ± 0.000
R n miz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr r Blin Sig 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSig 3.356 ± 0.002
Sh wBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindV rify 10.497 ± 0.002
Agg ega ThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perform nces evaluation.
Number of autho ities: , Sig ature size: 1 2 [B]
Transacti n compl xity siz [B]
Sig ature on clear message:
  ask signa ur O n) || ||
À get signatur O(n) 132
Ã v rify sig tur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Sign tur on hidden ssag :
  sk signature O(n) 516
À get signature (n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity a d transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arith etic backend. We h v rel ased the code
as an ope -sourc rojec on GitHub.3.
Table I shows t e m a (µ) d st ndard deviatio (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedur described in ction s c ion II.
Each en ry is th r ult of 10,000 measured on an Oct -cor
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeo . This t ble shows
t at signing is much faster t n verifying signatures ( bout
15 times faster for the scheme working on cle r messages,
and 3 time fast r for the sc eme on hidd n messages). Al o,
aggregation of keys an signatures are extre ely efficient.
Table II show th communication compl xity and t e
size f each exchange nvolved in the sign tu cheme, as
resen ed in fig. 1. T c pl xity is expressed a the number
of igning uthorities (n), and ||m|| represe t the siz f the
message on which the u er wish to obtain a signatur . Note
that in practice is the hash of the actual message, and is
th re ore set to 32 byt (for SHA-2). The ze of a sig ature is
132 bytes. The highest trans ction siz appears when the user
ask a signature o a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s sociated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Upda e the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition arc itectur
Bano: Re o t is figure as per Ba o’s notes, nd t en
refer to the steps in wri e-up.
to itself, and use t ese t ken to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold roperty f Mal t im-
plies that the adversary ne ds to corrup at le st t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from aking the user
money and disapp ar without is uing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preservi g e-petition a d e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are xpected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider th scenario wh re a
city C wish to issue so e lo g ter cre entials to th ir
citiz ns in order to allow any third party to org nize
privacy-pr serving -p titio or e-voting campa g ; all
citizens of C are llowed to participat , and should -
main anonymous, and unlinkable cross ampaig s. This
syst m is based on the Male libr ry contract a sim-
ple smart contract call d p tit on.
Similarly to the previous example, s t of auth riti s
in charge of C runs the Create function of the M l t
library. The parameters n, t are set accor ingly, and re f
points to a custom function r quiring he users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. Th u hori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: h t is q, and are expecti g to i sue
a blind and long-term signatu e on the citiz n’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-pet tion and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other i formation .g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current sc res)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
a d t fields owner and vk respe tively hold the v ifi-
cation k y of th thir part crea ing the petition and the
verification key of au horitie issuing h cr d nti ls.
In ord t si n a pe itio , the users comput a value n
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
h n, they construct a ze o-knowledg proof showing
that n is build fr the a e value k of their cr dentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
k
1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract he ks the pr of p and the
credential , and checks tha the vote is fresh by verifying
t at n is not p rt of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s t e vote of th us rs to the list f sc r s a d adds
u to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twi e uring the same campaign (prevent ouble sp nd-
ing). Also, t e pr of p ensures that n has been built fro
sign d private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed t e callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable e above application when com-
bin s.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens h ve to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anon mou .
• Thre hold: distributing the redential issuance re-
mov s a central a thority and pr vent a single au-
thority from creating arbit ary credentials to sign
multipl time a petition.
4.4 Cens ship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but pr x-
ies suffer from three limitatio s. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
Fig. 4: Th oin tumbler application.
V. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we pr ent three applic t n that le era
Coconut to off improv d secur t and pr vacy propertie —
a coin tumbler (Section V-A), a privacy-preservi g petition
system (Section V-B), and a system for censorship-r sistant
d stribution of proxies (Section V-C). For gener lity, the ap-
plications assume authorities exter al to the blockchain, but
these can also be embedded into the blockchain as described
in Section IV-C.
A. Coin Tumbler
We impleme a n tumbler (or mixer) on Chainspace
as depi ted in Figure 4. Coin tumbling is a metho to mix
cryptocurrency associated with an address visible in a public
ledger with other addresses, to “clean” the coins and ob-
scure the trail back to the coins’ original source address. A
limitation of previous similar schem s [13], [49], [27], [37],
[44], [9], [38] is that they ar either centralize (i.e., there
is a central authority t at perates the tumbler, which may
go offline), or r quir us rs to coordinat with each oth r.
The Coconut tumbler addresses these issues via a di tributed
design (i.e., secur ty relies on a s t of multiple authoriti s
that ar collectively trusted to contain at le st t honest nes),
and do s not require users to coordinate with each other.
Zcash [45] achieves a similar goal; it theoretically hides the
totality of the transaction but at a huge computational cost,
and offers the option to cheaply send transactions in clear.
In practice, the computational overhead of sending hidden
transactions makes it impractical, and only a few users take
advantage of the optional privacy provided by Zcash; as a
result, transactions are easy to de-anonymize [29]. Coconut
provides efficient proofs taking only a few milliseconds (see
Section VI), and makes hidden transactions practical. Trust
assumptions in Zcash are different from Coconut. However,
instead of assuming a threshold number of honest authorities,
Zcash relies on zk-SNARKs which assumes a setup algorithm
executed by a single trusted authority.
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Our tumbler uses Coconut to instantiate a pegged side-
chain [5], providing stronger value transfer anonymity than
the original cryptocurrency platform, through unlinkability
between issuing a credential representing an e-coin [21], and
spending it. The tumbler application is based on the Coconut
contract library and an application specific smart contract
called “tumbler”.
A set of authorities jointly create an instance of the Coconut
smart contract as described in Section IV-A and specify the
smart contract handling the coins of the underlying blockchain
as callback. Specifically, the callback requires a coin transfer
to a buffer account. Then users execute the callback and pay
v coins to the buffer to ask a credential on the public attribute
v, and on two private attributes: the user’s private key k and
a randomly generated sequence number s (Ê). Note that to
prevent tracing traffic analysis, v should be limited to a specific
set of possible values (similar to cash denominations). The
request is accepted by the blockchain only if the user deposited
v coins to the buffer account (Ë).
Each authority monitors the blockchain and detects the
request (Ì); and issues a partial credential to the user (either
on chain or off-chain) (Í). The user aggregates all partial
credentials into a consolidated credential, re-randomizes it, and
submits it as coin token to a merchant. First, the user produces
a zk-proof of knowledge of its private key by binding the proof
to the merchant’s address addr; then, the user provides the
merchant with the proof along with the sequence number s
and the consolidated credential (Î). The coins can only be
spent with knowledge of the associated sequence number and
by the owner of addr. To accept the above as payment, the
merchant submits the token by showing the credential and a
group element ζ = gs1 ∈ G1 to the tumbler contract along with
a zero-knowledge proof ensuring that ζ is well-formed (Ï). To
prevent double spending, the tumbler contract keeps a record of
all elements ζ that have already been shown. Upon showing a
ζ embedding a fresh (unspent) sequence number s, the contract
verifies that the credential and zero-knowledge proofs check,
and that ζ doesn’t already appear in the spent list. Then it
withdraws v coins from the buffer (Ð), sends them to be
received by the merchant account determined by addr, and
adds ζ to the spent list (Ñ). For the sake of simplicity, we
keep the transfer value v in clear-text (treated as a public
attribute), but this could be easily hidden by integrating a range
proof; this can be efficiently implemented using the technique
developed by Bu¨nz et al. [14].
Security consideration. Coconut provides blind issuance
which allows the user to obtain a credential on the sequence
number s without the authorities learning its value. Without
blindness, any authority seeing the user key k could potentially
race the user and the merchant, and spend it—blindness pre-
vents authorities from stealing the token. Furthermore, Coconut
provides unlinkability between the pay phase (Ê) and the
submit phase (Î) (see Figure 4), and prevents any authority or
third parties from keeping track of the user’s transactions. As
a result, a merchant can receive payments for good or services
offered, yet not identify the purchasers. Keeping a spent list of
all elements ζ prevents double-spending attacks [30] without
revealing the sequence number s; this prevents an attacker from
exploiting a race condition in the submit token phase (Ï) and
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money an disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities i
charge of C runs the Cr at function of the CoCo ut library.
The parameters , t re set ccordingly a d ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are exp cting
to issue a blind and long-t rm signature on the citizen’s priv te
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-peti ion and e-voting c mpaign. Succ ssively, any third party
create an in tance of the petition c tract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, op ions, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
c n also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut wh n deeply el ted to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Ran omize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prepar BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication co plexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complex ty i expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency s t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, wner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter u iquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pr of showing that   is
build from the same value x f their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has b en built from a signed private key k.
C. Mappi g authoriti s to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
s an ope - ourc pr ject on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each ntry is the r sult of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing i much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the schem working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get s gnature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ag regation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish t obtain a s gnature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size app s when th user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (s eed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, optio s, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has be n built from a s gned private key k.
C. Mappi g uthoriti s to bloc chain nod s
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blo kchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The sig ature scheme has been imp ement d in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-sour project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) nd standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of eac procedure described in s ction section II.
Each entry is the esult of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying sig atures (about
15 times f ster for the schem working n clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggre ate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
lindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden m sages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc eme, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 byt s; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Albert : discuss crypto relat d works
Alberto: compare results (speed nd size) with alternatives
to see why it is co l st ff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
ini
v te
Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architectur .
Similarly to the previous example, set of autho ities i
charge of C runs the Cr a function of he CoCoNut lib ary.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citiz f C. The aut orities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- m signature on the citizen’s p ivate
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
p rty create a instance f the petiti n contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p titio , and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initializ d to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fie ds owner nd k respectiv ly hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value   follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spe t
list L, and build a zero-knowl dge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x f their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has be n built from a signed pri ate k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
c n also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contra ts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prepar BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Sign ture on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidd n message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows th mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
he execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working n clear messages,
and 3 tim faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II sh ws the communicatio complexity and the
size f each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
mes ge on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transactio size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition arch tect re
Bano: Re o this fi ure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in thi use
case. What properties are xpected from this scheme?
In this xample, we consid r the scenario w ere a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
an the fi lds owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key f the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Al o, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a si ned private k y k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the cit zen’s s cret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the pr vious example, a set f authoriti s in
charge of C runs the Create fu cti n of th CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, nd ref oints to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting c mpaign. Suc ssively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, v ri ier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owne , vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add thei vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of th ir credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen t vot twic during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has bee built from a signed riv te key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme h s b en implem nt d in python
using the two crypo libr ries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I sho s the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 ti es faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances valuation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify si nature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
a d 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregat on of keys and signatures are extrem ly effic ent.
Table II s ows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange inv lved in the signatur scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| repres nts he size of the
messag on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that i practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
t refore set to 32 bytes (f r SHA-2). The size of a signa ure is
132 bytes. The highest transact o siz appears when the ser
ask a signature on a hidden message. This omes from t e fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t au orities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on th citiz ’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting camp ign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the p tition contr ct as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectiv ly hold
the public key of t e third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double sp nding), while the proof   nsures
that   has been built from a signed priv te k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe h w the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make cl ar the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply relat d t blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have cred ntials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster th n verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
  [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performa ces evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tran ction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) || ||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity nd transaction size.
and 3 time fas er for the sche e on idden me sages). A so,
aggregation of k ys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Tabl II shows th communication complexity nd the
size of ach xch nge involved in the signature sc eme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the umber
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the us r wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the has of the actual message, a d is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
late cy vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
ch ck the time it takes to hear back fr m t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: c mpare re ults ( peed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the prev ous example, a set of authoriti s in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoC Nut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities iss ing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to t op ions, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-k owledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vot twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from s gned private key k.
C. Map ing authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @G orge, Describ h w th C CoNut uthorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply relat d o blockchains), sinc we
actually built al of this to have cr dentials in smar c t acts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic ackend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much fast r than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the sche e working on clear m ssag s,
Number of m asures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
Sh wBlind i 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evalu tion.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear me sage:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key nd signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size o each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expr ssed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| repres nts the size of t e
message on which the user wi h to obtain a ignature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size f a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it s cool stuff; not many scheme have a tually been
3https://github.com/as nnino/coconut
init
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Fig. 5: Overvi w of the CoCoNut pe ition a chi cture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of aut rities in
charge of C runs the Crea funct n of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t a se acco di gly, and ref points to
custom function equiring the user to prove in so e ways that
he is a citizen f C. The authorit es e q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- r sign ture on th citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voti g campa gn. Suc es ively, any third
party create a insta e of the p iti n co tract as own in 5.
The UUID parameter u quely identifi s the p ition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (in tialized t z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES nd NO; and
the fields owner a d k respecti ly hold the public key of the
third party creating the etition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In ord r to sig the petitio , the us r compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showi g that   is
build from the sa e v lue x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen t vote twice during the same
camp ign (preve t double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri at key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Georg , Descr be how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluatio
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo librar e p tlib [1] a d bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing w rks over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
R ndomiz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perform nces evaluation.
Numb r of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signa ure on hidd n m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunicatio complexity and tr nsaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) nd t nd rd deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure describ d in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 m asured on an Oct -cor
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than ve ifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on cl ar messag ,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden message ). Al o,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), a d ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o thi figur as per Ba o’s not s, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and us hese token o steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Mal t im-
plies that the adversary nee s to corrup at least
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevent a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear withou issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What pr perties are expec ed from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the s enario where a
city C wish to issue s me long term credentials to their
citizens in o der to llow any th rd party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or -voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anon mous, and unlinkable acro s c mpaig s. This
system s based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called p tition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in ch rge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom fu ction requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a cit zens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and ong-term signature on the citizen’s priva e
key k; his sig ature acts as the citizen cred ntials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Ban : state if this may in-
volve checking some other information .g. passpor off-
band, but th n how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessiv ly, any third party cr ates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown i fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
a d the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the thoriti s issuing the credentials.
In order to sig a petition, the users compute a value n as
f llow :
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, t ey construct a zer -knowl dge proof showing
that n is build fr the same v lue k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th pet tio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and c cks that the vote is fres by v rifying
that n i not part of a spent list L; if ll the check pass, it
ad s th vote of the users to the list of scores and add
nu to t list L. Addin n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a sign d private key k; this means that the users correctly
ex cuted the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple ti a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based o
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address s bee blocke , but prox-
ies suffer from three limitatio s. First, proxies tend t
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Sim larly to the pr vious example, a s t of authorities i
charge of C runs t e Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom fu ction requiring th user to pr ve in some ways that
he is a itizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, nd ar expecting
to issue a blind and lo g-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citiz n credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create n instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, wner, vk, (2)
opti ns, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of t e third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  = gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof sh wing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alb rto: @Geor e, Describ how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potenti l
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to h v credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalua i
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two c ypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard devi tion (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each ntry is the res lt of 10,000 measured on an Octa-co e
Del de ktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear essages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Ag regateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rando ize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature siz : 132 [B]
Transaction co plexity size [B]
Signature o clear m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get sign ture O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidd n message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify signature O(1 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity a transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messag s). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the er wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practic m is the hash of the actual message, and i
therefore set to 32 bytes (f r SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s a sociated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previo s x mple, a set of authorities in
ch ge of C runs th Create function of th CoCoNu library.
The parameters n, t are set accordin ly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring he user to prove in ome ways that
he is a c tizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature o the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the itizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, optio s, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifi s the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the cas of a petition the options are o ly YES
and NO; and the fields own r and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party cr a ng the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as f llows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zer - nowledge proof showi g that   is
build from the s me v ue x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (pr vent double spending), while he proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, D scribe h w the CoCoN t authorities
can also be Chains ace n d s (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNu when deeply related to blockchains), nce w
actually buil all of this to have credentials in smart contr cts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatu e scheme has been implemented in python
using the tw crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. Th
biline r pairing w rks ver a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Op nSSL a t arithm tic backe . We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the ean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the xecution of each procedur described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table show
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomiz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances valuation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transa tion complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 t me faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the c mmunica ion complexity and the
size of e ch exchange involved in the signature sche e, as
presented in fig. 1. Th complexity is expressed as the number
of sig i g aut o ities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
m s age on wh ch the u er wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefor se to 32 byte (for SHA-2). Th size f a sign ture is
132 bytes. The highest transaction ize appears when the user
ask a sig ature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with th messag is approximat ly
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it t kes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto relate works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actu lly been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to he previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The p rameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref poi ts to a
custom function requiring the ser to pr ve in ome w ys that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and l ng-term signatur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credent als to si n any
e-petition and e-voti campaign. Successive y, any third party
crea e an instance of the petition co tract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, ow e , vk, (2)
ptions, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID p am t r uniq ely identifies th petition, and
the scores param ter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized t
zero). In the case of a p tition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner nd verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creatin the petition and f
authorities issuing the cred ntials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as foll ws.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, t ey add their vote to opti ns, appen   to a spent
list L, and build a zer -knowledge proof showing th t   is
build from the same value x of their cr dentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (pr vent double s endi g), while the proof   sur s
that   s been built from a signed privat key k.
C. Mapping authorities to lockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of t is to have cr dentials in smart contract .
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Na hr g [17] curv , using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have releas d the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operati n µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSi n 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performan es e aluati .
Number of aut orities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra saction complexi y size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get ignature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  as signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and tra saction size.
and 3 time faster f r th scheme on hidde messages). Als ,
ggrega ion of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Tab e II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obta n a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
ther fore set to 32 bytes (for SH -2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
t at the proof   associated with the message is pproximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n auth rity): cl ent
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of th CoCoNut p tition r hit cture.
Similarly to t e pr vious exampl , a set of a t orities in
charge of C runs th C ea e funct on of he CoCoNut libr ry.
T paramet rs n, t ar s t accordingly, and ref poi ts to a
custom function req iri the user to prove in some ways t at
he is a citizen of C. The authoriti s et q = 1, and a ex e ting
to issue a bli and lo - r si ature on the citizen’s private
key k; his signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting a p gn. Su ces ively, any hird
party create a inst nce of the petition c tract as s own in 5.
The UUID param t r un quely identifies the p ti ion, nd the
scores parameter holds th citizen’s vote (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti i n e op ions are only YES and NO; and
the fiel s owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
rd party cre ting the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. I order to sign th petitio , th users c mpute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the opti ns, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UU D ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen t vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spendi g), whil the proof   e sures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nod s
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluati n
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr p reBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TAB E I: Performances evaluation.
Number of aut orities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signa ure O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get sig ature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
Ope SSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) an st ndard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell deskt p computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much fast r than ver fying signatur s (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear essages,
and 3 time f ster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signa ures are extremely fficient.
Table II shows the communication compl ity and the
size of each xchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The omplexity is xpressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents th size of
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practic m is the hash of the actual message, and is
th refore set o 32 byt s (for SHA-2). The siz of a signature is
132 by es. The highest ransaction size appears when the u er
ask a signature on a idden mess ge. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s ssociated with the me sage is approximately
318 by es; t v i nly 157 byte .
Alberto: Upd te the abov
3https://github.co /asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of th Malet petit on architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and the
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these ken to steal all the money
in the buffer. Th threshold property of Malet im-
plies that he adv rsary needs to corrup at least t
au horiti fo this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Pr va y-prese v ng e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the en it es involved in this u e
case. Wh t p perties r expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the s enari where a
city C wish t issue some long term credentials o their
citizens in order to al ow any third p rty to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting c mp ign; all
cit zens f C are allow d t p rt cipate, and should re-
main nonymous, a d nlinkable cross campaig s. Thi
system is based on the Malet library contract and sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly t the previous example, a se of auth rities
in charge of C runs th C eate function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t re s t accord ly, and re f
point to a custom function requiring the users t prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties s q= 1 Bano: w at is q, a d r expe ting to issu
a blind and long-term signatur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and -voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve che king ome ther information e.g. ssport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party c eates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as sh wn in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, a d the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
an the fields owner and vk r spectively hold the v rifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verifi atio k y of e authorities issuing the credentials.
In rder to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they c truc a zero-knowledge pro f showing
that n i build fr t sam value k of their red tials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th p ti io sm rt contract checks he p oof p n the
crede tials, and checks that the ote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the u e s to the list of scores and adds
u to t list L. Adding to L prevents a citizen to vote
twic during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, th proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the call ack to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their be ave. Also, i allows the users to vote
anonymou ly.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across camp igns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: dis ributing the crede tials issuance re-
moves a c ntral authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
m ltiple ti e a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We i ple ent ship-resistant syst m based on
Mal t. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been lo ed, but prox-
ies suff r from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of c untries block T r by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
create petition happens every 
campaign
h pp ns 
only onc
Fig. 5: The petition application.
lock user’s funds10. Finally, this application prevents a single
authority from creating coins to steal all the money in the
buffer. The threshold property of Coconut implies that the
adversary needs to corrupt at least t authorities for this attack
to be possible. A s all subset of authorities cannot block the
issuance of a token—the service is guaranteed to be available
as long as at least t authorities are running.
B. Privacy-preserving petition
We consider the scenario where several authorities man-
aging the country C wish to issue some long-term credentials
to its citizens to enable any third party to organize a privacy-
preserving petition. All citizens of C are allowed to participate,
but should remain anonymous and unlinkable across petitions.
This application extends the work of Diaz et al. [23] which
does not consider threshold issuance of credentials.
Our petition system is based on the Coconut library con-
tract and a simple smart contract called “petition”. There are
three types of parties: a set of signing authorities representing
C, a petition initiator, and the citizens of C. The signing
authorities create an instance of the Coconut smart contract
as described in Section IV-A. As shown in Figure 5, the
citizen provides a proof of identity to the authorities (Ê). The
authorities check the citizen’s identity, and issue a blind and
long-term signature on her private key k. This signature, which
the citizen needs to obtain only once, acts as her long term
credential to sign any petition (Ë).
Any third party can create a petition by creating a new
instance of the petition contract and become the “owner” of the
petition. The petition instance specifies an identifier gs ∈ G1
unique to the petition where its representation is unlinkable to
the other points of the scheme11, as well as the verification key
of the authorities issuing the credentials and any application
specific parameters (e.g., the options and current votes) (Ì). In
10An attacker observing a sequence number s during a submit token
phase (Ï) could exploit a race condition to lock users fund by quickly buying
a token using the same s, and spending it before the original submit token
phase is over.
11This identifier can be generated through a hash function Fp → G1 :
H˜(s) = gs | s ∈ Fp.
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order to sign a petition, the citizens compute a value ζ = gks .
They then adapt the zero-knowledge proof of the ProveCred
algorithm of Section III-D to show that ζ is built from the
same attribute k in the credential; the petition contract checks
the proofs and the credentials, and checks that the signature
is fresh by verifying that ζ is not part of a spent list. If
all the checks pass, it adds the citizens’ signatures to a list
of records and adds ζ to the spent list to prevents a citizen
from signing the same petition multiple times (prevent double
spending) (Í). Also, the zero-knowledge proof ensures that ζ
has been built from a signed private key k; this means that
the users correctly executed the callback to prove that they are
citizens of C.
Security consideration. Coconut’s blindness property prevents
the authorities from learning the citizen’s secret key, and
misusing it to sign petitions on behalf of the citizen. Another
benefit is that it lets citizens sign petitions anonymously;
citizens only have to go through the issuance phase once,
and can then re-use credentials multiple times while staying
anonymous and unlinkable across petitions. Coconut allows for
distributed credentials issuance, removing a central authority
and preventing a single entity from creating arbitrary creden-
tials to sign petitions multiple times.
C. Censorship-resistant distribution of proxies
Proxies can be used to bypass censorship, but often become
the target of censorship themselves. We present a system based
on Coconut for censorship-resistant distribution of proxies
(CRS). In our CRS, the volunteer V runs proxies, and is known
to the Coconut authorities through its long-term public key.
The authorities establish reputability of volunteers (identified
by their public keys) through an out of band mechanism. The
user U wants to find proxy IP addresses belonging to reputable
volunteers, but volunteers want to hide their identity. As shown
in Figure 6, V gets an ephemeral public key pk′ from the
proxy (Ê), provides proof of identity to the authorities (Ë),
and gets a credential on two private attributes: the proxy IP
address, pk′, and the time period δ for which it is valid (Ì).
V shares the credential with the concerned proxy (Í),
which creates the proxy info including pk′, δ, and the creden-
tial; the proxy ‘registers’ itself by appending this information
to the blockchain along with a zero-knowledge proof and the
material necessary to verify the validity of the credential (Î).
The users U monitor the blockchain for proxy registrations.
When a registration is found, U indicates the intent to use a
proxy by publishing to the blockchain a request info message
which looks as follows: user IP address encrypted under pk′
which is embedded in the registration blockchain entry (Ï).
The proxy continuously monitors the blockchain, and upon
finding a user request addressed to itself, connects to U and
presents proof of knowledge of the private key associated with
pk′ (Ð). U verifies the proof, the proxy IP address and its
validity period, and then starts relaying its traffic through the
proxy.
Security consideration. A common limitation of censorship
resistance schemes is relying on volunteers that are assumed
to be resistant to coercion: either (i) the volunteer is a large,
commercial organisation (e.g., Amazon or Google) over which
the censor cannot exert its influence; and/or (ii) the volunteer is
Ledger
volunteer
proof of identity 
authorities
smart 
contract
Ledger
petition 
creator
citizen
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
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7
smart 
contract
Ledger
petition 
creator
citizen
7
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
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OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
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the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
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AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
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BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
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TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
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À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a set o author ties in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen cr dentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. S ccessively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as sho n in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, o tions, score ) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their v te t the options, app nd   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pr of showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply r lated to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two rypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section s ction II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop co puter, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of igning authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. Syst m evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
c eck the time it takes to he r back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto relate works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a s t of uthorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points t a
custom function requiring the user to rove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the opti ns, append   to a sp nt
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citiz n to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensur s
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockch in nodes
Alberto: @George, D scribe how the CoCoN t authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials i smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Int l Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pre areBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggreg teThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) || ||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden essages). Also,
aggregatio of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication compl xity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual m ssage, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is appr ximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see w y t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contrac as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, score ) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petit on, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pro f showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunicati n complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
g regation of key and s gnatures are extre ly efficient.
T ble II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each xc ange involved in the signature c me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is ex essed as the number
of signing autho ities ( ), and ||m|| r presents the size o the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, a d is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update he above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Ban , t st system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually be n
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea function f h CoCoNut librar .
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ef oints to a
custom function requiring the us r to prov in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities t q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm ignature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the cit ze credent als to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a r -knowledge pro f showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Opera io µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rando ize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr par BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindV rify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signatur on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À ge signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the xecution f h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Mal t p tition archit cture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of M l t im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
c tion key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowl dge proof showing
th t n is build fr the same v lue k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
smart 
contract
L dg r
petition 
creator
citizen
7
Simil rly to the pr vious example, a set of authoriti s in
c arge of C runs the Cr a e function of the CoCoN t library.
The par mete s n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
cus om functi n equiring the user to prove in some ways th t
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citize ’s privat
key k; this signature acts as the citiz n crede ti ls to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, sc res) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter h lds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
th public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorit es issuing t e cr dentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   i
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has be n built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alb rto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also b Chainspa e nodes (to mak clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockc ains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing w rks over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, u ing
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and st ndard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is m ch faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times fast r for the sch me working on cl ar messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggr gateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rformances evaluation.
Number of authoriti s: n, Sig ature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on cl ar message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden mes age:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À g t sign ture O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the sch me on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities ( ), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of t e actual message, and is
herefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The siz of a signature s
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e- etition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, optio s, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initi lized to
zero). In the case of a peti ion the options re only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
au horities issuing the cr dent als. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof sh wing that   is
build from the same valu x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   ha been uilt from a signe private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
u ing the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, u ing
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have re eased the code
as an ope - ourc proj c on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop comput r, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying ignatures (about
15 tim s faster for the scheme working n clear m ssages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
Aggre ateK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
prese ted in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wi h to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The high st transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the ess ge is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. Sys em evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme ha e actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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S milarly t the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiri g the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorit es set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of th petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owne , verifier, options, scor s) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the pe ition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and t e fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing he credentials. In ord r to sign the petition,
the u ers comput a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pro f showing hat   is
build from the ame value x f their credentials:
  = PK{( ) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
t e execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 m asured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop comput , 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear m ssages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSig 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perform nc eva uation.
Number of authori ies: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time fa ter for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user ish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when th user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update the above
B. System evaluati n
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS ( authority): clien
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut peti io r itecture.
Similarly to the pr vious example, a set of authorities in
harge of C runs the Crea e funct on of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t ar set accordingly, and r f p ints to a
cust m function r quiring the user to prov in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities et q = 1, and are x e ting
to i su a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signatur acts as the citiz n cred t als to sign
any e- etition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party cr ate a ins ance of the p tition c ntract s s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p tition, and th
scores parameter olds the citizen’s vot s (i itialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options a e onl YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively h ld the p blic key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issui g the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), i c we
actually built all of this have cr dentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
Bli dVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã ve ify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À g t signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C m unication complexity and tran action size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
1 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest tra saction size appe rs wh n the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update the above
3http ://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overvie of the Malet petition rchitecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, a d th n
refe to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and us these token to steal all the money
in the buffe . T threshold property of Mal im-
plies that the advers ry needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking th user
mo ey and disappear without issui g any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 P ivacy-preserving -p titio and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields own and vk resp ctively hold the verifi-
cat on key of the third party creating the p tition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In or er to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they con truct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
t at n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to th l t L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
xecut d the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allo s the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaig s. Joini g unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 C nsorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the revious example, s t of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordin ly, and r f po nts to a
custom function requi ing the us r to pr ve in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The aut orities t q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a bli and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citizen crede tials t s gn any
e-petition and e-voting campa gn. S ccessively, any third party
create an instance of the p tition contract as shown i ??.
(UUID, own r, verifie , opti s, scor s) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
optio s, cor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petitio , and
the scor s parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the publi key of the third party creating the petition and of
auth riti s issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users comput a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spen
list L, and build a ze o-knowledge proof s owing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. M pping aut orities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nod s (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Pri itives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the rithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of e ch procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an cta-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messag s,
Number of measures: 10,000
O ratio µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
Aggr g teK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Random ze 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
Bli dVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gat ThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances ev luation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tr n ction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask sign ture O(n) ||m||
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communicatio complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the cheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregati n of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II show the communic tion co plexity and the
size of each exc ge involved in the signature sch me, as
presented in fig. 1. The compl xity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in pra tice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
as a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System e aluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
l tency vs t – ask n signatures (and blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternativ s
to see why it is cool stuff; not many s heme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnin /coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract s shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies th p tition, and
the scores parameter h ld the citizen’s v tes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and v rifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of th ir cr dentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prev t doubl sp nding), w il the proof   e sur s
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
c also be Chainsp ce nodes (t make clear th potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all f this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluat on
The signature scheme has been implemented in pyth n
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works ov r Barr to-Naehrig [17] curve, usi g
OpenSSL s the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard eviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each pro dure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 me sured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This tabl shows
tha signing is much faste th n verifying signatur s (about
15 times faster for the scheme working n clear messag ,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TA LE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Sig ature on hidden message:
  ask signature O( ) 516
À get sign ture O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signatur is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
A berto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS ( authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signature (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back fr m t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare r ults (sp ed and size) with alternatives
t see why t is cool stuff; not many sch m have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/c con t
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petitio contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, ptions, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
o tions, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID pa ameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s v tes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
a d NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
uthorities i uing the credenti ls. In order to sign the petition,
he users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add t ir vote t the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof show ng that   is
build from the am value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prev t double sp nding), while the pro f   sur
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain odes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can a so be Chainsp ce nodes (to make cl ar the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actu lly built all of this t have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives valuation
The signature cheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barr to-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Ope SSL as th arit metic backend. We have released the code
s a pen-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I hows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure describ d in section secti n II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop c mput r, 3.6GHz Intel X on. This table shows
that signing is much f ster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify sign ture O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signatu e o hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y si nature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity nd transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregati n of key and signa ures a extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is exp ssed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System valuation
Alberto: @B no, test system on AWS (n authority): client
late cy vs t – ask sign tures (and n blind signatures) and
ch ck the time it tak s to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alb rto: discuss crypto relate works
Alberto: comp re results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the C CoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to th previ us example, a set of authorities i
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
T e param ters n, t are set accordingly, and f points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in som ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authori es et q = 1, a d are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signature on the citizen’s priv te
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
party crea e a instance of the petition o tract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies he p tition, and th
scores parameter holds the citizen’s vote (initializ d t z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields wner a d k res ectiv ly ho d th ublic key of the
hird party cr ating th petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users comp te a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add thei v e o the opti s, append   to a spent
list L, and buil zero-knowl dge of showing tha   is
build from the sa e valu x of their cred ntial :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L p vent a itizen to vote twice during the same
c mpaign (prevent doubl spending), whil the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a s gned pri te key k.
C. M pping uthorities to bl ckchain nod s
Alberto: @George, escribe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalu tion
The signatur scheme has been i plemented i pyth
using the two crypo libr ies p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateK ys .017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
howBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
A gre ateThSign .454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number f autho it : n, Sign ure size: 132 [B]
Tr nsaction complexity size [B]
Signature on cl messag :
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify ignature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature o hidd n m ssage:
  ask signatur O(n) 516
À get signa ure O(n) 132
Ã v rify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
Ope SSL as the arithm tic backend. We have released the code
a an open-sourc project on GitHub.3.
T ble I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Eac entry is the result of 10,000 measured n an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that sig ing is much faste th n verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster f r the scheme on hidde messages). Also,
aggregati n of keys d signatures are xtremely efficient.
Table II shows e communication c mplexity and the
size of ea h exchang involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fi . 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in prac ice m is the hash of the actual messag , and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Fig re 5: Overview of the Malet pe iti n a chitect re
Bano: Re o i figure as per Ba o’ notes, an then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and us these token to st al all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies t at t adve s ry eeds to corrup at least t
authorities for thi attack to happen. Thi property
also prevents a single authority from ta ing the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-pr servi g e-petiti n and e-
v t g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario whe e
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to th ir
citiz ns in ord r to allow any third party to orga ize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anony ous, and unlink ble across camp ig s. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petitio .
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-ter signature on t e citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petitio and e-voting Ba o: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as show in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
se ted? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the optio s are only YES and NO;
a d the fields wner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
v r fic tio key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In ord r to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
=
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, th y construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
hat n is build fr th same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio s rt contract checks the proof p and the
credent al , and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twi e during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
i g). Also, the proof p nsur s that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Pr perties brought by Malet. Malet pr vides a set of
rop rti s th t enable th above application when com-
bin s.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vo e across a paigns. Joining unlinkability with
bli dness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We impl me t censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Prox es are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of c nsorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Sec d, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Thir , a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a s t of authorities in
charge of C runs t Cre te function of the C CoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, nd ref points to a
custom fu ction requiring th user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The auth rities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind a d l g-term si ature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature a ts as the itizen credent als to sig any
e-petition and e-voting camp ign. Successively, any hird p rty
cr ate an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
opti ns, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely id ntifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s vo s (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to th options, append   to a pent
list L, and build a zero-knowledg pro f showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (preve t double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mappin authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme ha been implement d in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
b linear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an op n-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and stand rd deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for th scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± .006
Si n 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
Agg gateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Ra d miz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBli dSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Ag r gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Pe formances evaluation.
Num er of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signatu e on clear mes ge:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signatur O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify sig ture O(1) 355
TABLE II: Com unication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communicati n complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as th number
of signi g authorities ( ), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associat d with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is nly 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update t abov
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @ ano, st system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatur s) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t auth rities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonn no/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C uns the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set ccordingly, and ref points to
custom function requiring the use to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authoriti s set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this sign ture acts as th citizen credentials to sign any
-petition and e-voting campaign. Successiv ly, any third party
create an instance of the pe tion contract shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, opti ns, scores) 1
(UUID, ner, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4
The UUID par meter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the sco es parameter holds the citizen’s votes ( nitialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are on YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respec ively hold
the public key of the third party cre ting the titi and of
uth rities issuing the credentials. In ord r to sign the petition,
the sers c mpute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing hat   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that has be n built from a signed ivat key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nod s
Alberto: @G o ge, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to mak cl ar the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have cred ntials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalua ion
T e s gnature scheme h s been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
b linear pairing works over a Barre o-Naehrig [17] curve, us ng
Ope SSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on G tHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the e ecution of ach procedure describ d in sectio section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured n an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz I tel Xeon. This table shows
th t sig ing is uch faster han verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bl ndSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSig 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVe ify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rformances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature (n) ||m||
À get ignature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À et signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity nd transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are xtremely efficient.
Table II shows the com unication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the si ture sch me, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing uthoriti (n), and ||m|| repres nts the size of the
mes ag o which the user wish to o tain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the ha h of the actual mess ge, and is
therefore se to 32 byte (for SHA-2). T e size of a s gnature is
132 bytes. The h ghes ra sacti size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidd n me sage. This comes fro the fact
that the proof  s associated with t message is approximat l
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the bove
B. System evalu tion
l ert : @Bano, test system on AWS (n aut ority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to h ar back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Albert : disc ss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (spe d nd iz ) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Cr ate function of the CoCoNut library.
The paramet rs n, t re set c ordingly, and ref points to
ustom function requir ng the use to prove in some ways that
he is a cit z n of C. The authoriti s set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the c tizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credent als to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract s hown in ??.
(UUID, ow e , verifier, ption , scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, k, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
z ro). In the case of a petition the options are on YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party cre ting the peti ion and of
authorities issuing the cr dentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to th o tions, append   t a sp nt
list L, and build zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
b ild from th same value x f their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twic during the same
campaig (prev nt double spending), while the proof   sur s
that   has been b ilt from a sig ed ivate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Albert : @Geor e, Describe how he CoCoNut author ties
ca also be C inspace nodes (to make clear the pote tial
of CoCoNut when deeply r lated to blockchai s), since we
actually built all of this to ha credentials in smart ontracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalua ion
The signature scheme has been implemented n python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barre o-Naehrig [17] curv , us ng
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We hav rel ased he code
s an ope -source project on G tHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard d vi tion (
 
 2) of
the execution of ach procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Oc a-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table hows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the schem working on clear messages,
Numb r of measures: 10,000
Ope ation µ [ms]
 
  [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bl ndSig 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authoriti s: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Trans ction complexity size [B]
Signa ure on clear message:
  ask s gnature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hi den message:
  ask signature O(n 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication comp exity and transaction size.
and 3 t e fas r fo h scheme on hid en essages). Also,
ggr gation of y and sign t r s are extre ly efficient.
Tabl II shows the com unica ion complexity and the
size of eac exc ange volved in the signature sc m , as
presented in fig. 1. The c pl xity is expressed as the numb r
of signing authorities ( ), and ||m|| repres nts the size of the
message on which the u er wish t obtain a signatur . Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). T e size of a signa ure is
132 byte . The highest transaction size app ars when the u er
ask a signature on a hidden me sage. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with t message is approximat ly
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Upd te the bove
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, t t system on AWS (n authority): client
late cy vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to h ar back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Albe t : disc ss crypto elated works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool tuff; not many sc eme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoN petiti n architectur .
Similarly to the previous exampl , a s t of authorities in
charge of C ru s the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t ar set acc rdingly, and ref points to a
custom function requi ing h user to rove in so e ways that
he is a ci ize of C. T e authorities et q = 1, and are ex e t g
to is ue a lind nd long- m s g ature on the citizen’s p ivate
key k; hi signature acts as the citize cred ntials sign
any e-petition and e-votin campa n. Succes iv ly, any third
party create instance f he pe i ion contract as own n 5.
The UUI parameter un quely id ntifies the p tition, and the
score parameter holds the cit zen’s v tes (initialized t z ro).
In the case of a peti io t e optio are nly YES an NO; a d
he fields wner and k respectively hold the publ c key of the
third party cr ating the petiti n and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they ad their vote to t e options, append   to a spe t
lis L, a d build a zero-knowledge pro f showing that   is
build from the sa e value x o thei rede tial :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensu es
that   has been built fr m a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authoriti s to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNu when deeply related to b ockchains), sin e we
actually built all of th s t have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in py on
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of m asures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
ggreg teS g 0.004 ± 0.000
Aggr gat K s 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prepar BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bli dSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signatur O(n) ||m||
À g t signa ure O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Sig atur on hidden m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication com lexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the c de
as an op n- ourc project o GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mea (µ) a s andard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h p cedure described in section s ction II.
Each ntry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell deskt p comp ter, 3.6GHz Intel X on. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verify g signatures (about
15 times fast r for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on idden mes a es). Also,
aggregation of k ys and signature are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communic tion compl xity and th
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
prese ted in fig. 1. The c mplexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), a d ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m i the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview f the Malet petiti rc itectur
Bano: R o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, nd then
refer t the steps in writ -u .
to itself, and use these token to steal all e o ey
in the buffer. The threshold property of Ma et im-
plies that t e adversary needs to c rrup at least t
autho ities fo this at ack to hap n. This property
also prevents a single authority fr m taking th user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Priv cy-preserving e-peti ion a d -
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities nvolved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this ex mple, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-pr serving e-petition or e-voting campaign; al
cit zens of C are llowed to particip te, and should re-
main anonymous, and linkable ac oss campaigns. This
system is based on he M let library contract and sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorit es
in charge of C runs the Create function of he Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a ustom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties et q= 1 Bano: wh t is q, and are expecting to issue
a bl nd and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: stat if this may in-
volve checking ome other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third par y creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
a d t e fi lds owner nd vk respectively hold the verifi-
cat n key of th third party creating the petition and the
verificatio key of h authorities issuing t e credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
fo l ws:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Th n, th y co struct a zero-knowledge proof showing
th t n i build fr the same value k of their credential :
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
cr dentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is no part f s ent list L; if all the checks pa s, it
ad s t e vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice duri g e same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensur s that n has been built from
a sign d private k y k; this means that the users correctly
executed t e c llback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when c m-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
h ci izen’s s cr t key and use it to sign petition
th ir behave. Also, it allows th users to vote
an nymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system wh re citizen h ve to go
through the issu nce phase only once, nd can then
re-use their credentials multiple tim while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary creden ials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship- sistant distribution of
proxies
We implemen censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies a e often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP add ess has b en blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previou example, a set of authorit es in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term sign ture on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts s the citizen cr dentials to ign any
e-petition nd e-vot campa gn. Succes ively, ny t ir party
create an instance o the etition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owne , vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID pa ameter unique y identifies the pe itio , nd
the scores parameter holds citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating th p tition and of
authorities issuing the credenti ls. In ord r to sign th petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the opti ns, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pro f showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, De cribe how the CoCoNut uthoriti s
can also be Chainspa e nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when d epl relat d to bl ckchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of e ch procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the s heme working on clear messages,
Number of measur s: 10,000
Op ation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
Agg egat Key 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSi n 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.00
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perf rmances eval ation.
Number of authorities: , Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction c mplexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidd n message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Commu ication complexity and transactio size.
and 3 time faster f r the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
T ble II shows the communication complexity and the
size f each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the numb r
of igning auth ritie (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a sig ature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction ize appears when the us r
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the p oof  v is only 157 bytes.
Albert : Updat the abov
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n uthority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
ch ck the time it takes to he r back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discu s crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with lternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
ini
o e
7
smart 
co tract
L dg r
peti ion 
creator
citizen
7
Similarly to the previous exampl , a set of utho itie in
charge of C runs the Create fu ction of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, a d ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some wa s that
he is a citizen of C. The a t riti set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and l ng-t rm signature on the citizen’ private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Succ ssively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown i ??.
(UUID, owner, v r fier, tions, sc r s) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID param ter uniquely identifies the p tition, nd
the scores parameter holds the itizen’s v tes (i itializ d to
zero). In the case of a petition the options a e nly YES
and NO; and the fields owner a d verifi r respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to ign th petition,
the users compute a value  as f llows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showi g that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote wice during the same
campaign (prev nt d ble spending), while t e proof   ensures
that   h s been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping auth riti s to b ockchai nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut author ties
can also b Cha nspace nodes (to make clear the p tential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockc ains), si ce we
actually built all of this to have credentials in sm rt contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatu e schem has bee implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the ex cution of each pro edure described in sec ion s ction II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xe n. This table shows
that signing is much faster than v rifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme wo king on clear messages,
Numb r of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggrega eSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
Sh wBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perform nces evaluation.
Number f authorities: n, Sig ature size: 132 [B]
Tra saction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on idden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signatur O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication compl xity an tra saction size.
and 3 tim faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are xtremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of ach exchange involved in the signat re scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. Th complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
essag on which he user wish to obtain a signature. Not
that in practice m i th hash of the act al message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The ze of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest trans tion size pp a s when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from th fact
that the proof  s ass ciated with t e me sage is approxi tely
318 by es; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the bov
B. System evalu tion
Alberto: @Bano, tes system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: iscuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with altern tives
to see why t is co l st ff; ot many sch me have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the revious example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create functi of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref poi ts to a
custom function requiring the ser to prove in some ways that
he is a cit zen of C. T e auth rities set q = 1, and are exp cting
to issue a blind and long-term signatur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts s the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, a y third party
create an instance of the p tition contr ct as sh wn in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
options, sc es) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies he petition, nd
the scores parameter holds th citizen’s votes (i itialized to
zero). I the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the cr d ntials. In rder to sign the petition,
the us rs com ute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
The , they a d thei vote to the ptions, append   to a spent
list L, nd build a zero-knowledg proof showing that   is
build f om the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   t L pr vent a citizen to vote twice duri g t e a e
campaign (prevent double spending), while the p oof   sure
that   has been built from a signed priv e key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockch in no es
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to m ke clear t e potential
of CoCoNut w en deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart c ntracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure des ribed in section section II.
Each entry is the r su t f 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
th t signing is much fast r than v rifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
N mber of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
Aggr gateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
R domize 0. 45 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Blin Sign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Ag regateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performance ev luation.
Number of authorities: n, Sign ture size: 132 [B]
Transa tion complexity size [B]
Signature on clear me sage:
  a k s gnature O(n) || ||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify sig a ure O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communicati n compl xity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster f r th scheme on hidd n messages). Also,
ggregatio of key a d ig atures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the c mmu ication complexity and the
siz of each exc ange involved in the i ature sc me, as
pr sented in fig. 1. The co pl xity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities ( ), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the u er wish to btain a signature. Note
th t in practic m is the ash of e actual essage, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction siz appears when th use
ask a signatur on a hidden m ssage. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s ass ciated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the pro f  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, t st system on AWS (n authority): cli nt
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authoriti s.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: iscuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and ize) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have ctually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoC Nut pe iti n arc it ct re.
Similarly to t previous xample, set of uth riti s in
charge of C runs the Cr a e function of he CoCoNut library.
Th par m ters n, t are set ccordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requ r g the user to prove n some ways that
he is a citizen f C. The authorities et q = 1, and ar ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm si na ure o the citi ’s priva e
key k; this signature acts as t ci izen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, ny third
party create a instance of the p tition contract as s wn in 5.
The UUID par meter un quely identifies the p tition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e opti ns are nly YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the pet tion and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the opti n , append   to a sp t
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credenti l :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citiz to vote tw ce during the sam
campaign (prevent double spending), while th proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain no es
Alberto: @George, De cribe how the CoCoN t authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitiv s evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. Th
bilinear pairing works over a Bar eto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,00
Ope ation µ [ s]
 
 2 [ms]
K ygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Aggr gat Sign 0.004 ± .000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rand miz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBli d ign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bli dSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Aggr gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perf rmances evaluation.
Number of a thorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear essag :
  ask si nature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify si ture O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
T BLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. W hav rele se the cod
as an open-source project on Gi Hub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in s ction ection II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measur d on a Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel X on. This table s ows
that signing is much faster than verifying sig atures ( bout
15 times faster f r the scheme workin on clear messag s,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely e fici nt.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exch nge involv d in t sig ature scheme, as
prese ted in fig. 1. Th complexit is exp essed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Not
that in practice m is t e hash of the actual message, nd is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The ighest transac ion size a pears when he user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from t e fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 byte ; the proof  v i only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the M let petition rchite ture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in w ite-up.
to itself, nd use these token to ste l all the oney
in the buff r. The threshold pr perty of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
auth rities for this attack to appen. This property
also prevents a single authority fr m taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-pres rv g -petition and e-
vot g
Ba o: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this xa ple, we consider the scen rio where a
city C wish to issue some l g term credentials to their
citizens in ord r to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-prese ving e-petition or e-voti g campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to parti ipate, and should re-
main anonymous, a d unlinkable across campaigns. This
ystem is based on the M let library contract nd a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similar y to he previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create functio of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom funct on equ ri g the u ers to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are exp cting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this s gnatur ac s as the citiz n credentials to sign
any e-petition nd e-voting Bano: state if his may in-
volve checking some other informati n e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained? Suc-
ces ively, any hird party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
nd field owner and vk re pectively hold the verifi-
cation key f t e third p rty creatin t e petition and the
v rification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
I order t sign a petition, the user compute a value n as
f llow :
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, t ey construct a zero- nowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the ame value k of t ir credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio m rt contract check the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
tha n is not part of a s ent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of he users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n t L prev nts a citizen to vote
twice during the same c mpaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has bee built from
signed private key k; this mean that the users correctly
xecut d th al back to prove th t they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that e able the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secre key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, i allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joini g unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phas only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Thresh ld: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a sing e au-
thority from creating arbi rary credential to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censor hip
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
smart 
contract
L dg r
petition 
creator
citizen
7
Similarly to the previous exa pl , a et f au horiti s in
charge of C runs the Create functi n of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t ar set ccordingly, ref point to a
custom function requiring the ser to prov in s me ways that
he is a citizen of C. The au orities set q = , and are exp cting
to issue a blind and long-term sign r o the ci z ’s priv t
key k; this signatur acts as the itiz n cr dentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as hown in ??.
(UUID, own r, v rifi r, pti ns, sco s) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID param ter uniquely identifies the p titi n, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hol
the public k y of the third par y creating h petition a of
authorities issui the credentials. In ord r to sign th pe ition,
the users comput a v lue   s follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), whil th pr of   ensur s
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blo kchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe h w the CoCoNut authorities
can also be C inspace nodes (to make clear the pot ntial
of CoCoNut when dee ly related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of t is to have credenti ls in smart contr ts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petl b [1] and bplib [2]. T e
bilinear pairing works over Barreto-N ehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project o GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mea (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure descri ed in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the sche e working on cle r messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Op ration µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyg n 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSig 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSi n 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0. 01
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances valuation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature siz : 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear m ssage:
  ask signature O( ) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden m ssage:
  ask signature O( ) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã ver fy signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity a d transaction size.
and 3 tim faster f r the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Tabl II hows the communication complexity and the
size of ch exchange involved i the signat re scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expr ssed as the number
of signing authorities (n), nd ||m|| r pres nts the s ze of th
ess g on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
th refore set to 32 byte (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size ap ears when th user
ask a signature on hidden message. T is omes from the f ct
that the proof  s associated w t the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Updat th above
B. Syst m evaluatio
Alberto: @Ba o, t system n AWS ( autho ity): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind ignatures) and
check the tim it takes to hear back fro t a t orities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to ign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as sh wn in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, ores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
o tions, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely ide tifies the pe ition, an
the scores parameter holds the citiz n’ votes (i itialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and v rifi r respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petiti and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUI     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the s me
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key .
C. Mapping authorities to lockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe h w the CoCoNut a thorities
can also be Chai space nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply relat d to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart c ntracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
Th signature sch me has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works ov r a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard d viation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xe n. This table shows
that signing is much faster th n verifying sig atures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measur s: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
Ag regateKey 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr pareBli dSign 2.633 ± 0.
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.0 2
Sh wBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Numb r of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Trans ction compl xity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  sk signature O(n) ||m||
À get sign ture O(n) 132
Ã verify signatu O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signa ure O(n) 516
À get sign ture O(n) 132
Ã v rify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transactio siz .
nd 3 time faster fo the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggr g tion of k ys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involve in the signature sch me, as
sented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the numb r
of signing authorities ( ), a d ||m|| represents the size f the
message n whic the user wish o obtain a sig ature. Note
th t in pr ctic is the hash f the act al messag , and is
ther fore set t 32 bytes (f r SHA-2). The size of a ignature is
132 bytes. T e highest transaction size app ars when th u er
ask a signatur n a hidd n m ssage. T is comes from e fac
that the proof  s associat d with the message is approximat ly
318 bytes; the p oof  v is only 157 bytes.
Albert : Up ate t e abov
B. System evaluation
Alb rto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs – ask n sign tures (and n blind ignatur s) a d
eck th ime it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare re ults (speed a d size) wi h alternatives
t see why t is cool stuff; not many schem have actually be n
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref poi ts to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, nd are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen creden ials to ign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as sh wn in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, opti ns, s res) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
o tions, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely ide tifies the petition, and
the scores parameter olds the citizen’s votes (initial z d to
zero). In the case of a petition the optio r only YES
and NO; and the fi lds owner and verifier res ct v ly hold
the public key of the third party cr ating he petitio and of
authorities issuing t credentials. In order to sign the p titio ,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add the r vote to the options, appen   to spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof sho ing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), whil the proof   sures
that   has been built from a signe private k y k.
C. Mapping auth rities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoN author ties
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives ev luation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo lib aries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have rel ased the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measur d on an O ta-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bli dSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature siz : 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature o cl a messag :
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signa ure on hi den message:
  ask sign ture O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v i y sign ture O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and trans ction siz .
nd 3 tim faster for t sch me on hidden messag ). Also,
agg egation of k y and signatures are ex re ly efficient.
Table II shows the com unication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involv d in the signature sc eme, as
pres nted in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing aut orities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
m ssage o which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in p actice m is the hash of the ctual m ssage, nd is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
13 bytes. The highest transact on size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the pr of  s associated with the message is approximat ly
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Albert : Update the bove
B. System valuation
Alberto: @Ban , test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind sig atures) and
check the time it t kes to ear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypt related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with altern tiv s
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have ctually been
3https://gith b.com/asonnino/co nut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut pet tion architecture.
Similarly to the previous exam le, a s t of authori i
charge of C runs the Crea e function of h C N librar .
The parameters n, t are set acc rdingly, a ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways hat
he is a citizen of C. Th aut rit s et q = 1, and ar ex ting
to issue a blind and long- rm si n tur on the citiz ’s rivate
key k; this sign ture acts as t e citi n cr denti ls to ign
any e-petition and e-voting camp n. Succes i ly, a y third
party create a instance of the p tit o contract as s own i 5.
The UUID param ter un quely entifies the p titi n, d the
scores parame er holds the citizen’s vot s (initializ to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e o tions are only YES and NO; a d
the fields owner and k respectively hold th public key of the
third party creating th pet tio and of authorities issui g the
credentia s. In order to sign the p titio , t e users omput a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-k owledge proof sho ing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their cre ential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen o v te twic duri g the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the pr f   ensures
that   has been built from a sig d pri ate key .
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authori ies
can also be C insp ce nodes (to ake clear the po ntial
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in ython
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of easures: 10,000
Operati µ [ms]
 
 2 [ s]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
Ag regateK ys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rif 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Blin ig .356 ± 0.002
Sh wBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
Bli dV rify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perf r anc s v lu tion.
Num r of authorities: n, Signature siz : 132 [B]
Tra saction complexity size [B]
Sig ure on clear mes age:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get ignature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden mess ge:
  sk ignatur O(n) 516
À g t signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithm tic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source proj ct n GitHub.3.
Tabl I sh ws the mean (µ) and stand rd deviation (
 
 2) of
th exec tion of h p ocedure described in ect n section II.
Each entry is he result of 10,000 measured n an Octa-core
Dell deskt computer, 3.6GHz Intel X on. This table shows
hat igning is m ch fa ter than verifying ignatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time fast r for the scheme on hidden m ssage ). Also,
ag regation of keys and s g atures re extremely efficient.
Table II sh ws the communicatio complexity and h
size of each exchange i volved in the signature che e, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of ig ing authori ies (n), and || || represents t size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 by s (for SHA-2). The siz of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction siz ap ears when th user
ask a sig ature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s a sociated w th the message is approxi ately
318 bytes; the proof  v is o l 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://git ub.co /aso nino/cocon t
Figure 5: Overview of the Mal t petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s n tes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and us th se token t t all th mon y
in the buffer. The threshold property of Mal im-
plies that the adv rsary ne ds to corrup at l ast t
authorities for this attack to ha pen. This proper y
also prevents a s ng e uthor ty from ta ing the user
money and disappear w th ut issuing any t k n.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preservi g -petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly ame all th tities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consid r th sce ario wh re a
city C wish to i sue so e long term credenti ls t their
citizens in order to allow any third p rty t organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voti g campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a si -
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous exa ple, set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Cr at function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. Th authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Ba o: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blind ess be maintain d?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. T e UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
nd the field wner and vk respec ively hold the verifi-
catio key of t e hird party creati g th petition and the
v rifi ti key of the autho it s issuing the credentials.
In order to sign p tition, the u ers compute a value n as
fol ows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they onstru t a ero-knowledge proof showing
th t n is build fr the sam value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract ch ck the proof p and the
credent als, d checks that the vote i fresh by v rifying
t at is not part of a spent list L; if ll t checks p ss, it
d s th vote of th users to the list of scor s and adds
nu to list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to v te
tw ce during the am campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
signed private key k; hi m ans that he users correctly
execu ed the callb ck to prove th t the are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Mal . M l t provides a set of
properties that enable the ab ve applic tion when c m-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the uthorities from le rning
t e citizen’s secret k y and use it to sign petition
on th ir behave. Also, it allows the u ers to vot
a onymou ly.
• Unlink bility: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across ca paigns. Joi ing unlinkability with
blindness allows a syst m where cit zens hav to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials ultiple time while s aying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 C nsorship-resist nt distribution of
proxies
We implement censors ip-resistant syst m based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent ce sorship
whe the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer fr three limitations. First, r i s tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. F r exam-
ple a nu ber of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
requ st info
proxy 
p ration
r gist r
random t 2 Fp and randomized this ig atu e as follows:
s 0 = Randomize(s) = (ht ,e t)
Th refore, we can argu that since is ra domly dis-
tributed in Fp, s 0 is randomly distribut d i G21.
Blindness. Blindness ensures that the signer will not
learn any a i ional inf r atio about th mes ages m
during the exec tion of BlindSign. This property is
guarante d by the secu ity properties of the El-Gamal
encryption system since the input f BlindSign is an
El-Gamal encryption of m. Also, the ShowBlindSign
algorithm does not reveal any information about m nei-
ther by the zero-knowledge property of the proof pv.
pk 0
17
Fig. 6: The censorship-resistant proxy distrib tion system.
located outside the cou try of censorship. However, both these
assum tions wer prov n wrong [48], [47]. The pr posed CRS
overcomes this limit tion by offering coercion-resistance to
volunt ers fr m ensor-contr lled users a d authorities. Due to
Cocon t’s blindness property, a volunt er can get a credential
on its IP address a ephemeral public k y without revealing
those to the authorities. The s rs get proxy IP addresses run
b the volunteer, while being u able to link it to the volun-
teer’s long-t rm public ey. Moreover, the uth rities o e ate
independently and can be cont oll d by different e tities, and
are resilient against a threshold numb r of authorities being
dishonest or taken down.
VI. EVALUATION
We pr sent the evaluation f the Coc ut threshold creden-
tials scheme; first we present a benchmark of the cryptographic
primitives described in Section III and then we evaluate the
smart contracts described in Section V.
A. Cryptograp ic Primitives
We implement the primitives described in Section III in
Python using petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The bilinear pairing is
defined over the Barreto-Naehrig [31] curve, using OpenSSL
as arithmetic backend.
a) Timing benchmark: Table I shows the mean (µ) and
standard deviation (
√
σ2) of the execution of each procedure
described in section Section III. Each entry is the result of
10,000 runs measured on an Octa-core Dell desktop computer,
3.6GHz Intel Xeon. Signing is much faster than verifying
credentials—due to the pairing operation in the latter; veri-
fication takes about 10ms; signing a private attribute is about
3 times faster.
b) Communication complexity and packets size: Ta-
ble II shows the communication complexity and the size of
each exchange involved in the Coconut credentials scheme,
as presented in Figure 2. The communication complexity is
expressed as a function of the number of signing authorities
(n), and the size of each attribute is limited to 32 bytes as the
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Operation µ [ms]
√
σ2 [ms]
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
Unblind 0.445 ± 0.002
AggCred 0.454 ± 0.000
ProveCred 1.544 ± 0.001
VerifyCred 10.497 ± 0.002
TABLE I: Execution times for the cryptographic primitives described in
Section III, measured for one private attribute over 10,000 runs. AggCred is
computed assuming two authorities; the other primitives are independent of
the number of authorities.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 bytes
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on one public attribute:
Ê request credential O(n) 32
Ë issue credential O(n) 132
Ì verify credential O(1) 162
Signature on one private attribute:
Ê request credential O(n) 516
Ë issue credential O(n) 132
Ì verify credential O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size for the Coconut
credentials scheme when signing one public and one private attribute (see
Figure 2 of Section III).
output of the SHA-2 hash function. The size of a credential
is 132 bytes. The highest transaction sizes are to request and
verify credentials embedding a private attribute; this is due
to the proofs pis and piv (see Section III). The proof pis is
approximately 318 bytes and piv is 157 bytes.
c) Client-perceived latency: We evaluate the client-
perceived latency for the Coconut threshold credentials scheme
for authorities deployed on Amazon AWS [4] when issuing
partial credentials on one public and one private attribute. The
client requests a partial credential from 10 authorities, and
latency is defined as the time it waits to receive t-out-of-10
partial signatures. Figure 7 presents measured latency for a
threshold parameter t ranging from 1–10. The dots correspond
to the average latency and the error-bars represent the normal-
ized standard deviation, computed over 100 runs. The client is
located in London while the 10 authorities are geographically
distributed across the world; US East (Ohio), US West (N.
California), Asia Pacific (Mumbai), Asia Pacific (Singapore),
Asia Pacific (Sydney), Asia Pacific (Tokyo), Canada (Central),
EU (Frankfu¨rt), EU (London), and South America (Sa˜o Paulo).
All machines are running a fresh 64-bit Ubuntu distribution,
the client runs on a large AWS instance and the authorities
run on nano instances.
As expected, we observe that the further the authorities are
from the client, the higher the latency due to higher response
times; the first authorities to respond are always those situated
in Europe, while Sidney and Tokyo are the latest. Latency
grows linearly, with the exception of a large jump (of about
150 ms) when t increases from 2 to 3—this is due to the
7 remaining authorities being located outside Europe. The
latency overhead between credential requests on public and
private attributes remains constant.
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Fig. 7: Client-perceived latency for Coconut threshold credentials scheme
with geographically distributed authorities, measured for one attribute over
100 runs.
Coconut smart contract library
Operation µ [ms]
√
σ2 [ms] size [kB]
Create [g] 0.195 ± 0.065 ∼ 1.38
Create [c] 12.099 ± 0.471 -
Request [g] 7.094 ± 0.641 ∼ 3.77
Request [c] 6.605 ± 0.559 -
Issue [g] 4.382 ± 0.654 ∼ 3.08
Issue [c] 0.024 ± 0.001 -
Verify [g] 5.545 ± 0.859 ∼ 1.76
Verify [c] 10.814 ± 1.160 -
TABLE III: Timing and transaction size of the Chainspace implementation
of the Coconut smart contract library described in Section IV-A, measured
for two authorities and one private attributes over 10,000 runs. The notation
[g] denotes the execution the procedure and [c] denotes the execution of the
checker.
B. Chainspace Implementation
We evaluate the Coconut smart contract library imple-
mented in Chainspace, as well as the the coin tumbler (Sec-
tion V-A) and the privacy-preserving e-petition (Section V-B)
applications that use this library. As expected, Table III shows
that the most time consuming procedures are the checker of
Create and the checker of Verify; i.e., they call the VerifyCred
primitives which takes about 10 ms (see Table I). Table III
is computed assuming two authorities; the transaction size
of Issue increases by about 132 bytes (i.e., the size of
the credentials) for each extra authority12 while the other
transactions are independent of the number of authorities.
Similarly, the most time consuming procedure of the coin
tumbler (Table IV) application and of the privacy-preserving
e-petition (Table V) are the checker of InitTumbler and the
checker of SignPetition, respectively; these two checkers call
the BlindVerify primitive involving pairing checks. The Pay
procedure of the coin tumbler presents the highest transaction
size as it is composed of two distinct transactions: a coin trans-
fer transaction and a Request transaction from the Coconut
12The Request and Issue procedures are only needed in the case of on-
chain issuance (see Section IV-A).
10
Coin tumbler
Operation µ [ms]
√
σ2 [ms] size [kB]
InitTumbler [g] 0.235 ± 0.065 ∼ 1.38
InitTumbler [c] 19.359 ± 0.773 -
Pay [g] 11.939 ± 0.792 ∼ 4.28
Pay [c] 6.625 ± 0.559 -
Redeem [g] 0.132 ± 0.012 ∼ 3.08
Redeem [c] 11.742 ± 0.757 -
TABLE IV: Timing and transaction size of the Chainspace implementation
of the coin tumbler smart contract (described in Section V-A), measured over
10,000 runs. The transactions are independent of the number of authorities.
The notation [g] denotes the execution the procedure and [c] denotes the
execution of the checker.
Privacy-preserving e-petition
Operation µ [ms]
√
σ2 [ms] size [kB]
InitPetition [g] 3.260 ± 0.209 ∼ 1.50
InitPetition [c] 3.677 ± 0.126 -
SignPetition [g] 7.999 ± 0.467 ∼ 3.16
SignPetition [c] 15.801 ± 0.537 -
TABLE V: Timing and transaction size of the Chainspace implementation
of the privacy-preserving e-petition smart contract (described in Section V-B),
measured over 10,000 runs. The transactions are independent of the number
of authorities. The notation [g] denotes the execution the procedure and [c]
denotes the execution of the checker.
contract library. However, they are all practical, and they all
run in a few milliseconds. These transactions are independent
of the number of authorities as issuance is either handled off-
chain or by the Coconut smart contract library.
C. Ethereum Implementation
We evaluate the Coconut Ethereum smart contract library
described in Section IV-B using the Go implementation of
Ethereum on an Intel Core i5 laptop with 12GB of RAM
running Ubuntu 17.10. Table VI shows the execution times
and gas costs for different procedures in the smart contract.
The execution times for Create and Verify are higher than
the execution times for the Chainspace version (Table III) of
the library, due to the different implementations. The arith-
metic underlying Coconut in Chainspace is performed through
Python naively binding to C libraries, while in Ethereum
arithmetic is defined in solidity and executed by the EVM.
We also observe that the Verify function has a significantly
higher gas cost than Create. This is mostly due to the imple-
mentation of elliptic curve multiplication as a native Ethereum
smart contract—the elliptic curve multiplication alone costs
around 1, 700, 000 gas, accounting for the vast majority of the
gas cost, whereas the pairing operation using the pre-compiled
contract costs only 260,000 gas. The actual fiat USD costs
corresponding to those gas costs, fluctuate wildly depending
on the price of Ether—Ethereum’s internal value token—the
load on the network, and how long the user wants to wait for
the transaction to be mined into a block. As of February 7th
2018, for a transaction to be confirmed within 6 minutes, the
transaction fee for Verify is $1.74, whereas within 45 seconds,
the transaction fee is $43.5.13
13https://ethgasstation.info/
Coconut Ethereum smart contract library
Operation µ [ms]
√
σ2 [ms] gas
Create 27.45 ± 3.054 ∼ 23, 000
Verify 120.17 ± 25.133 ∼ 2, 150, 000
TABLE VI: Timing and gas cost of the Ethereum implementation of the
Coconut smart contract library described in Section IV-B. Measured over 100
runs, for one public attribute. The transactions are independent of the number
of authorities.
The bottleneck of our Ethereum implementation is the
high-level arithmetic in G2. However, Ethereum provides a
pre-compiled contract for arithmetic operations in G1. We
could re-write our cryptographic primitives by swapping all
the operations in G1 and G2, at the cost of relying on the
SXDH assumption [42] (which is stronger than the standard
XDH assumption that we are currently using).
VII. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
We compare the Coconut cryptographic constructions and
system with related work in Table VII, along the dimensions
of key properties offered by Coconut—blindness, unlinkability,
aggregability (i.e., whether multiple authorities are involved in
issuing the credential), threshold aggregation (i.e., whether a
credential can be aggregated using signatures issued by a sub-
set of authorities), and signature size (see Sections II and III).
a) Short and aggregable signatures: The Waters signa-
ture scheme [50] provides the bone structure of our primitive,
and introduces a clever solution to aggregate multiple attributes
into short signatures. However, the original Water’s signature
does not allow blind issuance or unlinkability, and is not
aggregable as it has not been built for use in a multi-authority
setting. Lu et al. scheme, commonly known as LOSSW signa-
ture scheme [35], is also based on Water’s scheme and comes
with the improvement of being sequentially aggregable. In a
sequential aggregate signature scheme, the aggregate signature
is built in turns by each signing authority; this requires
the authorities to communicate with each other resulting in
increased latency and cost. The BGLS signature [11] scheme
is built upon the BLS signature and is remarkable because of
its short signature size—signatures are composed of only one
group element. The BGLS scheme has a number of desirable
properties as it is aggregable without needing coordination
between the signing authorities, and can be extended to work
in a threshold setting [10]. Moreover, Boneh et al. show how
to build verifiably encrypted signatures [11] which is close to
our requirements, but not suitable for anonymous credentials.
b) Anonymous credentials: CL Signatures [17], [34]
and Idemix [8] are amongst the most well-known building
blocks that inspired applications going from direct anonymous
attestations [22], [7] to electronic cash [19]. They provide blind
issuance and unlikability through randomization; but come
with significant computational overhead and credentials are
not short as their size grows linearly with the number of
signed attributes, and are not aggregable. U-Prove [39] and
Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) [6] are computationally
efficient credentials that can be used once unlinkably; therefore
the size of the credentials is linear in the number of unlinkable
uses. Pointcheval and Sanders [41] present a construction
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Scheme Blindness Unlinkable Aggregable Threshold Signature Size
[50] Waters Signature 7 7 7 2 Elements
[35] LOSSW Signature 7 7 7 2 Elements
[11] BGLS Signature 3 7 3 1 Element
[17] CL Signature 3 3 7 O(q) Elements
[8] Idemix 3 3 7 O(q) Elements
[39] U-Prove 3 3 7 O(v) Elements
[6] ACL 3 3 7 O(v) Elements
[41] Pointcheval and Sanders 3 3 7 2 Elements
[Section III] Coconut 3 3 3 2 Elements
TABLE VII: Comparison of Coconut with other relevant cryptographic constructions. The aggregability of the signature scheme reads as follows; : not
aggregable, : sequentially aggregable, : aggregable. The signature size is measured asymptotically or in terms of the number of group elements it is made
of (for constant-size credentials); q indicates the number of attributes embedded in the credentials and v the number of times the credential may be shown
unlinkably.
which is the missing piece of the BGLS signature scheme; it
achieves blindness by allowing signatures on committed values
and unlinkability through signature randomization. However,
it only supports sequential aggregation and does not provide
threshold aggregation. For anonymous credentials in a setting
where the signing authorities are also verifiers (i.e., without
public verifiability), Chasse et al. [20] develop an efficient pro-
tocol. Its ‘GGM’ variant has a similar structure to Coconut, but
forgoes the pairing operation by using message authentication
codes (MACs). None of the above schemes support threshold
issuance.
c) Short and threshold issuance anonymous credentials:
Coconut extends these previous works by presenting a short,
aggregable, and randomizable signature scheme; allowing
threshold and blind issuance, and a multi-authority anonymous
credentials scheme. Our primitive does not require sequential
aggregation, that is the aggregate operation does not have to
be performed by each signer in turn. Any independent party
can aggregate any threshold number of partial signatures into
a single aggregate credential, and verify its validity.
VIII. LIMITATIONS
Coconut has a number of limitations that are beyond the
scope of this work, and deferred to future work.
Adding and removing authorities implies to re-run the
key generation algorithm—this limitation is inherited from
the underlying Shamir’s secret sharing protocol [46] and
can be mitigated using techniques coming from proactive
secret sharing introduced by Herzberg et al. [28]. However,
credentials issued by authorities with different key sets are
distinguishable, and therefore frequent key rotation reduces the
privacy provided.
As any threshold system, Coconut is vulnerable if more
than the threshold number of authorities are malicious; collud-
ing authorities could create coins to steal all the coins in the
buffer of the coin tumbler application (Section V-A), create
fake identities or censor legitimate users of the electronic
petition application (Section V-B), and defeat the censorship
resistance of our proxy distribution application (Section V-C).
Note that users’ privacy is still guaranteed under colluding
authorities, or an eventual compromise of their keys.
Implementing the Coconut smart contract library on
Ethereum is expensive (Table VI) as Ethereum does not
provide pre-compiled contracts for elliptic curve arithmetic in
G2; re-writing our cryptographic primitives by swapping all
the operations in G1 and G2 would dramatically reduce the
gas cost, at the cost of relying on the SXDH assumption [42].
IX. CONCLUSION
Existing selective credential disclosure schemes do not
provide the full set of desired properties, particularly when it
comes to issuing fully functional selective disclosure creden-
tials without sacrificing desirable distributed trust assumptions.
This limits their applicability in distributed settings such
as distributed ledgers, and prevents security engineers from
implementing separation of duty policies that are effective in
preserving integrity.
In this paper, we present Coconut—a novel scheme that
supports distributed threshold issuance, public and private
attributes, re-randomization, and multiple unlinkable selective
attribute revelations. We provide an overview of the Coconut
system, and the cryptographic primitives underlying Coconut;
an implementation and evaluation of Coconut as a smart
contract library in Chainspace and Ethereum, a sharded and
a permissionless blockchain respectively; and three diverse
and important application to anonymous payments, petitions
and censorship resistance. Coconut fills an important gap in
the literature and enables selective disclosure credentials—
an important privacy enhancing technology—to be used in
settings with no natural single trusted third party to issue
them, and to interoperate with modern transparent computation
platforms.
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APPENDIX A
SKETCH OF SECURITY PROOFS
This appendix sketches the security proofs of the crypto-
graphic construction described in Section III.
a) Unforgeability: There are two possible ways for an
adversary to forge a proof of a credential: (i) an adversary
without a valid credential nevertheless manages to form a proof
such that VerifyCred passes; and (ii), an adversary that has
successfully interacted with fewer than t authorities generates
a valid consolidated credential (of which they then honestly
prove possession using ProveCred).
Unforgeability in scenario (i) is ensured by the soundness
property of the zero-knowledge proof. For scenario (ii), run-
ning AggCred involves performing Lagrange interpolation.
If an adversary has fewer than t partial credentials, then
they have fewer than t points, which makes the resulting
polynomial (of degree t − 1) undetermined and information-
theoretically impossible to compute. The only option available
to the adversary is thus to forge the remaining credentials
directly. This violates the unforgeability of the underlying blind
signature scheme, which was proved secure by Pointcheval and
Sanders [41] under the LRSW assumption [36].
b) Blindness: Blindness follows directly from the blind-
ness of the signature scheme used during IssueCred, which
was largely proved secure by Pointcheval and Sanders [41] un-
der the XDH assumption [12]. There are only two differences
between their protocol and ours.
First, the Coconut authorities generate the credentials from
a group element h = H(cm) instead of from gr˜1 for random
r˜ ∈ Fp. The hiding property of the commitment cm, however,
ensures that H(cm) does not reveal any information about m.
Second, Pointcheval and Sanders use a commitment to the
attributes as input to BlindSign (see Section III-C), whereas
Coconut uses an encryption instead. The IND-CPA property,
however, of the encryption scheme ensures that the ciphertext
also reveals no information about m.
Concretely, Coconut uses Pedersen Commitments [40] for
the commitment scheme, which is secure under the discret
logarithm assumption. It uses El-Gamal for the encryption
scheme in G1, which is secure assuming DDH. Finally, it relies
on the blindness of the Pointcheval and Sanders signature,
which is secure assuming XDH [12]. As XDH implies both of
the previous two assumptions, our entire blindness argument
is implied by XDH.
c) Unlinkability / Zero-knowledge: Unlinkability and
zero-knowledge are guaranteed under the XDH assump-
tion [12]. The zero-knowledge property of the underlying proof
system ensures that ProveCred does not on its own reveal
any information about the attribute m (except that it satisfies
φ′). The fact that credentials are re-randomized at the start
of ProveCred in turn ensures unlinkability, both between
different executions of ProveCred and between an execution
of ProveCred and of IssueCred.
APPENDIX B
MULTI-ATTRIBUTES CREDENTIALS
We present the cryptographic primitives behind the multi-
attribute Coconut threshold issuance credential scheme de-
scribed in Section III-E. As in Section III-D, we describe below
a key generation algorithm TTPKeyGen as executed by a
trusted third party; this protocol can however be execute in a
distributed way as illustrated by Kate et al. [32].
v Setup(1λ, q) → (params): Choose a bilinear group
(G1,G2,GT ) with order p, where p is an λ-bit prime
number. Let g1, h1, . . . , hq be generators of G1, and g2 a
generator of G2. The system parameters are params =
(G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, h1, . . . , hq).
v TTPKeyGen(params, t, n, q) → (sk, vk): Choose (q +
1) polynomials of degree (t − 1) with coefficients in Fp,
noted (v, w1, . . . , wq), and set:
(x, y1, . . . yq) = (v(0), w1(0), . . . , wq(0))
Issue a secret key ski to each authority i ∈ [1, . . . , n] as
below:
ski = (xi, yi,1, . . . , yi,q) = (v(i), w1(i), . . . , wq(i))
and publish their verification key vki computed as follows:
vki = (g2, αi, βi,1, . . . , βi,q)) = (g2, g
xi
2 , g
yi,1
2 , . . . , g
yi,1q
2 )
v IssueCred(m1, . . . ,mq, φ) → (σ): Credentials issuance
is composed of three algorithms:
v PrepareBlindSign(m1, . . . ,mq, φ) → (d,Λ, φ): The
users generate an El-Gamal key-pair (d, γ = gd1); pick
a random o ∈ Fp compute the commitment cm and the
group element h ∈ G1 as follows:
cm = g
o
1
q∏
j=1
h
mj
j and h = H(cm)
Pick at random (k1, . . . , kq) ∈ Fqp and compute an El-
Gamal encryption of each mj for ∀j ∈ [1, . . . , q] as
below:
cj = Enc(h
mj ) = (g
kj
1 , γ
kjhmj )
Output (d,Λ = (γ, cm, cj , pis), φ) ∀j ∈ [1, . . . , q], where
pis is defined by:
pis = NIZK{(d,m1, . . . ,mq, o, k1, . . . , kq) : γ = gd1
∧ cm = go1
q∏
j=1
h
mj
j ∧ cj = (gkj ,1 γkjhmj )
∧ φ(m1, . . . ,mq) = 1} ∀j ∈ [1, . . . , q]
v BlindSign(sk,Λ, φ) → (σ˜i): The authority i parses
Λ = (γ, cm, cj , pis) and cj = (aj , bj) ∀j ∈ [1, . . . , q], and
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ski = (x, y1, . . . , yq). Recompute h = H(cm). Verify the
proof pis using γ, cm and φ. If the proof is invalid, output
⊥ and stop the protocol; otherwise output σ˜i = (h, c˜),
where c˜ is defined as below:
c˜ =
 q∏
j=1
a
yj
j , h
x
q∏
j=1
b
yj
j

v Unblind(σ˜i, d)→ (σi): The users parse σ˜i = (h, c˜) and
c˜ = (a˜, b˜); compute σi = (h, b˜(a˜)−d). Output σi.
v AggCred(σ1, . . . , σt) → (σ): Parse each σi as (h, si) for
i ∈ [1, . . . , t]. Output (h,∏ti=1 slii ), where:
li =
 t∏
i=1,j 6=i
(0− j)
 t∏
i=1,sj 6=i
(i− j)
−1 mod p
v ProveCred(vk,m1, . . . ,mq, σ, φ′) → (σ′,Θ, φ′): Parse
σ = (h, s) and vk = (g2, α, β1, . . . , βq). Pick at random
r′, r ∈ F2q; set σ′ = (h′, s′) = (hr
′
, sr
′
), and build κ and ν
as below:
κ = α
q∏
j=1
β
mj
j g
r
2 and ν = (h
′)r
Output (Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv), φ′), where piv is:
piv = NIZK{(m1, . . . ,mq, r) : κ = α
q∏
j=1
β
mj
j g
r
2
∧ ν = (h′)r ∧ φ(m1, . . . ,mq) = 1}
v VerifyCred(vk,Θ, φ′) → (true/false): Parse
Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv) and σ′ = (h′, s′); verify piv using
vk and φ′; Output true if the proof verifies, h′ 6= 1 and
e(h′, κ) = e(s′ν, g2); otherwise output false.
APPENDIX C
ETHEREUM TUMBLER
We extend the example of the tumbler application described
in Section V-A to the Ethereum version of the Coconut library,
with a few modifications to reduce the gas costs incurred and
to adapt the system for Ethereum.
Instead of having v (the number of coins) as an attribute,
which would increase the number of elliptic curve multipica-
tions required to verify the credentials, we allow for a fixed
number of instances of Coconut to be setup for different
denominations for v. The Tumbler has a Deposit method,
where users can deposit Ether into the contract, and then send
an issuance request to authorities on one private attribute:
addr||s, where addr is the destination address of the merchant,
and s is a randomly generated sequence number (1). It is
necessary for addr to be a part of the attribute because once the
attribute is revealed, the credential can be spent by anyone with
knowledge of the attribute (including any peers monitoring the
blockchain for transactions), therefore the credential must be
bounded to a specific recipient address before it is revealed.
This issuance request is signed by the Ethereum address that
deposited the Ether into the smart contract, as proof that the
request is associated with a valid deposit, and sent to the
authorities (2). As addr and s will be both revealed at the
same time when withdrawing the token, we concatenate these
in one attribute to save on elliptic curve operations.
After the authorities issued the credentials to the users (3),
they aggregate them and re-randomize them as usual. The
resulting token can then be passed to the Withdraw function,
where the withdrawer reveals addr and s (4). As usual, the
contract maintains a map of s values associated with tokens
that have already been withdrawn to prevent double-spending.
After checking that the token’s credentials verifies and that
it has not already been spent, the contract sends v to the
Ethereum destination address addr (5).
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